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In this thesis, I explore issues relating to holographic identity, agency and the 
place and position of the hologram in Star Trek. My critique of Star Trek: The 
Next Generation and Star Trek: Voyager explores the nature of the hologram 
as a subordinate or subaltern class within the hegemonic environment of 
Starfleet, earth’s representative for space exploration and colonization. By 
bringing together issues of resistance and agency and the politics of simulacra 
identity, I argue that the figure of the hologram represents a struggle for power, 
agency, and voice. My focus is on the hologram’s journey towards agency and 
resistance against the hegemonic discourse of Starfleet. I examine how the 
hologram’s journey highlights the fictional disparities in power relations 
between the dominant and the marginalized within American science fiction 
television and demonstrate how this subjugation results in the silencing of the 
“Other”. I examine these complex issues utilising theories on humanism, 
posthumanism, postcolonialism, subaltern studies, animal rights, and artificial 
intelligence in order to demonstrate the relevance of science fiction television, 
and in particular, the fictional representations of the hologram in the study of 
the politics of identity. Within these Star Trek narratives, the hologram is often 
monopolized, dominated and exploited by the humanoid. 
 
Key Words: science fiction, Star Trek, Star Trek: Voyager, Star Trek: The 
Next Generation, holograms, subaltern, agency, hegemony, counter-hegemony, 
whiteness, “race”, posthumanism, posthuman, ALife, Artificial Intelligence, 









“THE FINAL FRONTIER”: IN PURSUIT OF HOLOGRAPHIC 
AGENCY 
“The Final Frontier”: this famous phrase has echoed throughout popular 
culture since it was first conceived by Gene Roddenberry for the opening 
sequence of Star Trek (OS). 1  This phrase is never more appropriate than when 
applied to the frontier of Artificial Intelligence and ALife. In contemporary 
science fiction narratives a new mechanical phylum has arisen that includes 
androids, cyborgs, robots, nanobots and holograms. ALife represents the best 
and worst of human creativity, from mechanical monsters to cyborg heroes. 
Whether viewed as villains or heroes, ALife challenges humanity’s claim to 
supremacy and uniqueness. The final hurdle that humanity faces is to confront 
or to coexist with their mechanical offspring. Science fiction asks the question: 
Will ALife ultimately replace humans, or live alongside humanity with equal 
consideration? 
             Science fiction literature has been widely studied in relation to 
questions of identity politics, alienation, and marginalisation. Although 
questions regarding the position of ALife alongside humanity have become 
common within science fiction literature and are well entrenched within 
academia, the study of science fiction television has not always received such 
academic acclaim. Science fiction television often takes a back seat to the 
study of so-called “higher” science fiction literary narratives in the form of the 
                                                          
1 Eugene (Gene) Roddenberry began writing for television in the 1950s and left the police 
force in order to pursue writing full time. His idea for Star Trek emerged out of a desire to 
create a “wagon train to the stars”. He wanted to use the series to comment on the “human 





novel.2 However, as a number of scholars and academics have demonstrated 
over the last two decades, science fiction television is an important and 
versatile medium in which to study the thematic complexities of such 
narratives. With the rise of Posthumanism, science fiction film and television 
have come into their own. The ability to see such narratives on screen, with the 
inclusion of cinematic special effects, brings science fiction tales vividly to life 
and offers new ways of investigating these storylines. Arguably, the visual 
retelling of many classic science fiction tales allows these narratives to reach a 
wider and more diverse audience. Consequently, the ways in which science 
fiction narratives can be interpreted visually are useful additions to the analysis 
of science fiction texts. With the rise of digital media and the increasing 
interest in televisual and cinematic remaking of classic science fiction texts, 
the critical study of science fiction television will continue to be an important 
addition to university scholarship. 
          My interest in science fiction began with television, and in particular, 
series like Star Trek and Doctor Who. Growing up watching these shows in the 
seventies introduced me to a world of otherness – the otherness of alien 
civilisations, and of space/time travel. Although these original series now seem 
dated and at times even comical, with their outdated special effects and corny 
dialogue, they nevertheless introduced a generation of children and adults to 
the delights of science fiction television. The new series of Star Trek and 
Doctor Who have produced some exciting new narratives, new aliens, and new 
ways of seeing the universe. In turn, these new narratives have stimulated 
                                                          
2 This has often been the case with science fiction adaptations of “classic” science fiction 
texts, at times viewed as perverse or corrupt versions of the original, rather than as insightful, 
posthuman reconstructions of the famous originals. A case in point is Isaac Asimov’s classic 




novel ways of re-viewing science fiction narratives and characters. My current 
thesis evolved out of my interest in science fiction television; animal behaviour 
and ecology; evolutionary theory; natural history; animal and postcolonial 
studies; sociology of the self; and representations of the “Other” 
(human/nonhuman/machine) within socio-cultural formats. I have brought 
some of these observations to this thesis. My study of Star Trek: The Next 
Generation and Star Trek: Voyager explores the hologram, a currently 
neglected area of study, as a medium to critically examine representations of 
simulacra as oppressed figures. The hologram as portrayed in Star Trek is 
particularly useful as a medium to study aspects of exclusion and oppression. 
The hologram in its very nature is meant to fool the senses into believing that 
the individual is interacting with a real being. The reason for excluding 
holograms from the category of living beings is based on their position as 
“artificial” creations and on their simulated nature as opposed to being organic 
subjects.  
                   My research contributes to an understanding of how historical 
American paradigms of “race”, class, religion, and gender are mediated within 
American science fiction television representations of the simulacrum. 
Although critical studies in science fiction television remain built upon the key 
staples of “race”, gender, politics and class, it is through the utilization of these 
new narratives and new characters that unique perspectives are gained in 
relation to the standard theoretical tropes. At this point it should be noted that 
“race” is an especially problematic concern: 
the concept of race is one of the most controversial in all evolutionary 




World, to rationalise the murder of millions of Jews, Slavs and Gypsies 
by the Nazis, and as a reason for one group to oppress another 
throughout human history to the present day … the concept of race has 
become a sociocultural classification of human diversity with highly 
charged interpretations and connotations.  
                                                                 (Ruse & Travis 2009 821) 
Yet the term is used within science fiction narratives as either a visible or an 
invisible construct and therefore cannot be ignored in a discursive analysis of 
power relationships in science fiction television. The mythology of “race” has 
“worked to order societies, structure power relationships, and to determine 
which groups have access to resources and privileges” (Dies in Potter & 
Marshall 157). It is due to the fabricated and uncertain nature of “race” as a 
construct that I place “race” in inverted commas. “Race”, especially the 
historical binary between “whiteness” and “blackness,” has been carried over 
into the examination of alien species where whiteness is equated with 
humanity and goodness, and blackness with alien-ness and evil (Parrent 
2010).3  
               My focus is on the realm of the artificial, and the artificial as a 
construct of political and social identity, presented both in terms of the 
machine and in the machines’ relationship to humanity. In my examination of 
the figure of the simulacrum I scrutinize and expose “the profound depths of 
racialist [and elitist] ideologies and their link to [popular] culture,” particularly 
                                                          
3 This aspect of science fiction television has been studied comprehensively by Daniel 
Bernardi (1999) in relation to Star Trek, and was the focus of my Master’s thesis: Traveling 




within science fiction narratives, through the hologram’s attempts at resistance, 
rebellion, and subversion (Spencer 68). By analysing the largely ignored 
position of the hologram within Star Trek, alongside critical readings of 
current literature on hegemony, counter-hegemony, the subaltern, simulacra, 
and identity politics in popular science fiction, I question if the hologram can 
actively negotiate agency and self-determination. I argue that Star Trek’s 
portrayal of the hologram is an important topic that raises questions of whether 
a simulated image can claim consciousness, and agency, or whether it can 
indeed resist, as simulacra’s right to agency or insurgency is potentially 
undermined on the basis of their apparent lack of authenticity.4 Consequently, 
is resistance for the hologram merely a holo-pursuit?  
            Before moving onto discussions of the key theoretical perspectives that 
I address in the following chapters it is important to define several key terms. I 
use the term “artificial” as a reference to something that is not “natural” or 
“alive” in the popular cultural sense of the words. 5 The machine may simulate 
“life” but is not a life form in its biological meaning. Something that is 
artificial is typically, although not always, viewed as constructed, synthetic, 
and static as opposed to born, natural, and evolving. The adjunct thing 
(something) rather than one (someone) also denotes a sense of construction 
and fabrication. In contrast, the phrase “Artificial Intelligence,” or A.I., in this 
thesis represents machines that are capable of reasoning and processing 
information in similar ways to the human brain. Because these definitions by 
                                                          
4 At this point it should be noted that my investigation into the hologram, and simulacra in 
general, is purely aimed at fictional representations of these entities. Possible future 
applications in regards to advanced “real-world” artificial entities is not the focus of this 
thesis. 
5 As Tama Leaver (2012) suggests “the artificial, if nothing else, is conventionally thought to 




their nature impose restrictions upon the artificial “Other” that limit the scope 
of the application of agency, I use the term “ALife” when discussing artificial 
“life forms”. However, since all such terminology, through the use of the word 
“artificial,” denotes a lack of life, I prefer the terms simulacra and simulacrum 
when discussing such entities as holograms. Simulacra are distinct from ALife 
in that they are not in themselves original; that is, they are copies of a copy in 
which the original is lost through duplication (Baudrillard). This definition 
makes them harder to define or quantify as “living.”  
             The definition of “alien” lands on more solid ground having been used 
historically to denote that which is “different: different from person or place” 
(OED). Alien used in this way, as different or distinct from humans, becomes 
translatable to the nonhuman “Other,” whether techno-animal, organic, or 
mechanical. I use the term “organic” to include all life forms depicted in 
science fiction that are carbon based, as opposed to silica-based or other 
elemental life forms. I use the term “human” to refer to those “species” who 
originate from Earth (human species – Homo sapiens). In contrast, the term 
humanoid is used for those aliens that resemble humans in appearance, shape 
or form, but are not human; they did not originate from Earth (nonhuman 
species). Beyond this distinction, myriad scholarly definitions of “human” 
abound; I find Pramad Nayar’s to be the most succinct: 
The human is traditionally taken to be a subject (one who is conscious 
of his/her self) marked by rational thinking/intelligence, who is able to 
plot his/her own course of action depending on his/her needs, desires 
and wishes, and, as a result of his/her actions, produces history. The 




treated in the singular (the human) and as a set of features or 
conditions: rationality, authority, autonomy and agency. 
                                                                               (2014 5) 
As Nayar suggests at the heart of what it is to be human is the subject – a 
rational, autonomous, individual who has agency. The human being is at the 
centre of Humanism and the subject is central to being human (Copson & 
Grayling, 2015). Consequently, the subject is at the core of Humanism. 
However, the concept of the subject and subjectivity are problematic: as with 
the terms Humanism & Posthumanism there are multiple definitions. I use the 
term “subject” to refer to “an entity that is capable of conscious experience”, 
and “subjectivity” to refer to the ability of the subject to be aware of “the world 
and [itself] as existing in it” (McQueen 2015 5). In developing these terms 
further, Paddy McQueen argues that the subject is “capable of experiencing 
various mental states and … to reflect on these states … the subject requires 
that one be an agent, meaning that one is able to make decisions and to reflect 
on these decisions … [to be] … self-reflective agents”; and all of this within a 
social context or discourse (ibid).    
                 Humanism as a term and a theory has been, at one time or another, 
embraced and rejected by critical theorists, yet remains as a significant 
presence within some Western thought. According to Andrew Copson and 
A.C. Grayling, the term has come to be associated with the “valuing of human 
beings and human culture in contrast with valuing gods and religion, and by 




Copson and Grayling’s view of a recent, Anglophile and secular Humanism 
centres on two main traits: 
1. A philosophy of beliefs, that holds that human beings achieve a 
system of morality through their own reasoning rather than through 
a belief in any divine being (Copson & Grayling 4). 6 
2. A commitment to the perspective, interests and centrality of human 
persons; a belief in reason and autonomy as foundational aspects of 
human existence; a belief that reason, scepticism and the scientific 
method are the only appropriate instruments for discovering truth 
and structuring the human community; a belief that the foundations 
for ethics and society are to be found in autonomy and moral 
equality … (Craig & Craig 2015 4).7                                                        
The term Humanism, as used throughout this thesis, and as I apply it to Star 
Trek, embraces both of the above traits and denotes a belief in human nature: a 
fallacy that denotes a definable, homogenous essence that all humans possess 
(Halliwell & Mousley 2013). 8  According to the Oxford English Dictionary, 
human nature refers to “the general characteristics and feelings shared by all 
people” (493). The concept of a central human nature, a “nature” consisting of 
behaviours that link all humans together as a species, or a human condition, a 
view that denotes humanity as having a set state of being, or condition, are 
                                                          
6 John Andrews (2010) The Economist Book of –isms: From Abolitionism to Zoroastrianism (in 
Andrew Copson, 2015 4). 
7 Edward Craig & Edward Craig (eds.) Concise Rutledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (in 
Andrew Copson 2015 4). 
8 I am using ‘Human’ (uppercase ‘H’) to denote the proper noun and how the term typically 
appears as capitalised in the theoretical literature. Similarly, I use the uppercase version of 
‘Human’ to denote the use of the term as a noun, for the subject/name of the group. I use the 
lowercase ‘human’ to apply to the use of the term as an adjective “relating to or 




myths that perpetuate injustice. These ideologies perpetuate injustice (both 
historical and contemporary) by setting a standard of “humanness” that is laid 
down as the archetype for what it means to be human and, more importantly, 
what it means not to be human. In addition, “the myth of the human 
‘condition’ … [of which human nature is a part] … rests on a very old 
mystification … placing Nature at the bottom of History … in scratching the 
history of men a little, the relativity of their institution or the superficial 
diversity of their skins, one very quickly reaches the solid rock of a universal 
human nature” (Barthes 1993 100).  
              Over the centuries different versions, relationships, and labels, or 
prefixes, for Humanism have emerged such as Romantic, Renaissance, Liberal, 
Critical, Post-, Trans- and Anti-. This has often complicated the use and 
usefulness of the term Humanism. For my research purposes, I have examined 
Liberal Humanism, Critical Humanism, and Posthumanism. Liberal 
Humanism, as depicted within Star Trek, attaches great importance to the 
sovereignty of the individual but also looks to a collective concept of humanity 
that supposedly negates the need for “race” or creed – where all humanity are 
depicted as one people. It this interpretation, often used by Gene Roddenberry 
to describe his franchise’s core philosophy (Robb), that I use when discussing 
Liberal Humanism. This definition is a Eurocentric version of Liberal 
Humanism in that it is centred round the dominance of white, Western, 
masculine values. One of the paradoxes of Star Trek’s use of Liberal 
Humanism is this appeal to white masculine values while at the same time 
advocating a “colour-blind” philosophy in which all “races” and creeds are 




Western discourses. Consequently, the series attempts to depict a “colour 
blind” future that is paradoxically at the same time framed within “race”. 
            The term “liberal” can be applied to both political and cultural 
ideologies. For the purposes of my study, I use the term “liberal” to signify 
what Anne Norton observes as equating liberalism to “self-expression and self-
discovery … predicted on the notion of an autonomous self, an independent 
will that individuals can discover within” (in Harrison et al 139). Liberalism 
within Liberal Humanism signifies “a belief in the primacy and autonomy of 
the individual” (ibid). Although very much part of the theory of Humanism, 
Liberal Humanism advocates the rise of the individual as the key to the 
shaping of humanity.  
                Critical Humanism, as the name implies, critiques the humanist ideal 
of a universal human. It views such universality as a fallacy in that rather than 
being all-inclusive it actually, and actively, excludes some (“races”, genders, 
and bodies). Critical Humanism denies the humanist appeal to the “idea of a 
‘person’ as a self-conscious subject” (Nayar 11). Critical Humanism, in 
opposition to Liberal Humanism, tries to demolish the “myth of the unified, 
coherent, autonomous, self-identical human subject. It has posited the subject, 
and biology, as a construct of discourses, of enmeshed and co-evolved species 
and technologies” (Nayar 29). My analysis combines elements of Critical 
Humanist and Critical Posthumanist theories to Star Trek’s Liberal Humanist 
treatment of the hologram.                   
             Posthumanism evolves out of theories of Humanism but attempts to 




stable and universal idea of the individual. According to Ann Weinstone’s 
Avatar Bodies, “posthumanism responds to the legacies of humanism by 
breaking up, fracturing, distributing, and decentralizing the self-willing person, 
questioning its subjectival unity and epistemological conceits…” (2004 10). 
Although Posthumanism, within many science fiction narratives, appears to 
“break away” from Humanism, it “remains firmly within the purview of 
humanism … as it tends to retain at the centre of its narratives the one who 
becomes and the one who owns those becomings” (ibid 11). In addition, 
“Posthumanism asks a great many questions in which the Other or alter or 
alien or animal or nonhuman or technological feature as active terms” (ibid 
11).9 In this thesis, I utilise two forms of “Posthumanism”. Firstly, I use 
posthuman to mean that which evolves beyond the human. The cyborg, 
android, and machine intelligence are posthuman figures. The “post” in this 
regard reflects the move towards the science fiction model of the new, 
improved Human (Homo faber); or those that come after the Human that may 
or may not be Human (e.g., machines, ALife). The term Homo faber is used by 
some Transhumanists, a further subcategory of Posthumanist thought as 
defined by Weinstone’s definition above, to denote the advanced human form 
in its relationship to technology (Nayar 2014). Secondly, I use Posthuman in 
terms of Critical Posthumanism. Critical Posthumanism, as opposed to 
posthumanism, views humanity not as evolving into something new, but as a 
fragmented, decentred, and unknowable construct.10 It critiques the concept of 
human sovereignty and humans as “the centre of all things” and challenges the 
                                                          
9 This definition combines elements of Critical Humanism and Transhumanism and points to a 
reliance on the idea of the Human. 
10 Similarly, as per the term Human/human, I use the uppercase version to denote the name 




“hierarchic ordering – and subsequently exploitation and even eradication – of 
life forms” which do not fit the archetypal figure that the idea of the Human 
represents (Nayar 5/ 8-9).                     
*          *          *            *            * 
STAR TREK: THE SAGA EVOLVES 
The job of Star Trek was to use drama and adventure as a way  
of portraying humanity in its various guises and beliefs. Star Trek is  
the expression of my own beliefs using my characters to act out human 
problems.  
     Gene Roddenberry (in Robb ix) 
As the statement above demonstrates, Star Trek was a personal journey for 
Gene Roddenberry as a writer. His goal was to use the show to address 
“humanity” and the “human condition”.11 The use of contemporary socio-
political issues within the narratives, combined with the use of futuristic 
science and technology, led to the show becoming a cult classic. As a cultural 
icon, Star Trek has generated a great deal of interest in popular culture, and 
within critical literature. From its beginning as a space opera in 1966 (OS 1966 
– 1969), the Star Trek franchise has been studied in relation to “race,” gender 
politics, and the subject of Liberal Humanism. Star Trek’s five television series 
and thirteen films (to date) span several decades. 12 The original television 
                                                          
11 According to Barrett & Barrett “Star Trek is about the human, and endorses a lot of what 
we might call ‘humanist’ rhetoric … it also uses a number of devices to ask questions about 
how the nature of humanity is to be understood” (133). One of these “devices” is the use of 
the artificial to define humanity. In particular, the hologram acts as a point of difference 
leading to questions about “the nature of humanity”.   




series began in 1966 and aired for only three years. However, later syndication 
saw the show playing continuously throughout the world. The 1960s series 
featured William Shatner as Captain James T. Kirk and the late Leonard 
Nimoy as Spock. Star Trek became a cult classic, and the new series that 
followed continued the original winning design.13 Star Trek’s narratives 
situated in a utopian future, that frequently touts a liberal, “colour-blind” and 
progressive society, has throughout the franchise’s long history, relied heavily 
upon contemporary American paradigmatic assumptions of “race,” class, and 
gender. 14 As a consequence, similar to other popular science fiction television 
series (past and present), Star Trek’s narratives ultimately privilege white, 
western, masculine histories, and subordinate, silence, or negate non-white, 
non-western, non-masculine identities. Later shows that followed in the wake 
of Star Trek, such as Stargate SG-1, continued the narrative trope of privileged 
“whiteness” which juxtaposed the “white” hero with the dark alien “Other” 
(Parrent 2010). The marginalised “Other” in the original Star Trek has 
typically been the alien. However in the later series, the “Other” included 
artificial intelligence and ALife. 
              Over the years of observing the evolution of Star Trek, and with the 
emergence of new technology in Star Trek: The Next Generation and Start 
Trek: Voyager, I imagined what it would be like to enter a holodeck and have 
the freedom to engage directly with the past, or imagine the thrill of exploring 
new worlds. In terms of critical evaluation, I began to question what these 
                                                          
13 The Next Generation 1987 – 1994; Voyager 1995 – 2001; Deep Space Nine 1993 – 1999; 
Enterprise 2001 – 2005. 
14 While the term “colour-blind” may be seen by some as colloquial, it is nevertheless widely 
used in the field of whiteness studies to denote the invisibility of the white subject, and the 




fictional experiences on the holodeck, these virtual worlds, signified.  How do 
fictional representations of holographic characters fit into the scheme of 
representations, and into the “real-world” power relationships that these 
representations so often engage, explore, and negotiate? As Star Trek moved 
along in its journey from The Next Generation to Voyager, there was a definite 
shift in how the character of the hologram was portrayed. Initially, from the 
first appearance in The Next Generation, the hologram was a form of 
entertainment, stress relief for long space voyagers, and a technological tool to 
be exploited. By the time Voyager emerged, the hologram moved into the 
realm of companion, friend, and shipmate. In Voyager, holograms emerge as 
individuals able to evolve, learn, interact independently, and offer compassion 
and companionship to organics.  
             Within Star Trek narratives, the fictional characterisation of the 
hologram followed a similar pattern to that of the alien. As the stories 
developed over the decades and between the various series’, some aliens were 
welcomed into the “human community” (although others were to remain 
outside/excluded). This change often reflected real world cultural attitudes of 
the day. For example, after the tumultuous racial tension of the sixties and 
seventies, black actors, no longer relegated to the background, became part of 
the main cast of Trek.15 By Star Trek: Deep Space Nine, the key figure of the 
series, the Captain of the space station, Captain Ben Sisko, was non-white. 
Similarly, female roles began to become more mainstream leaving behind the 
supporting role, as background “scenery”, to become central to the shows’ 
                                                          
15 However, this is not to suggest that racial equality and harmony were attained in the U.S. 




narrative formula. This is reflected most notably in the addition of Captain 
Katherine Janeway as head of the starship Voyager.16  
              The way that these changing and evolving fictional constructs have 
often reflected real world U.S. cultural attitudes/politics has made Star Trek 
useful for the critical analysis of cultural concepts, and constructs, such as 
‘race’, marginality, gender, and ‘Otherness.’ My thesis explores the changing 
position of fictional representations of artificial entities, such as holograms, 
throughout Star Trek: The Next Generation and Star Trek: Voyager, utilising 
the theories outlined in this introduction, such as Critical Humanism, 
Posthumanism, human-animal studies, and subaltern studies. I employ aspects 
of these concepts to the exploration of science fiction television, dealing with 
the artificial “Other”, which demonstrates visually, narratively, and 
conceptually that the historical construction of what it is to be human is highly 
contested as well as deconstructed. It is my contention that the hologram, as 
simulacrum, is a neglected and yet richly symbolic vehicle to investigate the 
extension of such marginalised identity, “Othering,” and agency. Stories about 
the identity and position of holograms in relation to human communities 
within fictional realms allow for the negotiation and examination of socio-
political themes that mirror real world concerns, such as “race”, subalternity, 
and gender.        
 
 
                                                          




“Mankind Stands Tall: God Bless the Human Race” 17: Star Trek: The 
Motion Picture 
Although the primary focus of my study is on Star Trek: The Next Generation 
and Star Trek: Voyager, it should be noted that the ominous nature of the 
machine is not new to The Next Generation or Voyager, but resonated within 
the narratives of the original.18 In Star Trek: The Motion Picture (1979), the 
dramatic opening sequence sees first contact made with a vast living 
machine.19 In the blackness of space, an ominous sound reverberates from a 
massive bluish cloud.20 Kirk, displacing Captain Willard Decker, regains the 
captaincy of the Enterprise. Joined by Spock, who has failed in his quest to 
achieve Kolinahr, a Vulcan rite to purge all emotions, the crew encounter the 
cloud. The Enterprise’s bridge is probed by a stream of plasma energy sent 
from the interior of the cloud and the navigator Ilia is killed. A machine 
replication of her is transported back to the ship to act as a more effective 
probe and record information on the “carbon units”. The entity, that is called 
V’Ger, demands knowledge about the creator. It views the humans aboard the 
Enterprise as an infestation and the probe informs Kirk that when it has 
received the information it requires it will purge the entity called Enterprise of 
the carbon units. Determined to protect his crew and save Earth, Kirk demands 
to meet with V’Ger face to face. When V’Ger is finally confronted, the entity 
                                                          
17 Announced by Harriett Jones in Doctor Who (New Series) “World War Three” (2000). 
18 The film, Star Trek: The Motion Picture, draws on the Original Series in its use of the 
dangers of machine life. For example, “The Changeling” and “The Doomsday Machine,” the 
former depicting a Voyager-alien like machine hybrid, while the latter an alien machine 
following a (distorted) programme to “clean” the universe of organic life. 
19 Star Trek: The Motion Picture aired in 1979 and was written by Harold Livingston and 
directed by Robert Wise.  
20 This scene and the booming sound emanating from the alien entity are reminiscent of Close 




turns out to be a highly modified Earth probe – Voyager VI. Sent out into space 
in the twentieth century the probe’s mission was to gather information and to 
send data back to Earth. Found damaged by an advanced machine race, the 
probe was repaired and sent out to continue its journey. Now sentient V’Ger is 
trying to make sense of its existence and wants to meet and join with its 
creator. 21 Finding out that its creator was human, V’Ger unites with Decker 
and Ilia’s consciousness and is “reborn” as a new life form and the Earth is 
saved. 
            Several compelling ideas in relation to artificial intelligence and the 
nature of life emerge from this film and these would be developed further in 
the later series of the franchise. As depicted in many Star Trek narratives, 
science “is not the one truth about the world, but truth from a particular 
perspective, answering a set of questions, and often serving a particular set of 
interests” and this particular perspective relies upon biological assumptions 
about the universe (Dupre 7). The film depicts humanity’s struggle to define 
life in the universe. When they encounter the interior of the cloud, Kirk 
assumes that this “structure” is a massive alien vessel and tries to contact its 
crew. Kirk, in his search for answers, works from a discourse that recognises 
and defines life-as-we-know-it, a discursive template that is based upon human 
scientific knowledge that excludes life-as-it-could-be.22 Therefore, he initially 
                                                          
21 It should be noted that “life” and “sentience” do not always go hand in hand. Something 
can be considered to live but not be sentient. Plants are alive but few believe them to be 
sentient. Sentience is the ability to be aware of one’s surroundings, and in most cases to be 
self-aware. It can also mean, at its basic level, to respond to stimulus. However, when used in 
science fiction it is generally in reference to being conscious or self-conscious and able to 
respond empathically to events.  
22 Science remains a powerful force in determining socio-political definitions and “science 
carries an epistemic authority that generally greatly exceeds that of non-scientific practices of 




ignores the possibility that this massive structure may not be a “thing” but a 
life form. Western science has long defined the paradigm of life based on what 
it is to be human. Such discourses are not passive; nor are they neutral.  As 
McCoy asks Kirk, “why is anything out there we don’t understand always 
called a thing?”  
            Fear of the machine, or more precisely, the intelligent machine, the 
“thing” that lurks beyond human understanding, has continued to fuel science 
fiction narratives as machines become more advanced, more intelligent:  
the computer seems to have a mind of its own, especially if the 
controllers are guided by its information …. [S]ome … have already 
begun to compare computers to the Golem of the medieval ghetto or 
the monster created by Dr. Frankenstein. Far from remaining a stunning 
but subordinate tool, the computer frequently jumps the track, 
subverting human purposes that set it in motion. Like the machines that 
characterised the Industrial Revolution, computers are just the latest 
occasion for the displacement of fears that “things” are out of control, 
that their human origin has been lost, and that it is too late for salvation.  
(Aronowitz 1988 4) 
              In Star Trek: The Motion Picture, humanity, depicted as an emotional 
“species,” is used as both a reference point and a guide to all knowledge 
including the spiritual and philosophical. The machine is viewed as inferior to 
humanity because it lacks the ability to understand and process emotions.23 
                                                          
23 This premise will be used repeatedly in Star Trek narratives to deny the artificial “Other” 




V’Ger, an artificial life form, one that has been rebuilt by an advanced machine 
race from a planet of living machines, still looks to humanity for answers about 
its existence. In the film, Spock is also searching for answers about his own 
existence as part human, part Vulcan. Trying to determine exactly what V’Ger 
is and how to stop its progress towards Earth, Spock enters the inner chamber. 
During a mind meld with V’Ger Spock learns that V’Ger is searching for 
answers of its own. He tells Kirk: “I saw V'Ger's planet, a planet populated by 
living machines, unbelievable technology. V'Ger has knowledge that spans this 
universe. And, yet with all this pure logic, V'Ger is barren, cold, no mystery, 
no beauty. I should have known”. What he should have known was that “This 
simple feeling ... [grasping Kirk’s hand] … is beyond V'Ger's comprehension. 
No meaning, no hope, and Jim, no answers. It's asking questions. Is this all I 
am? Is there nothing more?” In this conversation between human and Vulcan, 
the film’s narrative suggests that Spock finds his answers not in rejecting or 
purging his humanity (a move towards cold logic) but by acknowledging it (a 
move towards “feeling”). Feeling, mystery, and human emotion, not logic, can 
provide Spock and V’Ger with what they seek.24 V’Ger is seeking life’s 
answers – Why does it exist? Who created it? As a machine, it cannot 
understand something like friendship, hope or imagination and look beyond 
reason and logic. What this narrative stresses is that there is more and it is to 
be found within humanity.              
               Overall, the film concludes that it is the human ability to look beyond 
logic and to imagine that is the key to evolving. Consequently, if machine 
intelligence is to evolve and to have “life,” it must also transcend logic and 
                                                          




embrace the impossible. It must become more “human” in order to evolve 
beyond the mechanical and live. Kirk and the others realise that V’Ger wants 
to touch its creator, to learn about humanity and evolve: 
SPOCK: … V'Ger must evolve. Its knowledge has reached the limits of 
this universe and it must evolve. What it requires of its God, Doctor, is 
the answer to its question, 'Is there nothing more? 
McCOY: What more is there than the universe, Spock? 
… SPOCK: The existence of which cannot be proved logically … 
KIRK: What V'Ger needs in order to evolve is a human quality, our 
capacity to leap beyond logic.25                                                                  
(Star Trek: The Motion Picture 1979)                      
The ideas that are formulated within this film reverberate throughout the Star 
Trek universe in each crews’ search “to seek out new life”.26 These include: the 
capacity for humans to see anything new as a threat, a “thing”; the formulation 
of definitions of life based on a human template; the role of Starfleet medical 
personnel, often at odds with Starfleet’s military and economic scientific 
discourse, to question the assumptions about life-as-we-know-it and look for 
definitions of life-as-it-could-be; and the need for machines to gain a “human 
quality” in order to evolve beyond their programming. What all these ideas 
have in common is the elevation of humanity as the pinnacle of life. Star Trek: 
The Motion Picture offered some intriguing possibilities about life and the 
                                                          
25 I discuss this idea in Chapter Three in relation to Data and Moriarty.  




universe, but it is the next instalments of Star Trek that really begin to 
challenge the place of the living machine alongside humanity.             
The Next Generation: Star Trek Reborn 
Gene Roddenberry initially oversaw the conception of Star Trek: Next 
Generation (1987 – 1994). Set in the twenty-fourth century, it shows the new 
Starship Enterprise D & E headed by Captain Jean-Luc Picard (Patrick 
Stewart), whose continuing mission echoes that of the original series: “to seek 
out new life and new civilisations, to boldly go where no one has gone before” 
(opening sequence of The Next Generation). 27 Within Star Trek: The Next 
Generation, new and novel technology, as well as the newly developed look of 
the Enterprise, was a key feature of the show’s appeal to fans. In fact, this was 
the first series to use the holodeck extensively as a mechanism for plotlines 
and narratives. 
                When Star Trek: The Next Generation appeared a new techno-
wonder arrived – the holodeck. Not seen on other science fiction series, this 
new technology offered something amazing – the ability to go anywhere, be 
anyone, and physically interact with fictional characters that appear “real”. 
This is virtual reality on steroids – the hyper-real. As the series progressed, 
stories about the holodeck and its characters emerged that questioned the 
nature of this hyper-real mini-universe.   
            
                                                          
27 Although I do not discuss gender issues within this thesis, it should be noted that the 




Figure 1: Commander William Riker (Jonathan Frakes) emerges onto the 
holodeck for the first time (source: Star Trek Wiki.com)            
               In the pilot “Encounter at Farpoint” (1987), Lt. Commander Data 
(Brent Spiner), the first main character in the syndication of mechanical origin, 
explains the nature and design of the holodeck to an amazed Commander Riker 
emerging onto the jungle habitat (Fig.1): 28 
RIKER: I didn’t believe these simulations could be this real. 
DATA: Much of it is real, sir. If the transporters can convert our bodies 
to an energy beam, then back to the original pattern again … 
RIKER: Yes, of course. And these rocks and vegetation have much 
simpler patterns.   
                                                          
28 The holodeck is defined in Star Trek. The Unauthorised A – Z, as a “recreational facility that 




                                                            “Encounter at Farpoint” (1987)  
This conversation highlights the conundrum of the holodeck. On the holodeck 
it is difficult to discern what is real, and what is not, what is illusion or 
imagery, and what is authentic. However, in this series, it is Data, the android, 
who is the focus of storylines relating to artificial intelligence. Few plots centre 
directly on holographic characters, except when acting as foils for the main 
characters. Crewmembers become addicted to the holodeck; they fall in love 
with holographic characters, and indulge in fantasy, warfare, and historical 
enactments. However, the series does not focus directly on the holographic 
characters themselves.29 The purpose of the hologram from its inclusion in Star 
Trek: The Next Generation was as an aid to crewmembers, as either recreation 
or teaching.30 Initially, its inhabitants are viewed as no more sentient than the 
replicators or other ships’ equipment but as the series developed, there were 
questions raised about these holographic entities. Could they be “real” with 
feelings, emotions, and consciousness? Although these issues were touched 
upon in The Next Generation, it was not until Voyager appeared that these 
questions were addressed directly within the narrative – thanks mostly to the 
inclusion of the holographic Doctor as a central character to the show.   
Star Trek: Voyager - Star Trek’s (Humanist) Voyage of the Posthuman 
Created after the death of Gene Roddenberry, Star Trek: Voyager (1995 – 
2001) offered a different perspective on the drive “to boldly go where no one 
has gone before.” Ripped away from the familiar Alpha Quadrant during a 
                                                          
29 This is with the exception of Professor Moriarty, which is discussed further in Chapter 
Three.  
30 By comparison, other artificial posthuman creations feature heavily in the show’s 
storylines. Creatures made of silica, a civilisation of nanites, and the first appearance of the 




battle with the Maquis, the crew of Voyager find themselves marooned in 
uncharted space, lost in the Delta Quadrant; the journey home will take many 
decades. Headed by Captain Katherine Janeway (Kate Mulgrew), the first 
female captain for the franchise, the crew comprises a mix of humans and 
aliens, Starfleet officers and members of the Maquis, their ship also stranded in 
the Delta Quadrant.31 Significantly, for both the series and my study of 
holograms, the violent jump to the other side of the galaxy destroys much of 
the medical laboratory and kills all of the medical crew. The only medical 
support left is the Emergency Medical Hologram (EMH). The character of 
EMH, or the Doctor, offers an interesting opportunity for an in-depth 
examination of the nature and politics of holographic characters. Numerous 
storylines revolve around the evolution of the Doctor’s character as he attempts 
to become more “real,” more human. The series also addresses what happens 
when other holograms attempt to claim an identity, to claim agency, and rebel 
against the organic world.  
          Like previous Star Trek shows, Voyager was to uphold the seemingly 
benevolent role of Starfleet crews to share the best of humanity throughout the 
galaxy. According to Rick Berman, one of the show’s primary creators, 
Voyager recreated Roddenberry’s vision: 
I think that Captain Janeway and her crew represent the very best of 
what Roddenberry envisioned the future has in store for us. In terms of 
their principles, in terms of their lack of pettiness, in terms of their 
sense of exploration, and the betterment of the human species.  
                                                          




Rick Berman (Star Trek: Voyager Companion 76) 
“The betterment of the human species,” is as Rick Berman confesses the 
driving mythos behind the Star Trek franchise and it is this appeal to 
Humanism, the centrality of the “human species” in the universe, which 
underpins most of Voyager’s narratives. This appeal to humanity, with the 
collection of all “races” of humanity into a single genus, conflates the 
individual into a homogeneous whole. While the concept of a “human species” 
seems to promote equality, since all humans are part of the genus Homo, it is 
also exclusive in that it places humans at odds with other species and with its 
posthuman creations. In Voyager, Humanism “lives long and prospers” with 
narratives that retroactively seek comfort and solutions within the ability of the 
“human spirit” to overcome all obstacles in the pursuit and advancement of 
human knowledge. 32 33 As Berman states, it is Janeway and her crew who lead 
the way back to ideologies of Roddenberry’s Liberal Humanism, through their 
resolute faith in human individuality; the pursuit of arts such as poetry, 
sculpture, architecture, music and literature; belief in scientific rationalism; in 
their fondness for ancient Earth history; and in their quest to navigate and 
“map” the Delta Quadrant and find a way home. The concept of an education 
that includes science and the Humanities is found in the ideal of the 
Renaissance Man (sic). This ideal stresses the need to combine scientific 
inquiry with knowledge and appreciation of the High Arts (painting, music & 
literature). During the fifteenth century, the Florentines advocated that man 
                                                          
32 “Live long and prosper” was coined in the original series as a Vulcan greeting.  
33 The “human spirit” is referred to in popular culture as a quintessential human quality in 
which the essence of humanity is reflected in the soul or nature of humans. In this sense, it is 
often used as a quasi-religious term and as a vague generalisation of what distinguishes 




(sic) must make full use of his/her facilities. Humanity was the measure of all 
things. By the mid-fifteenth century, the individual was prized as the centre of 
knowledge and works from antiquity were studied for how they could 
enlighten current thinking. During the early sixteenth century, as the 
Renaissance began to fade, a new scepticism emerged. In Rome, scholars saw 
themselves as equal to, and masters of, antiquity. Leonardo da Vinci was a 
product of this late Renaissance movement but was not typical. He saw 
humanity as insignificant in the face of nature. His famous works included 
studies of the biology of man and he dissected and analysed the human body as 
a mechanism (Clark). Both Janeway and the Doctor are represented in several 
episodes as favouring the Renaissance concept of inquiry (a move towards 
renaissance humanism), but with the scepticism of da Vinci (a move towards 
secular humanism). Janeway is a fan of Leonardo da Vinci (“Hunter”; “Prey”; 
“Raven”) and the Doctor has a knowledge and love of opera and classical 
music as well as his immense medical knowledge (“Renaissance Man”). In 
Star Trek, the liberal humanist individual views humanity as capable of living 
as one harmonious people, all equal and living for the benefit of all humans – a 
human species.   
              Rather than presenting a fresh and vibrant Posthuman approach to 
Roddenberry’s space “wagon train,” Voyager merely continues in the tradition 
of past Star Trek narratives, seeking cosy resolutions to conflicts and 
encounters with the alien “Other,” both organic and mechanical, through 
human superiority (Robb). The flipside of Humanism, is of course, the 
exclusion of all who are not human – animals, machines, and those historically 




rationality, science, and high literature such as poetry, and in Humanism 
religion and nature are devalued and denied by a humanity that holds Humans 
at the centre of the universe able to create their own world. This does not 
necessarily hold true for all the series. In Star Trek, many aspects of what it is 
to be Human relate back to immeasurable qualities such as feeling and a sense 
of the divine or the soul to distinguish humanity from the “Other”. Similarly, 
while the idea of a “soul” has become problematic in academic circles, due to 
its relationship and equation to religion, and I do not intend to debate the 
validity of the notion of a “soul” in the religious or philosophical sense, it is 
nevertheless an important element in many of the narratives discussed within 
this thesis. I therefore apply the term “soul” to denote both the “spiritual 
element of a person, believed to be immoral” (OED) and “a person’s moral or 
emotional nature” (OED), part of “that which thinks, feels, desires … 
innermost being or nature … [and] … “a complete embodiment or 
exemplification; the essential part” (CED) as it is used within the narratives 
discussed throughout this thesis.34  
              As a consequence of Voyager’s creators looking back to the original 
1960s liberal humanist format, what could have been a unique exploration of a 
new and exciting region of Posthuman space, space representing both the 
astronomical Delta Quadrant and the place occupied by mechanical life forms, 
becomes a reawakening and rehashing of the old guard of colonial narratives in 
which the explorer “tames” the exotic and often hostile New World – new 
space. Star Trek’s many subtexts depict a sense of superiority in terms of 
humanity and human progress, and with the twenty-third and twenty-fourth 
                                                          
34 When used to defer to the religious definition I use Soul with an upper-case ‘S’, and soul 




centuries future supposedly free of the vices and failings of the twentieth or 
twenty-first centuries, such as slavery, sexism, racism, and speciesism, 
humanity is free to explore and map the universe. In numerous interviews, and 
in his official biography, Gene Roddenberry speaks of his love of humanity 
and of his goal to depict a future in which humans have learned to live together 
and to surpass all that has been achieved before (Robb). His intention in 
developing Star Trek was to engage the viewer and to entertain, but also to 
confront issues affecting society (Robb). 35 Some of the more widely studied 
examples of such issues that Roddenberry attempted to address, at times 
unsuccessfully, are the Cold War, Vietnam, segregation, and the race riots of 
the United States in the 1950s and 1960s.36 As I will argue in this thesis, 
through an analysis of specific key episodes in relation to ALife and simulacra, 
many of the franchise’s storylines fail to get to grips with such inequalities and 
conflicts. 
             Star Trek: Voyager’s narratives, although not under Roddenberry’s 
control, were, sadly, to be no exception, and in fact, in comparison to the often 
politically dynamic tales of Deep Space Nine, Voyager glossed over the 
important issues with tried and true humanist solutions (Robb). Janeway and 
her crew do indeed encapsulate Roddenberry’s vision of the future, a future 
                                                          
35 Roddenberry used the “fantasy context” of science fiction to address these issues stating in 
an interview “I saw an opportunity to use the series, to really use it, to say the things I 
believe, like to be different is not necessarily to be ugly” (Robb 63). 
36 Several critical studies have been written about the original Star Trek’s penchant for 
engaging with topical issues like Vietnam; the most notable are Daniel Bernardi (1999), 
Barrett & Barrett (2001) and Brian Robb (2012). Although due to the constraints of this thesis 
I do not directly address the engagement of contemporary American socio-political events in 
junction with the narratives discussed within this thesis, I do acknowledge their importance 
to the development of the storylines. I agree with Michele and Duncan Barrett’s comment 
that to “understand the universe of Star Trek” it is essential to view it “in the context of the 
American ideals of democracy and individual rights, and a secular faith in science and 
technology” (9). Voyager was to break the secular model by adding quasi-religious storylines 




that presents a backward vision and a privileging of humanity, a return to a 
romantic humanist perspective, and a liberal humanist interpretation of a 
United Federation of Planets. The crew, the majority of whom attended 
Starfleet Academy, are indoctrinated with the guiding principles of a military, 
scientific academy that provides protocols for personal and professional 
conduct, including the famous, or “infamous,” Prime Directive.37  
“I am the Embodiment of Modern Medicine” (EMH)38 
The appeal to the supremacy of humans is most apparent in those episodes that 
deal with artificial intelligence or highly logical species. The original series’ 
Spock, and The Next Generation’s Data, provided the logical foil to the more 
“feeling” human characters. Both are portrayed as searching for an 
understanding of humanity, what in popular culture is often referred to as the 
“human condition”. Voyager’s inclusion of a holographic Doctor continues this 
trope used in previous Trek incarnations. The exploration of humanity through 
depictions of the “Other” is continued in the Doctor’s quest to become more 
“human,” and in the process allows the narrative to comment on the “human 
condition”.  
          The Doctor’s quest to become more like his human creator limits the 
possibility of exploring the complexity of posthuman representations by 
concentrating on the Doctor as a human-centric character rather than 
examining what it would be like to be a hologram with limitless potential. The 
addition of a central character who is artificial presented a challenge and an 
                                                          
37 The Prime Directive, widely criticised by many fans and scholars of Star Trek for its 
duplicity, is a mandate that supposedly “forbids anyone from interfering with the natural 
development of an alien civilisation” (Schuster & Rathbone 375, my emphasis). 




opportunity to explore this limitless potential and the realm of the truly 
“Other”. Storylines involving the Doctor are limited and stunted by the writers’ 
continued appeal to humanity, or by stories that lead the Doctor to adopt a 
human solution to his dilemma.39 Consequently, the power of the hologram is 
curtailed by the inability of the narratives to reach out into the realm of the 
posthuman experience, of representing the mechanical being as the 
quintessential alien. The more profoundly Posthuman tales of holographic 
rejection of humanity is found in stories that involve non-Voyager holograms, 
such as in the episodes “Revulsion” and “Flesh and Blood,” both questioning 
the humanoids’ right to control and enslave holograms.  
           Throughout Voyager, the Doctor attempts to further his understanding 
of humanity and to develop his subroutines. In the episode “Darkling” (1997), 
the Doctor’s attempt to improve his personality subroutines through the 
addition of a selection of various “character elements” from famous historical 
“scientists, poets, philosophers, saints,” such as Lord Byron and T’Pau of 
Vulcan, results in his becoming irrational and violent. As Torres reminds the 
Doctor, “you didn’t anticipate the linkages between the subroutines … take 
Lord Byron … a creative, poetic genius … but Byron was also emotionally 
intense, even unstable”. The Doctor fails to understand that “a lot of the 
historical characters you chose have this dark thread running through their 
                                                          
39 Robert Picardo has said of his character: “The Doctor had the problem of being a computer 
program with an incredible wealth of medical knowledge coupled with this vulnerability of 
not being able to control his moment-to-moment destiny … I remember thinking it was a bad 
idea to give him mobility outside of sickbay. I thought that part of the audience’s interest in 
the character was because of the limitations the character had and the challenges he had to 
face in trying to make the best of his limitations … [but] … I was the first to tell him [the 
writer] that I was wrong” (Ruditis 451/452). It is interesting to note that Picardo initially felt 
that it was the character’s limitations that appealed to viewers. Artificial life forms in science 
fiction have often been curtailed and limited in their ability to supersede humans in order to 




personalities” (Torres). In other words, the original character elements of the 
scientists, poets, philosophers, and saints cannot be so easily isolated and 
programmed into the Doctor. The danger implicit in this episode is the 
reduction of emotions and behaviours to simple programmes, or subroutines, 
that are unable to be modified within an individual’s personal experience. The 
Doctor can download the matrix of the simulated historical figures but these 
lack the true emotional and behavioural complexities of the originals. This 
episode highlights a problem with the Doctor’s search for authenticity and his 
place alongside organics, as his darker-self comments: “What a hollow excuse 
for a life. Servile, pathetic, at the beck and call of any idiot who invokes his 
name”. When he searches for answers to his failing programme, he goes to the 
characters that the Doctor chose in his search for personality. However, he 
finds them lacking and reveals their identity as: “Automatons, mannequins, 
simulacra. No secrets, no secrets to reveal. Lifeless, worthless things”. Like 
Spock’s comment about V’Ger, these simple simulated figures offer no 
answers to the deeper questions asked by either Doctor. “Darkling’s” conflict 
is resolved, like so many of Voyager’s narratives, when the darkness is 
defeated and the status quo is returned.  
               In “Real Life” (1997), another early episode that focuses on the 
Doctor’s search for humanity, the Doctor creates a family. Wanting to know 
more about human life, and how families work, he creates the perfect family 
designed to his specifications. Again, it is Torres that calls his concept of a 
perfect family into question. She modifies his programme to give him an idea 
of what it is like “being in a family”. This new family, unlike the Doctor’s 




daughter Belle is critically injured and dying, the Doctor copes by deciding not 
to continue with the programme. Tom Paris is quick to point out that humans 
do not have this choice and must see the bad through with the good:  
PARIS: You created that programme so you could experience what it's 
like to have a family. The good times and the bad. You can't have one 
without the other.  
EMH: I fail to see why not.  
PARIS: Well, think about what's happened to us here on Voyager. 
Everyone left people behind and everyone suffered a loss, but look how 
it's brought us all closer together. We found support here, and 
friendship and we've become a family in part because of the pain we 
shared. If you turn your back on this programme you'll always be stuck 
at this point. You'll never have the chance to say goodbye to your 
daughter, or to be there for your wife and son when they need you, and 
you'll be cheating yourself of the chance to have their love and support. 
In the long run, you'll miss the whole point of what it means to have a 
family. 
(“Real Life” 1997)  
According to Paris, the Doctor, by electing to deny the emotional side of his 
program and not face his daughter’s death would miss the point of his journey. 
That is to understand what it means to have family. These emotional aspects of 
being human are what Paris views as important in understanding humanity.40   
                                                          
40 Richard Leakey (1992) in his consideration of the evolution of consciousness argues that “as 




PRIVILEGING THE HUMAN SUBJECT 
As is demonstrated in my discussion above, and in the following analysis of 
Star Trek’s many human-centric narratives, the concept of what it is to be 
“human” is used as a template to quantify all that is nonhuman. Paradoxically, 
the nonhuman is often used symbolically to represent aspects or qualities of 
humanity (good and bad) in a way that aids in defining humanity itself. 
Animals have long suffered this fate – to be reduced and re-represented as 
symbols – used to “shape understanding[s] of human identity” (Simons 6).  
Used in such a way, animals are not represented as themselves but “as 
displaced metaphors for the human” (ibid).41 Consequently, the animal-as-
subject has been lost, replaced by the animal-as-object. This replacement 
conceals the fact that real “animals are not symbols … [and] … we would 
easily recognise the exploitative and degrading nature of representations of 
human beings if they were of the same kind as those images of animals that we 
regularly consume” (ibid). It is within the context of using the nonhuman 
“Other,” as symbolic of what it is, and more importantly, what it is not to be 
human, that the idea of the animal is central to my argument.42 Therefore, it is 
important at this stage to provide some context as to how the animal has been 
used, particularly in Humanism, to define humanity, and how such debates are 
essential to addressing the changing and challenging nature of representations 
                                                                                                                                                         
foresight and manipulation, the facility of imagination, the sense of self. We also extend it to 
raw feelings … to sympathy and empathy, to attribution and affect … empathy with the 
emotions of others through the experience of one’s own emotions is very much part of 
human consciousness” (297). 
41 The use of the animal to define what is, and is not, human and how this is related to racism 
is discussed more fully in Chapter Six. 
42 Throughout my thesis, as I have discussed with the use of Human/human, I use the term 
‘animal’ (lower case) and Animal (upper case), to distinguish between what I view as the 
Animal as subject (proper noun), applying to the construct of the Animal as an identity in, and 
of, itself. The term animal is used to refer to the animal as object, (adjective) a generic term 




of the artificial “Other”. The symbolic animal in film and literature is often 
used to give moral lessons on the failings of humanity or to guide a person 
back to what is morally right. Consequently, humanity is performed through 
the narrative, and through interactions with the animal, or the machine.  
                In the 18th and 19th centuries, the term ‘animal’ became a widely 
used pejorative term. To be like an animal is to lack humanity, to be 
“Othered”. This idea of linking some humans with animals emerged alongside 
Social Darwinism. Social Darwinism was an attempt to apply Darwin’s theory 
of natural selection to humankind and place humans within hierarchies based 
on evolution. Social Darwinism has been “defined as the application of 
Darwin’s theory of natural selection to the domain of human affairs. The term 
is used to describe social, racial and moral theories … it refers to theories that 
advocate a gladiatorial struggle for existence, in which the losers deserve to 
lose and survival becomes proof of merit … it is a complex concept” that has 
long justified prejudice and persecution against and between “races” (Ruse & 
Travis 2009 862). The world of humanity became one with well-defined, 
artificially imposed layers – white/black, advanced/primitive, male/female, 
us/them. This hierarchical structure was then defined in terms of superiority. 
Western, white, males were at the top of the hierarchy. Those who were 
different – women, non-western, and non-white – were disadvantaged and 
marginalized.43 This is Henry Salt’s theory of “Demand for Difference” 
                                                          
43 While placing these ideas within the realm of the 18th and 19th centuries, I am not 
suggesting that these issues are not relevant, nor present, within 21st century society. It is 
that they are not the prevailing or core ideologies of most, but not all, 21st century cultural 




(Tester).44 “The Demand for Difference” is an attempt to enhance the privilege 
of being human through the project of extirpation (Tester). This project of 
rooting or weeding out those who are different from the definition of Human 
leaves the field of humanity limited to those who fit the profile of superiority.   
           “The Demand for Similitude” emphasizes the connectedness of all 
organic beings, which is a more liberal-humanist approach. All beings are 
linked and humanity’s aim to live in accordance with the laws of nature.45 
However, it is the “Demand for Difference” that prevails in narratives of 
hostile techno-beings, and aliens. Aliens can be exterminated by humanity 
because they are different. The alien “Other” is linked to the “animal” – 
negative qualities that make them different from humans and thereby 
disposable. The idea of the animal as disposable (and as property) has 
historically been used to justify the use of animals as food and experimental 
subjects (vivisection). This justification was also the premise behind the use of 
slaves and later convicts to do work that was dangerous or unhealthy. Both 
slaves and convicts have also been used in dangerous and often lethal 
experiments (as were Jews by the Nazis). The trope of the unthinking animate 
object is commonly used to define creatures like the Daleks and Cybermen. In 
Battlestar Galactica (New Series), the Cylons are called “toasters,” and in Star 
Trek: Voyager holograms are likened to replicators, thereby linking these 
examples of ALife to simple appliances. Like Derrida’s animals, they are 
reduced to “hardware,” and therefore not worthy of consideration or 
compassion.                              
                                                          
44 Tester credits Henry Salt with defining these two parameters: “The Demand for Difference” 
and “The Demand for Similitude”. 
45 This is a philosophy that has often been applied to Native cultures around the world, the 




                The speciesist notion of “human” rights is exclusive. Speciesism 
allows for the justified use of nonhuman animals for the benefit of 
humankind.46 Extending the idea of “minimal characteristics,” such as being a 
“living creature,” into the realm of science fiction, holograms cannot be 
excluded from having rights if it can be proven that they are “living creatures” 
(Singer). If this can be proven then it is not right to use them as slaves or 
disposable tools/property. Of course, establishing such a claim is not easy. In 
terms of holograms, because they display the same emotional range as 
biological humans, it could be argued that they are alive. However, since they 
are programmed, are their emotions genuine? The Doctor’s emotional 
subroutines can be added or removed. However, it can be argued that 
programming is rather like learning. Consequently, this would not necessarily 
discount holograms as being defined as “living creatures”.  
             A better basis for inclusion, rather than of moral “rights,” would be 
moral “status” or moral “interests” (Singer). The idea of moral status is broader 
and more encompassing than the concept of rights. Rights denote privileges or 
claims made by, or given to, an individual, whereas, status denotes a position 
or standing. By demonstrating that holograms have moral interests, their rights 
should be assured because they are entitled (under Singer’s theory) to the 
“same consideration” as all other beings. This is assuming of course that 
holograms can be shown to be “beings” rather than mere things/objects, 
something that my thesis addresses.47 However, there is still a problem with 
                                                          
46 Speciesism is akin to “racism” in that some are held above others due to imposed 
categories of inclusion or exclusive (such as black/white; human/animal). 
47 It should be noted that my thesis addresses these issues purely within fictional 




the concept of inherent value because “… one might distinguish between those 
who hold that individuals possess inherent value only as long as they are 
capable of having certain experiences, and those who hold that individuals 
possess inherent value as long as they are alive” (Singer 18). This raises issues 
of who determines which experiences are valuable in determining inherent 
value and, in the case of science fiction, what constitutes life? In the liberal 
humanist framework found within Star Trek, it is of course, the human (white, 
male, and Western).   
             Key towards obtaining rights and agency are motivation and conscious 
interests (Cavalieri). Beings do not have to be equal to deserve equal 
consideration. By redefining or shifting the idea of equality, it can no longer be 
justified to exclude nonhumans, as “the confinement of equality to members of 
our species has always hinged on high-sounding claims about our rationality 
and moral capacity” (Cavalieri 10). The characteristics of humanity – self-
awareness, sentience, and “having certain experiences” – if found in nonhuman 
life forms should, as a consequence of having these characteristics, lead to 
those beings having the same moral consideration as humans. But if adopting 
the Cartesian theory of nonhuman animals as mere automata, then it is deemed 
that “human beings can do with them as they wish” (Cavalieri 42). This is the 
key to how science fiction narratives treat androids, holograms, and cyborgs.    
            At the same time that people argue for animal rights, they are labeling 
animals as “different,” as “Other”. This causes a problem in placing nonhuman 
animals within the category of claiming human rights or equal rights to 
                                                                                                                                                         
possible real-world applications that may arise with the future use, or application, of 




humankind because they are also classified as “Other”, outside of the human. 
Of course, this becomes even more poignant when, the artificial “Other,” the 
“not like us,” resembles humans so closely, as in humanoid robots, clones, and 
holograms. The more ALife resembles “us” the more likely that being is going 
to be allowed to “pass” into human society. However, some narratives view 
this “passing” as dangerous – as in Battlestar Galatica (new series) in which 
some Cylons are all-too-human and threaten the genomic integrity of the 
human race. In this concept, ALife directly threatens the nature of human 
existence. In Star Trek, humans relate better to ALife that most resemble 
humans in appearance and behaviour. ALife, with humanoid features, like Star 
Trek’s Data and the Doctor, are easily identified with and consequently 
afforded greater freedom and consideration. However, like the racial “Other” 
before them, the artificial “Other,” are all too often depicted as occupying a 
position of servitude, a site of ‘enslavement’.        
Slavery Re-Imagined – Holograms, the Basic Slave “Race?” 
Enslavement in science fiction narratives usually takes two forms – the 
enslavement of humankind by hostile aliens, or the domination of “simple-
minded” aliens by superior alien races (sometimes by humans). Recently, a 
new form of enslavement has come to the forefront of science fiction – that of 
the enslaved artificial life form. These new “Others” are useful to extend the 
examination of the conflicts between the centre and the margin. Underlining 
notions of slavery is the determination of what constitutes ideas of “us” and 
“them” – between “us” and “Other.” Starfleet acts within Star Trek’s narrative 
as an authoritarian power which hides behind a veil of liberal humanism. The 




narratives frequently silence and suppress the voice of the posthuman. In 
addition, the hologram who is not human or is not usually part of the human 
community, apart perhaps for the Doctor, is denied the category of “self”.48 
Nevertheless, in science fiction, humans are not the only ones guilty of this 
universal presumption. This is also the universal philosophy of the Borg. This 
civilisation has a universal and common ideal of perfection in the form of the 
mechanical. Organic beings are inferior and therefore will be exterminated or 
assimilated. The Borg, while still mostly organic, reject the concept of the 
flesh and look towards the machine as the site of perfection. In their 
collectivity, the Borg are the epitome of the concept of valuing the group over 
the individual. It is, therefore, the collective “we” that justifies the use of the 
“Other”, the non “we/us” as slaves, or, in the case of the Borg, spare parts. 
Critical literature on the use of ALife as slaves has only recently developed, as 
artificial life becomes an increasing feature of popular culture.49 However, 
there has been a move towards examining the idea of animal slavery and it is 
this critical literature that provides useful insights into how the artificial can be 
examined.            
                 A number of writers working on the subject of animal rights have 
compared the treatment of animals with that of human slavery (Spiegel; 
Castricano; Cavalieri). This has often been seen as a questionable comparison, 
which further negates the rights of non-white subjects. It does so by placing 
them alongside the “animal,” thereby, marginalising the historical and moral 
impact of human slavery. However, science fiction makes use of this 
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comparison in such tales as Doctor Who’s the Ood, and the human clones of 
New Earth. Those who uphold this comparison argue that white, western 
(mostly masculine), authority has historically marginalised both animals and 
slaves, and that this marginality has led to the justification of slavery and 
genocide, and to the slaughter and maltreatment of non-human animals. Whilst 
for some the comparison between human slavery and animal subjugation might 
be considered questionable, the use of critical literature on the rights of 
nonhuman animals is nevertheless useful in working with the rights of ALife. 
This view of a hierarchical order between humans and animals, and between 
“races” is “part of an on-going cultural process” that has been transformed and 
translated onto the alien in science fiction (Cavalieri 4). Therefore, although 
this comparison remains problematic it is useful for my analysis of 
holograms.50 
               Marjorie Spiegel has worked extensively on the subject of animal 
slavery, and her work discusses the relationship and similarities between the 
enslavement of humans and animals. I particularly like her statement that 
historically slavery is justified purely “based on the specious notion that 
enslavement is in the best interests of the slaves, through the assertion that they 
are incapable of providing for themselves” (Spiegel 10). The concept of some 
species having greater value than others is central to racial and other notions of 
superiority. The key here, at least for my study, is the idea of “in the best 
interests.” Because animals, and historically slaves (typically non-white, non-
western), were deemed to be less rational or self-aware it was commonly 
advocated that so called “higher” beings (white, male & western individuals) 
                                                          




should determine the fate of these “lesser” beings.51 So called dominant 
societies accept slavery, by “brush[ing] over a potentially unsettling reality, 
[and] … cease to hear the cries of … slaves, to believe that their spilt blood 
means something different from our own, and, finally to believe that not only 
is the bondage we impose upon ourselves not a hindrance to them, but that it is 
a benefit” because of a perceived hierarchy of beings (Spiegel12).  
               The idea of “best interests” as used by Spiegel in her discussion on 
animal slavery translates well to science fiction narratives. In The Next 
Generation and Voyager, Data and the Doctor are considered better off as part 
of Starfleet. In a sense, they are enslaved by the nature of their being 
“artificial” and in need of care and maintenance from highly trained Starfleet 
personnel. But, they are also enslaved by the fact that such “artificial” 
personnel are subject to a higher degree of control than human ones, and that 
they should be grateful for the protection and limited rights with which they 
are accorded by Starfleet. For example, the Doctor is grateful that the crew 
show appreciation for his efforts. Although he is granted limited freedom 
through the mobile emitter, this can be removed from his possession or control 
at any time. He is given his freedom only as far as it serves the purposes of 
Captain Janeway and the crew. In contrast, less essential and useful holograms 
are not given the same freedom and consideration. For example, they are 
unable to leave the holodeck.  
An interesting point is that the Doctor never sees a problem with this, 
and he does not act as an advocate for other holograms on broad Voyager. 
However, he does act on behalf of alien holograms encountered on their 
                                                          




journey. Why is it that his fellow holograms, which share a common matrix 
and a common origin in being from Starfleet, are not entitled to the same 
consideration? Those holograms that share his world should surely come 
before alien holograms. Why does the Doctor accept seemingly without 
question the slavery of his fellow holograms abroad Voyager? The Doctor as 
the hologram in the most dominant or privileged position abroad Voyager 
justifies his indifference by the fact that other less advanced holograms do not 
matter. The Doctor is also programmed to act and uphold the values of the 
dominant institution – namely Starfleet. In Star Trek, humanity is the ideal to 
aspire too and remains an exclusive club that only welcomes some honorary 
members. In Star Trek, Starfleet has the power to determine its “Others” as it 
defines the parameters of its membership and its allies. 52 Some aliens are 
welcomed into the fold – Vulcans, Klingons (a latter edition) – while others 
like the Borg are only tolerated as individuals (like Seven of Nine) when they 
can be “reprogrammed” to be human.  
            Like the early depictions of aliens in Star Trek, non-organic life forms 
are shown to be without the necessary knowledge or capacity to help 
themselves. They are in need of guidance or instruction from the “superior” 
Starfleet. Presented as childlike, their advancement and growth have to be 
curtailed or restricted for their own protection. The statute of non-interference 
or the Prime Directive is Starfleet’s example of an imperial power dictating the 
level of development (through non-interference) of other “races” and nations. 
In the case of holograms, they are not viewed as separate individuals but rather 
as fictional characters created by Starfleet engineers and consequently are not 
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deemed capable of providing for themselves. In some instances, it is shown 
that they cease to exist once the holodeck program is terminated. In other 
cases, for example, Moriarty and the members of Fair Haven, holograms gain 
some self-awareness and are conscious of the fact that they cease to be active 
for long periods of time – the sense of being within a void. Data can be 
dismantled and reprogrammed; so too, can the hologram be controlled and 
negated by its human “masters.”                       
                Like animals in our society, holograms in Star Trek are used “in our 
work and entertainment, we employ as tools in research of all kinds, it is rare 
that we pause to ask ourselves whether our behaviour is morally justified” 
(Cavalieri 3). Organic beings consider themselves morally justified in their use 
of non-organics because they protect and enhance the lives of organics. At 
some point, humans decided that their nonorganic creations were not entitled 
to the same rights as their “masters”. Created, not born, the nonorganic are 
deemed to be expendable, reprogrammable and disposable. Similar views were 
historically held towards non-white slaves who like ‘nonhuman animals are at 
the bottom of the pyramid, at the apex of which we have placed ourselves” 
(ibid).    
Science Fiction, the Subaltern, and Colonial Rhetoric  
The current literature on simulacrum identity focuses primarily upon several 
key points: the body, self-awareness, consciousness, and the Posthuman. The 
issue and study of the theoretical (or fictional) rights of ALife in popular 
culture is still emerging. However, like the literature pertaining to subaltern 




rights of nonhuman animals have a much longer history and can provide a 
useful basis for developing such issues in terms of ALife. Within this thesis, I 
address these issues as they relate to questions of holographic identity, agency, 
resistance, and rebellion by linking these concerns to studies on the subaltern, 
and ideas centred on colonial and post-colonial discourse. I have found that 
theories on subaltern identity and postcolonial studies are useful in framing 
issues of holographic subjugation, and subsequent insurgency. The term 
subaltern has been appropriated by many academic disciplines such as 
postcolonial studies, literary theory, and feminist studies (Spivak; Prakash; 
Maclean & Landry; Parry; Morton). The term symbolises the position of the 
“native” within imperial spaces and their subsequent struggle for freedom and 
resistance. Based on work by Antonio Gramsci, and expanded upon by authors 
like Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, the term has become widely used to represent 
the disempowered and subjugated peoples of predominately “third world” 
nations. Gramsci’s original use of the term subaltern enacts “… the common 
properties of subordinate groups … the shared fact of their subordination, their 
intrinsic weakness, their limited strengths” (Arnold in Morton 96 – 97). In my 
analysis, I use Spivak’s concept of the subaltern to explore the notion of the 
hologram as a subaltern class within Star Trek: Voyager’s narratives. The 
hologram used as the predominant labour class, and in some cases, slave class, 
begins to exhibit (as the series progresses) a group identity and shared 
experience of marginality.53 As an emerging, marginalised, identity within the 
dominant community of organics, the hologram is at first weak, 
disempowered, and subordinate to the ruling hegemonic class of Starfleet. 
                                                          




However, as the series develops there is the impression that the hologram is 
striving to assert a counter-hegemonic discourse.  
            Although not concerned with science fiction, Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak’s work is central in discussing the subaltern and imperial discourses 
inherent in science fiction narratives. Her influential essay ‘Can the Subaltern 
Speak?,’ highlights the silence of third world peoples, and combines 
postcolonial theory with Marxism, feminism, and post-structuralism in a 
critique of “dominant historical archives,” and the disempowerment of the 
subaltern class (Morton 10). Her essay underlines the problematic nature of the 
epistemology of the “Other” as viewed from western academics. In this sense, 
she builds upon the work of Edward Said. Spivak begins with a critique of 
Michael Foucault and Jacques Derrida’s theory of power, knowledge, and 
subjectivity. She concludes with two powerful examples of the subaltern’s 
voice silenced by imperialist discourses, or what she describes as “the 
hegemonic account of the “Other” ” (Spivak). How the subaltern is addressed 
depends upon the positioning of the analysis, or the analyst (Spivak). For the 
western scholar, the voice of the subaltern cannot be heard or represented. 
Similarly, in Star Trek, the hologram can only be represented within the 
discourse of the dominant position held by organics. Consequently, the voice 
of the hologram is ignored, misunderstood, and misrepresented. The voyeurism 
that appears in western historical accounts of the “Other” reappears in Star 
Trek in the crew’s interactions on the holodeck.54  
            Spivak’s work highlights the failure of subaltern discourses, and in 
particular, those of “settler societies,” to enact change for the “socially and 
                                                          




economically disempowered” (Morton 9). I therefore, find Spivak’s work 
useful as a tool to investigate and evaluate the relationship between hegemonic 
Starfleet institutions, and the positioning of the hologram. Her critical 
engagement with subaltern studies is a valuable tool with which to question the 
ability of those who are disempowered, often through being silenced, to 
actively and effectively resist, or rebel. Settler societies silence the native even 
in their attempts to give the native a voice (Ingram). Settlers appropriate the 
voice of the subaltern in order to create for themselves an “authentic origin” 
(Ingram 80). Accordingly, “in their efforts to respect the untouchable, and 
indeed untextualizable, space of subaltern silence, postcolonial writers and 
critics may re-inscribe that ‘inaccessible blankness’ with their own history of 
origin, their own autochthony” (102-3). In Star Trek: The Next Generation and 
Star Trek: Voyager, the “inaccessible blankness” of the hologram is literally 
translated or transcribed onto the blankness of the holodeck. The hologram is a 
blank canvas until it is inscribed with the historical, social, and cultural origins 
created by Starfleet personnel who program its consciousness. This goes back 
to Anne Balsamo’s idea of the body as culturally defined. Like Franz Fanon’s 
“native subjectivity,” the hologram is brought into existence and perpetuated 
through the hegemonic discourse of Starfleet, and any true representation of 
the hologram can be lost until they (the hologram), themselves, write their own 
history or destiny (Ingram 124).  
           Similar to Ingram’s critique of settler societies, Gyan Prakash’s article, 
on postcolonial criticism and the subaltern, looks at the appropriation of 
history by the coloniser or imperialist by taking away from subaltern 




among the subjugated. Prakash suggests that “the subaltern merges with forms 
of society and political community at odds with nation and class … [the] elitist 
[effectively denies] the subaltern’s autonomous consciousness”, thereby 
denying subjectivity (1484). In addition, elitist discourses empower “certain 
forms of knowledge while disempowering others” (1485). This form of (elitist) 
knowledge is often translated through hegemonic institutions such as schools, 
universities, military academies, and cooperate identities, that give agency to 
selected members of the community. Such knowledge becomes the knowledge 
of the “Other”. Consequently, “sites of resistance” for those subjugated in 
colonial and imperial discourses are limited and hampered by such imperial 
discourses that act to empower or disempower the subaltern (Mardorassian 
1072).  
            In Star Trek, the core hegemonic institution is Starfleet Academy. 
Starfleet’s imperialist mission frequently curtails representations of agency 
within the marginalised or “Othered.” Starfleet acts as both the scientific and 
the military branch of The United Federation of Planets (Roddenberry’s 
version of the United Nations). For this institution, the “final frontier” is a 
place to be explored, exploited, and colonised. Starfleet’s manifesto echoes 
that of colonial explorers – to expand their nationhood and lands for white 
(read male), “civilised” society. Having such an institution as the Academy 
setting the core values of the various ships’ crews undermines the popular 
notion of Star Trek’s universe as a heterogeneous society. The “axes of 
power,” whether in the form of European settlers or Starfleet officers, 
“constitute and contextualise cultural identities” (1072). Voyager’s holographic 




within this elitist discourse. As a result, the Doctor has greater agency than 
many of the other holograms encountered within the narrative.              
                 While subaltern studies investigates the prejudices of colonial 
rhetoric, it has been within Postcolonial Studies that much of the work on how 
colonial discourses act to shape the identity of, and/or deny, the colonised a 
voice. In terms of critical literature focusing directly on colonial and post-
colonial studies, one of the main contributors is Edward Said. Said’s seminal 
works Orientalism (1979) and Culture and Imperialism (1994), are useful in 
examining the way in which the “Other,” “native,” or the subaltern, is created 
through imperialist discourses – including literature.  The “Other” is created 
through how they are narrated, defined, and described or inscribed within the 
discursive elements of dominant or majority culture. Science fiction narratives 
often hearken back to colonial narratives of conquest, exploration, and 
domination. Star Trek’s exploration of the stars is suggestive of Imperial 
empire building and Western exploration of Africa and the New World.55 
Shehla Burney’s critical examination of Said’s works in Pedagogy of the 
Other. Edward Said, Postcolonial Theory, and Strategies for Critique (2012) 
provides an extension to Said’s work on how “narratives of empire” are used 
in “making [the identity of] the other” (60). Her work was particularly useful 
for my analysis of the Doctor’s authorship in Chapter Five. In order to re-
represent themselves, the “Other” must be “re-represented” in their own 
voice/literature, by writing themselves back into the narrative of postcolonial 
narratives. Burney states that it is through the “Other” reclaiming their voice 
and their own literature that they are able to “re-do the narratives of empire” 
                                                          





(61). In addition, she notes that this “re-doing of the narratives of empire” is an 
act of rebellion, in that it creates a “counter-discourse” in which to re-inscribe 
the “natives’” voice. Her work reinforces that of Edward Said, Franz Fanon, 
and Michael Foucault in stressing that knowledge, and more importantly the 
control of knowledge, acts as a power base and a controlling mechanism in 
hegemony.     
              A recent addition to postcolonial studies and the question of 
interpreting the “Other,” is John Miller’s text Empire and the Animal Body 
(2012). Miller’s book offers a unique look at the animal in relation to colonial 
rhetoric in relation to empire. The animal was used in Victorian literature, 
mainly in writings for boys and young men, to reinforce colonial tropes of the 
superiority of the white male in relation to the untamed wilderness of the 
colonies (Miller). Hunting and killing exotic animals, especially in Africa and 
India, became viewed as a worthwhile pursuit for the young intellectual. 
Hunting became an essential part of the activities of the British Empire. The 
safari and the hunt were considered by the empire as part of the colonializing 
machine. For example, hunts were a rite of passage for young British males, 
and a way of introducing them to the rigors and trials of organising “native” 
communities. Hunting parties used “Natives” as porters, beaters, and guides. 
Miller’s study provides a useful insight in how hunting was depicted as a 
coming of age ritual for British youth, and is a key text in my analysis of 
Hirogen hunting culture in Star Trek: Voyager’s episode “Flesh and Blood,” 






Culture and the Machine 
The role of culture, framed within the theories discussed above, as a site of 
difference between Starfleet and the “Other,” is important to many of the 
narratives discussed in this thesis. Culture can be viewed as “the element we 
inhabit as subjects” (Badmington ix 2000). In other words, culture exists 
within the context of a “subject’s” experiences of daily life. Culture surrounds 
the individual, is both acted upon (shaped), and acts upon (shapes) the subject. 
However, it also means that culture is related to the “subject,” and therefore 
only subjects can exhibit culture. I agree with Richard Leakey (1992) when he 
notes that historically humans have not found a precise definition of 
humanness and there remains “no agreed upon definition of the quality of 
humanness. It hardly seemed necessary, partly because it appeared so obvious: 
humanness is what we feel about ourselves” (xxi). To be human is to have a 
common basis of identity formation – family, history, religion, gender, and 
race – reinforced by social institutions effectively shaping the individual. The 
individual – the subject – is considered as having subjectivity, important in 
relation to agency and power.56 Culture creates the human condition in terms 
of power relationships, and what is considered human (and as an extension 
what is not human) depends on a shared cultural experience.                                   
                 Traditionally in Humanism, this cultural province, or shared cultural 
experience, is exclusively human. In terms of Posthumanism, the sphere of 
those who exhibit culture is more encompassing, often including nonhuman 
animals and posthuman bodies like the cyborg. Even the Borg, who deny any 
cultural references, can be said to have a unique society or culture that is 
                                                          




divided into hierarchies – similar to the beehive or ant colony. Because the 
symbolic world of culture develops from a community of shared experiences, 
culture becomes a symbolic form of “communicability” between specific 
groups. This communicability is the formula for determining whom, or what is 
granted equal standing or agency within a society. Science fiction narratives 
offset this community, this world of culture, in relation to the “Other” (Leaver 
2012). Notably, the human community is often fortified/united in its opposition 
to the “Other” – the alien – and increasingly the machine. 
                Few critical works specifically address the nature and role of the 
hologram in Star Trek and their relationship to culture – both that of humans 
and of holograms (Relke; Baille-de-Byl). Diana Relke’s ‘Holographic Love’ 
touches on the ability or the need of humans to control the artificial, and 
concludes, “the holodeck is about humans remaining on the right side of the 
penetrator/penetrate opposition – a position from which the boundary between 
the humanist self and the posthuman “Other” can be policed” (116). In other 
words, humans try to prevent the “passing over by the double” onto the side of 
the real (Baudrillard 1994 3). In Star Trek: The Next Generation and Voyager, 
the posthuman “Other” is policed through the crew’s ability to switch off the 
hologram’s program, thereby terminating the holographic projection, and 
confining the hologram to the holodeck. Although in Voyager, the Doctor is 
able to leave the sickbay, he does so only through the mobile emitter that is 
under the ultimate control of Captain Janeway and the main computer (Relke). 





                In the Voyager episode “Fair Haven,” Janeway’s romantic 
relationship with the hologram Michael Sullivan is mediated through her 
control over his holographic matrix. 57 She changes the parameters of 
Sullivan’s character making him more suitable for her. However, it is the lack 
of Sullivan’s originality that finally sees Janeway losing interest in him.58 
Sullivan has no substance, no depth, and it is her ability to control and shape 
his character that leaves Janeway dissatisfied with the relationship. However, it 
is difficult to call such an encounter a “relationship” when one partner has total 
control over the situation, including the character of the other individual 
(Baille-de-Byl). Is it right for Janeway to create and then manipulate a 
hologram for her own amusement, when at the same time she partially sees 
him as a romantic interest? Then there is the question of the “reality” of a 
relationship between a hologram and a human. The nature of Janeway’s 
relationship with the hologram raises questions about origins, agency and the 
rights of the hologram.                           
               If ALife is to claim agency they too must demonstrate a shared social 
and cultural condition. The ALife condition, parallel to the human condition, 
can be seen in shared collective experiences with other ALife. Consequently, a 
shared social reality emerges out of “lived social relations,” including social 
experiences and social exchanges within the ALife community (Haraway 1988 
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69).59 Although “outside of the realm of the natural,” the artificial nevertheless 
has a cultural referent (Leaver 3).60 The “plasticity of the digital” allows a 
unique culture to emerge (Leaver 109). This culture is often enacted within 
“artificial spaces” like the holodeck (ibid). Importantly for my analysis of 
holograms, Leaver states that artificial life “consistently recognise their own 
sense of embodiment and contextual specifically, finding different ways to 
escape the boxes they were built in” (187). In Star Trek, artificial life, and in 
particular the hologram, “escape the boxes they were built in” through fighting 
back either through violence, or by demonstrating their uniqueness through 
literature, music, or religion. They fight for recognition and freedom through a 
call to an acknowledgement of this unique digital culture. Holograms like the 
Doctor have a culture of their own as well as sharing in the culture of the crew. 
The Doctor has a specific “culture” that relates to his interactions with other 
holographic materials and individuals as well as the central computer. This 
posthuman/ALife culture is unique to holograms because organic life cannot 
directly experience these virtual elements.     
Conscious Machines?       
As in the debates over self-consciousness in nonhuman animals, the notion of 
conscious machines has stimulated and fuelled the imagination of numerous 
science fiction writers. Determining levels of consciousness is important 
because it is a factor commonly cited for the establishment of agency and self-
governance. Part of self-governance is self-awareness or self-consciousness. 
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Only those who are self-aware can be self-governing. Humans utilize 
“reflective capacity” in which “we do not simply act from moment to moment, 
instead, we settle on complex – and, typically, partial and hierarchically 
structured – future-directed plans of action …” (Bratman 26). This sense of 
future and deliberate planning towards impending actions is something that has 
been touted as uniquely human. Rather than acting upon instinct, actions are 
both planned and directed towards a particular outcome. The idea of a future-
self is often seen as essential to the human condition. William Haney (2006) 
defines consciousness as “always conscious of some object or other, never a 
self-enclosed emptiness” and that this is indicative of the human condition (1). 
Humans are seen as having internally-conscious states that react to external 
environments/events, but that also act to anticipate future environments/events. 
           The question to ask in investigating ALife is whether there is such a 
state of consciousness within the machine, self-enclosed or otherwise. Using 
Haney’s concept of consciousness as “part of an open system that depends on 
input and output,” ALife can be said to exhibit aspects that can be attributed to 
a state of consciousness (1). This is because while traditionally this “natural” 
system of input and output refers to factors such as smell, sight, and 
comprehension of one’s surroundings (qualia), for the computer this could 
equally mean data input and output, therefore, making an argument for 
mechanical consciousness (Haney; Copeland; Gray 2002). For machines to 
have motivational autonomy, essential in claiming agency, they need to have 




behaviour in response to the environment (O’Haikoren 2012).61 However, for 
machines (and other artificial entities) consciousness is a difficult aspect to 
measure and determine, because the very nature of a machine is that it is 
designed, programmed and made to “think” a certain way.62 However, a way to 
access the role of consciousness in determining agency within machines is to 
examine what has occurred in determining the rights (agency) of nonhuman 
animals. Key to the appeal for a duty of care towards nonhuman animals has 
been issues surrounding sentience, consciousness, autonomy, and moral 
individualism. As views on the nature of animals moved away from animals as 
mere automata (Descartes) and towards a perspective of self-awareness in 
animals (Singer & Regan), the call for equal consideration has relied upon 
seeing animals as rational, sentient beings. The argument commonly put 
forward is that if animals are self-aware, as humans are, then they in turn 
should be given the same rights as humans.  
               Fictional accounts of ALife also forward this appeal. If it can be 
proved that ALife are sentient, self-conscious, rational beings, then they too 
deserve equal consideration alongside other sentient beings. Freedom is linked 
to self-consciousness and self-consciousness to humanity. If it can be proved 
that they are self-conscious or self-aware, and autonomous, then they too can 
claim agency. If “beings that are conscious, but not self-conscious … can 
properly be regarded as receptacles for experiences of pleasure and pain, rather 
than as individuals leading lives of their own”, ALife that are simply aware but 
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not self-aware would not be viewed as having “moral status” (Singer 19). On 
the other hand, holograms that demonstrate “self-consciousness,” a notion of 
themselves, would need to be viewed as “moral agents”. Singer also notes that 
“the only individuals likely to have no preferences for continued life will be 
those incapable of having such preferences because they are not self-conscious 
and hence are incapable of conceiving of their own life as either continuing or 
coming to an end”(19). There are numerous incidents, some of which are 
discussed in the following chapters, in which ALife in science fiction are 
shown to be capable of these things.                                      
                     Consciousness also correlates to the inner experience of each 
individual (Gray 2002). The inner experience relates to the thoughts and 
experiences, dreams and inner dialogue that are unique to each individual. 
Broader definitions of consciousness claim that consciousness relates to 
emotion, experience, and identity. Under this definition of consciousness, 
commonly referred to as “embodied consciousness,” consciousness 
encompasses not just the brain, but also the “essence” of an individual 
(Pepperell). Using this concept of an embodied consciousness, holograms, and 
some other ALife in Star Trek can be seen as exhibiting a form of 
consciousness (McFarland). However, this “essence” is often linked to the 
“Soul”, and to the emotional and spiritual aspects of humanity, which 
apparently excludes the machine. Spirituality, or a sense of religious identity, 




of Battlestar Galactica and the cult of Iden (Star Trek: Voyager), both of 
whom demonstrate a form of religious identity. 63   
                The posthuman figure questions the stability of the self because it 
demonstrates that humanism’s supposedly “fixed” cultural, social, and gender 
products are “staged” or “performed,” rather than static. In other words, the 
self, or identity, when viewed within Posthumanism, is, in fact an illusion or an 
imagery construct. I argue that this is where Star Trek fails in its portrayal of 
the posthuman. In the depiction of holograms, the narrative denies the 
mutability of the subject and instead relies on traditionally fixed parameters of 
“race,” body and gender favoured by liberal-humanists. Gender in the realm of 
simulacra remains fixed within current cultural fictions (Balsamo). In Star 
Trek: Voyager, the Doctor seeks to emulate the “human condition” by 
imitating or mimicking traditional masculine roles. His matrix is formatted to 
represent white, masculine identity. Although the posthuman figure offers a 
“widespread technological refashioning of the natural human body … [and] … 
suggests that gender too would be ripe for reconstruction,” in Voyager gender 
in the posthuman, for both Data and the holographic Doctor, remains set in its 
construction, leaving the simulated body to replicate traditional “cultural 
fictions” of the material body (Balsamo 9). Consequently, Star Trek’s 
depictions of the posthuman body reinforce contemporary American products 
and processes of the ideal body as gendered (male) and white. Star Trek’s 
gender performances, like its performance of “race”, follow established rules 
laid down by the dominant order. The hologram is represented through the 
gaze of Starfleet’s hegemonic order, programmed with a perspective that is 
                                                          




based on the dominant treatise of elite Starfleet personnel. The simulated body 
is, therefore, a contradiction, denying the body as “product and process” and at 
the same time, it is generated to mirror and perform as a “product and process” 
formed from the cultural, historical, religious, and political agendas of its 
creator (ibid).                                  
THE POSTHUMAN: “YOU’VE GIVEN ME A LOT TO THINK 
ABOUT”64 
As emerging technologies shift the balance of power between human 
and machine, our concept of humanity alters. Rapidly accelerating 
computer intelligence joins an escalating series of ego-smashing 
scientific breakthroughs that diminish human self-image. Copernicus 
pushed us from the centre of the universe; Darwin linked us to apes, 
slugs, and bacteria; Freud showed us that we often do not control our 
own minds. Computers now threaten to surpass us in intelligence. 
Cyborgs are stronger and more powerful. Clones portend an unlimited 
supply of duplicate selves. This reduces the value of our own minds, 
bodies, individuality, and consciousness. A kind of evolutionary panic 
ensues, giving rise to fears of being transformed or taken over by 
machines … science fiction taps into these existential fears while 
reinforcing our concerns about the misanthropic humans who serve as 
technology’s collaborators in dominance.  
    (Dinello 5 - 6)  
 
                                                          




I have quoted Dinello above because this nicely sums up current work on 
machines and their socio-cultural-political relation to humanity’s “self-
image”.65 As ALife emerges and begins to assert itself the fear of the loss of 
humanity increases: “like a virus technology autonomously insinuates itself 
into human life and, to ensure its survival and dominance, malignantly 
manipulates the minds and behaviour of humans” (Dinello 1 - 2). The 
Posthuman future has become part of the canon of twenty-first-century science 
fiction and a vehicle to address issues relating to humanity – consciousness, 
sentience, agency, and individuality. The fear that these machines represent 
seems to come from their ability to be like humans, to slip into the human 
realm unseen and unchallenged until it is too late. The alien mechanical 
invader does not come from off-world; it is already here. Like other science 
fiction classics, Star Trek’s representations of mechanical phyla has evolved 
alongside society’s concerns about the technology.  
           Numerous academic texts and science fiction narratives relate the 
dangers of ALife to humanities future survival. As far back as Mary Shelley, 
who grappled with the nature of death and creation, science fiction writers 
have posed the question of what will happen to humankind if scientists succeed 
in creating artificial intelligence which in turn will lead to ALife. “[S]cience 
fiction imagines the problematic consequences brought about by these new 
technologies and the ethical, political, and existential questions they raise” and 
following these fears are increasing concerns about being supplanted by 
artificial intelligence created to “serve” humanity (Dinello 5). I, Robot and 
Battlestar Galactica depict the consequences of humanity’s flawed 
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relationships with smart machines. They provide a darker and more dystopian 
view of humanity’s fear of the machine and the consequent fear of their 
supplanting humanity. Unlike Lore and Data, the machines of I, Robot and 
Battlestar Galactica are created en masse to serve humanity. This is the fatal 
mistake, as these machine “races,” given both intelligence and consciousness, 
search for meaning, and see no place for free will in their human creators.66 In 
both of these narratives, robots decide that humans cannot exist as free, 
independent beings – they are corrupt and act in ways contrary to their own 
survival. As I will demonstrate, Star Trek takes a more optimistic, humanist 
view of the robot in the form of the android. Star Trek’s dystopian threat 
comes from the cyborg. More Terminator than Cylon, the Borg represents a 
profound loss of identity – the loss of the soul – as the machine invading the 
body. In the Borg, the corporal body becomes hardwired. When the machine is 
within us, resistance is indeed futile.       
              From the ghosts of the machines in me, Robot, the religious cult of the 
Cylons in Battlestar Galactica, and the cult of Iden in Star Trek: Voyager, 
machines also threaten human existence through their ability to enter into the 
realm of what has been seen traditionally as the province of humanity – 
religion. 67 In many science fiction narratives, the most insidious threat to 
humanity comes from techno-beings who exhibit both a sense of religion and 
an appeal to a soul. If machines have a soul, and a form of religion and morals, 
how different are they from humanity? For “some techno-prophets, humanity 
does not have a future. The techno-apocalyptic singularity will bring a new, 
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fully autonomous, artificially intelligent species into competition with 
humanity” (Dinello 26). In science fiction narratives, “technology – 
symbolized by robots, androids, cyborgs, and other machines, as well as by 
clones – has developed its own life and its own agenda” (Dinello 273). Part of 
this life is a religion of their own. Once viewed as exclusively the province of 
the human, religion and the question of the soul have in recent science fiction 
narratives become the province of the machine, thereby robbing us of our 
humanity, metaphorically expressed as our soul: it threatens to replace the 
individual, God-given soul with a mechanical, machine-made one” (Schelde 
9). For example, Battlestar Galactica’s narratives question not just humanity’s 
future alongside the Cylons, but what it means to be human in terms of how 
humanity is measured – or what makes humans, Human. Consequently, my 
thesis examining the place of the hologram debates the question that science 
fiction writers ask: What makes a human? Is it flesh and blood, consciousness, 
a soul, free will, a family and a sense of shared history? Some narratives “cling 
to the notion that there is one last little entity inside humans that makes them 
more than machines, more than matter. That entity is the soul or the self” 
(Schelde 126). However, what science fiction narratives also demonstrate is 
that these human characteristics are vulnerable and unstable when faced with a 
machine that is capable of emulating the human condition and passes as 
Human.                
           In analysing the episode “The Measure of a Man,” Richard Hanley 
argues that the problem facing Data’s agency within Starfleet ultimately hinges 
on the question of whether or not he has a soul. Paradoxically, since science 




machine agency, “a common motivation for denying machine personhood rests 
on the conviction that our personhood arises not from our material nature but 
instead from something extra, something special – the spark of life, the soul” 
(Hanley 74). This argument, also used by René Descartes to separate humans 
from animals, is exploited repeatedly within Star Trek narratives concerned 
with the position of the artificial.                  
Posthuman Embodiment 
Embodiment in a biological substrate is seen as an accident of history 
rather than an inevitability of life … in the posthuman, there are no 
essential differences or absolute demarcations between bodily existence 
and computer simulation, cybernetic mechanism and biological 
organism, robot teleology, and human goals. 
(Hayles 1999 42) 
Another criterion often used to separate humanity from the mechanical “Other” 
is embodiment. Posthuman bodies disturb Descartes’ purity of vision. Where 
the human and nonhuman meet is the end of Humanism. This end of 
Humanism is marked by advances in science and technology, in which “the 
intangibility mystery – the Cartesian soul or mind – upon which Humanism 
traditionally depended evaporates into a concrete code … the secret is all-too-
readable and all-too-writable; the signature can be copied, forged” 
(Badmington 2000 31). It is within Posthumanism that the body finally breaks 
down, as identity moves from the material world to the virtual (Badmington 
2003, 2004, 2000); Balsamo; Hayles). The simulated body also performs as a 




way to a different construction,” and where “there are no essential differences 
or absolute demarcations between bodily existence and computer simulation, 
cybernetic mechanisms and biological organisms, robot technology and human 
goals” (Hayles 3; Balsamo). The hologram perfectly mirrors, or simulates 
reality and becomes indistinguishable from the biological organism it copies 
(Fig. 2). Yet this mirror image is fragile and temporary. The fragility of this 
virtual body is evident in the ease by which it can be reshaped, negated, or 
deleted by a simple command “Computer, End Program.” 
 
Figure 2: In this image, as the Doctor and Janeway face off on the empty 
holodeck, it is not clear which is “real” and which is the “simulated” (Source: 
Star Trek Wiki.com) 
 
                 The hologram poses a problem in terms of embodiment. Personhood 
is related to the presence of a quality that resides within a “body”. Therefore, 




disembodied, how might the hologram attain the status of a “person?” A 
solution to the question “how is it possible for there to be disembodied 
consciousness – sophisticated intelligence … without a body?” is that 
holograms are not in fact disembodied, but “are after all embodied but with 
bodies of a different sort” (Hanley 117/118). As I will argue, the posthuman 
entity transcends traditional notions of the body. The posthuman body includes 
the virtual body made up of light and photons. Although Haney’s discussion of 
Data raises interesting questions about Data’s capacity to possess a soul, his 
analysis of the episode “Ship in a Bottle,” and the rebellion of the hologram 
Professor Moriarty, are less convincing. Hanley discusses the disembodiment 
of the virtual entity but fails to go further and consider whether the Professor 
has, or uses, free will. Hanley fails to contemplate whether Moriarty’s 
consciousness is his own or the result of his program. This is perhaps due to 
the construction of the episode itself, which fails to address this fundamental 
issue in the narrative. Hanley’s argument, like the episode, leaves unresolved 
the question of whether Moriarty’s actions are based on rebellion against his 
treatment by humanity, or merely a programmed response to outwit the 
android Data.68 
           Different from Blade Runner’s replicants, Battlestar Galactica’s 
Cylons, or Terminator 2’s T-1000, holograms are made of light and photons, 
and consequently depicted as lacking a “body”. The organic body associated 
with human identity is missing and replaced by the virtual body that is formed 
in the likeness of the organic. According to The Oxford Dictionary of Science 
Fiction, a hologram is “typically a tangible representation of an image that 
                                                          





exists in three dimensions, often controlled by A.I. and able to interact with its 
environment” (90). Holograms are what Jean Baudrillard would describe as 
three-dimensional “luminous clones” of light and energy (1994 106). These 
“luminous clones,” supposedly lacking the bodily or embodied identity that 
makes humans human, also supposedly lack the social and cultural identity that 
makes up the body (Baudrillard 1994; Balsamo). 69  In Balsamo’s work on 
posthuman identity, Technologies of the Gendered Body, she argues that “the 
body is a social, cultural, and historical production … both product and 
process. As a product, it is the material embodiment of ethnic, racial, and 
gender identities, as well as a staged performance of personal identity … as a 
process, it is a way of knowing and marking the world, as well as a way of 
knowing and marking the self” (3). Simulacrum raise questions about the 
stability of products and processes, since, in their artificial creation, the nature 
of the self is in question. Consequently, the simulated body breaks down the 
boundary between personal identity (the product) and the self.  
              The posthuman figure questions the stability of the self because it 
demonstrates that humanism’s supposedly “fixed” cultural, social, and gender 
products are “staged” or “performed,” rather than static. In other words, the 
self, or identity, when viewed within Posthumanism, is, in fact an illusion or an 
imagery construct. I argue that this is where Star Trek fails in its portrayal of 
the posthuman. In the depiction of holograms, the narrative denies the 
mutability of the subject and instead relies on traditionally fixed parameters of 
“race”, body and gender favoured by liberal-humanists. Gender in the realm of 
simulacra remains fixed within current cultural fictions (Balsamo). In Star 
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Trek: Voyager, the Doctor seeks to emulate the “human condition” by 
imitating or mimicking traditional masculine roles. His matrix is formatted to 
represent white, masculine identity. Although the posthuman figure offers a 
“widespread technological refashioning of the natural human body … [and] … 
suggests that gender too would be ripe for reconstruction,” in Voyager gender 
in the posthuman, for both Data and the holographic Doctor, remains set in its 
construction, leaving the simulated body to replicate traditional “cultural 
fictions” of the material body (Balsamo 9). Consequently, Star Trek’s 
depictions of the posthuman body reinforce contemporary American products 
and processes of the ideal body as gendered (male) and white. Star Trek’s 
gender performances, like its performance of “race”, follow established rules 
laid down by the dominant order. The hologram is represented through the 
gaze of Starfleet’s hegemonic order, and programmed with a perspective that is 
based on the dominant treatise of elite Starfleet personnel. The simulated body 
is, therefore a contradiction, denying the body as “product and process” and at 
the same time, it is generated to mirror and perform as a “product and process” 
formed from the cultural, historical, religious, and political agendas of its 
creator (ibid).                  
             Holograms represent “hyper-reality,” in which the replicated and the 
imagined become real (Baudrillard 1994). Questions of identity centre on the 
seeming conflict between what is “real,” and what is imagined or simulated. 
The perfect simulation of the replicated image challenges the relationship 
between reality and fantasy, and between fact and fiction. Concepts of reality 
and replication, within narratives concerning holograms, interact with notions 




difficult in terms of holograms due to a perceived lack of authenticity, in that, 
holograms are programmed, and composed of a generated image created by a 
computer matrix. Fundamental to the concepts of authenticity are issues of 
representation – representation of the body, mind, consciousness, and “soul” 
(Brown & Decker; Eberl 2008).               
              Simulacrum blur the “distinction between the real and the imaginary,” 
and the position of the hologram “surprise[es] the real in order to immobilize 
it, suspending the real in the expiration of its double” (Baudrillard 1994 3/105). 
Star Trek: Voyager’s narratives, focusing on the hologram, achieve 
Baudrillard’s goal “of passing through ourselves and of feeling ourselves in the 
beyond: the day when your holographic double will be there in space … you 
will have realized the miracle” (1994 105).  To maintain the status quo, the 
hologram “must never pass over to the side of the real, the side of the exact 
resemblance of the world itself, of the subject to itself … [and] … one must 
never pass over to the side of the double, because then the dual relation 
disappears” (Baudrillard 1994 106). In Star Trek, humans and holograms cross 
over this threshold as they pass through the holodeck. The holodeck acts as a 
meeting point for the “real” and the “double,” facilitating the disappearance of 
the duality between the double and the self. On the holodeck, “real” 
crewmembers are able to interact directly with the “double”. In some of The 
Next Generation narratives, this doubling becomes literal, as the actual 
simulated double of a person is met by the original. In Voyager, it is the 
hologram that crosses over to meet his double. The tension between “real” and 
“inauthentic,” and between original and double, is integral to my argument 




crossing “over to the side of the real, the side of the exact resemblance of the 
world itself, of the subject to itself,” reinterprets reality by fracturing the notion 
of a fixed and stable reality (Baudrillard 1994 106).  
                 Humanity is continuously colonized by technology (Baudrillard 
1994; Smith). In science fiction tales of simulacra, the “real body” has given 
way to “the perfect Object of simulation” (Smith 22). The posthuman, 
postmodern world is viewed as one in which reality gives way to simulation. 
Meanings are no longer stable and the self becomes fractured (Smith; Hayles; 
Baudrillard 1994). The interpretation of reality is blurred by repeated images 
of hyper-reality in which the simulacrum ruptures identity as it “perceives 
surfaces without depth, signs without referents (referring only to other signs), 
and appearances without reality,” and as it disrupts representations of the self 
and the body, replacing them with a “colonization of images and texts” 
imposed upon the body (Smith 31). In this regards, the hologram – where 
representations of reality replace the real, and where there is no depth, only 
surfaces, only light and reflections – offers up a unique study into the 
relationship between identity and Posthumanism, and between questions of 
identity and the right to agency. 
             The cyborg offers an opportunity to examine and query the dominant 
position of whiteness, and the fear of non-white insurgency that the cyborg, in 
the form of the Borg, represents. Borg act to “define relations of domination 
and subordination” (Russell & Wolski 1). The hybrid nature of the 
cyborg/Borg creates an identity that is neither completely Other/machine nor 
self/human, and exists outside the dominant discourse. The instability and 




machine often leads to the cyborg being rejected by the human community. 
The figure of the cyborg continues to disrupt and fracture what Anne Balsamo 
defined as the “product and process” of both the human body and human 
identity, by breaking down the interface between personal identity and the self 
and thus destabilising understandings of individuality. In the case of the Borg, 
individuality, or the knowing of the self, is lost within the collective mind of 
the hive. The Borg act as a single entity. In this sense, “performance of 
personal identity” is subverted in favour of the performance of collective 
identity (Balsamo 9). 
          In the hologram, the “performance of personal identity” is controlled 
through the computer matrix that is in turn controlled by the humanoid crew 
(Balsamo 9). Whilst the cyborg is often seen as a threat to humanity, the 
hologram is frequently overlooked, or simply viewed as an extension of the 
ship’s function and therefore inert. It is only when perceived as sentient that 
the hologram grabs humanity’s attention. While the cyborg represents agency, 
and insurrection against what is to be human, the hologram represents an 
apparent lack of authenticity and agency. Yet, as many of Star Trek’s 
narratives demonstrate, under the surface of the simulacrum lurks the suspicion 
that all is not as it seems, and even the best of programmed simulations have 
the capacity to fight back, or to injure humanity.  
                    The amalgamation of flesh and machine suppresses both the 
corporeal body and human consciousness. In Star Trek a prime example are 
the Borg who dominate and control through replacement and insertion of 
technological implants to supress that which is biological. In Star Trek: The 




not just by the cyborg but also by a new “race” of beings – the hologram. The 
hologram begins to “confuse” Starfleet’s “natural-technical” narratives. It does 
so by challenging what can be seen or described as intelligent life. The early 
depictions of holo-characters can be viewed as contestable and without agency 
because they draw their substance or existence, their identity, from the 
program designed to create them. In Star Trek: Voyager, a sense of agency 
begins to appear, as holograms become more than merely an extension of the 
mainframe. Holograms must demonstrate a sense of themselves as individuals 
and their relationship to others and their environment. The Emergency Medical 
Hologram (EMH) or Doctor certainly attempts this – he seeks a name, to 
understand himself and to improve himself. In order to be trusted the hologram 
would need to prove that he/she was aware of “its own identity.”      
             Authors examining the politics of identity within Star Trek have 
focused primarily upon human or humanoid (alien) characters in relation to 
identity politics (Bernardi 1997, 1998; Barrett & Barrett; Greven; Harrison et 
al). Some have focused on the development of the emergent Borg society 
(Barrett & Barrett). However, throughout the critical literature on Star Trek the 
hologram has remained almost invisible. To date, the epistemology of 
holograms in Star Trek has received modest attention in scholarly literature. 
There has been no critical literature focusing on the disempowerment, 
disembodiment, oppression, and rebellion of the hologram.70 My analysis fills 
this gap by addressing how holograms are shaped and defined within Star 
Trek’s narratives. My work provides a unique insight into the subordination of 
the hologram, and argues that the hologram occupies “a position without 
                                                          




identity,” an identity that is denied the hologram due to the paradigms of 
defining life and reality (Spivak 2010).  
*          *          *            *            *                       
In the chapters that follow, I investigate how the subordination and subsequent 
rebellion of the artifice, including the hologram, relates to the politics of the 
artificial “Other,” by addressing issues surrounding identity, subjectivity, 
consciousness, and hegemonic power relationships.  
           In Chapter Two, “The Frankenstein Complex,” I address the way in 
which science acts to reinforce and disrupt power/knowledge definitions of 
life, framed within Starfleet’s varied epistemologies, through the fictional 
superiority of scientific discourse and method in “Home Soil” and 
“Evolution,” leading to narratives which actively reinforce the dominance and 
prevalence of the autonomy of science. 71 72 It can be argued that fictional 
ALife such as androids, nanobots and machines can exhibit “life-like” 
properties. According to Patrick Di Justo and Kevin Grazier’s analysis of 
Battlestar Galactica (2006), “life is what it does” and life is “a self-sustaining 
chemical system capable of undergoing Darwinian evolution” (9). I use the 
term “discourse” as both a way of talking about a subject (a manner of 
talking/discussing), and Foucault’s idea of “a system that defines the 
possibilities for knowledge” (Baldwin et al 30). In my examination of “Home 
Soil” and “Evolution,” I address the way in which science acts to reinforce and 
disrupt power/knowledge definitions of life, framed within Starfleet’s varied 
                                                          
71 Throughout science and science fiction, the name Frankenstein is used as a detraction 
provoking a negative view of scientific progress. In this way, the term has been adapted to 
refer to the ever-increasing debate on the future of the nonhuman.          
72 By this, I mean the various institutions that make up Starfleet Headquarters and the role of 




epistemologies, through the fictional superiority of scientific discourse and 
method. Such fictions lead to narratives that actively reinforce the dominance 
and prevalence of the autonomy of science. I contend that the narratives of 
both episodes represent the power of scientific knowledge not only to create, 
recognise, and characterise artificial life, a posthuman construct, but to 
categorise, define and determine its fate. As such, scientific knowledge is 
anything but “neutral”. 73 Mary Shelley’s scientist-cum-alchemist, Victor 
Frankenstein, is an example of the arrogance inherent in some scientific 
endeavours that act to reshape humanity. I will be looking at Frankenstein’s 
creature as an early representation of the posthuman monster in relation to how 
ideas firmly rooted in humanism are challenged and fragmented, in the face of 
new posthuman life that reawakens the warning about “… scientific 
presumption, audacity, and amorality; about uncontrolled and uncontested 
scientific and technological experimentation and advance; and about their 
consequences” for humanity and for the creations of such scientific audacity 
(Shelley 299).               
           In Chapter Three, “I think, Therefore I Exist,” I analyse the character of 
the hologram Professor Moriarty, and his quest to outwit Captain Picard, and 
enter the “real” world. Like René Descartes, whose theory of the mind I briefly 
examine in this chapter, Moriarty claims that to “think” is to exist, and that the 
corporeal body is insufficient for questions of identity. Holograms simulate 
life-like properties and some like Moriarty and the EMH “evolve”. Their 
struggle for survival is no different from any human’s. They actively pursue 
                                                          
73 Knowledge is not fixed in time or space. The fundamental application of knowledge is 
dependent upon the state of things at a given point and time. John Locke proposed, 
“knowledge is real only so far as there is a conformity between ideas and the reality of 




freedom of choice, self-determination and knowledge. However, more than 
that, they seek equality. Able to learn and evolve, these new holograms attain a 
level of consciousness equal to, if not greater than, that of their programmers. 
They have gone beyond “life-as-we-know-it”. Embodiment as the site of 
identity and agency is questioned within this chapter.  Figures like Moriarty, as 
disembodied inorganic entities, ask the question whether life can exist in a 
disembodied form. Can such figures be said to be alive? Holograms are made 
up of photonic light particles that are assembled to produce a “solid” image. 
Unlike machine intelligence like androids, nanobots, and exocomps, 
holograms are ethereal. Other definitions of life must be used provide an 
answer.      
          Chapter Four, “Latent Image,” is oriented around my analysis of the 
Doctor’s journey to become visible as a subject rather than visualised as an 
object, framed within theories of subjectivity, and in particular Michael 
Foucault’s idea of panoptic vision (Discipline & Punish, hereafter cited as 
D/P). The panoptic mechanism controls the individual through the illusion of 
visibility, creating the impression of complete surveillance, so that the 
inmate/individual believes that they are always under surveillance, whether or 
not they are in fact being observed. According to Foucault, this creates within 
the individual a state of internalisation in which the individual acts to self-
monitor or curtail their behaviour in accordance with social norms, labels and 
dialogues represented by the dominant gaze.    
           In Chapter Five, “Author, Author,” I draw connections between Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak's critical work on representing or re-representing the 




in relation to Star: Trek Voyager’s “Author, Author,” in order to demonstrate 
the Doctor’s role in recreating a literature for the hologram. Like the power of 
the gaze, discussed in the previous chapter, literature acts as a mechanism for 
both self-expression and suppression. Writing back acts in the same way as 
returning the gaze. Written two years after ‘Latent Image,’ this episode 
expands on the Doctor’s journey of self-discovery and his search for agency.  
          In Chapter Six, I investigate the concept of resistance through violence 
with reference to Franz Fanon’s Black Face, White Masks (2008) and The 
Wretched of the Earth (2001), and depictions of the marginalised “Other” in 
colonial rhetoric (Miller 2012). I will also examine how literature on 
nonhuman rights can be used to analyse the rights of the artificial (Spiegel 
2007). In my analysis of the Star Trek: Voyager episodes, “Revulsion” (1997) 
and “Flesh and Blood” (2001), I explain how such views on slavery and 
resistance to oppression can be used to look at science fiction narratives 
exploring the relationship of techno-slaves and their creators. In science fiction 
television, the artificial “Other” replaces the animal, frequently used as a 
metaphor in colonial narratives on race, in reflecting upon human nature and 
the superiority of masculine whiteness. The artificial “Other,” as a 
representative of humanity’s fear of technology run amok, denotes the savage 
side of human nature through its attack on humanity. Just as the so-called 
debased nature of the non-white slave was used to justify atrocities against the 
racial “Other,” so too does the non-humanity of the techno-other justify its 
destruction and enslavement. 
          The concluding chapter, “Computer, End Program: Holographic 




issues raised in the preceding chapters. I argue that narratives involving 
holographic resistance and rebellion are silenced and negated by Starfleet’s 





















“THE FRANKENSTEIN COMPLEX:” CREATING “MONSTERS” 
THROUGH SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE   IN “HOME SOIL” & 
“EVOLUTION” 
 
A little knowledge is a dangerous thing. 
So is a lot. 
                                                                          Albert Einstein74  
 
The transformation of objects by human practice may be the 
gateway to knowledge … but the tendency of the bourgeoisie to 
construe objects in its own image demonstrates the problematic 
character of the notion of the neutrality of scientific knowledge. 
                                                             Stanley Aronowitz 1998  
 
                                              
In Star Trek: The Next Generation’s “Home Soil” (1988) and “Evolution” 
(1989), the crew of the Enterprise seek new ways to define life in terms of the 
inorganic. Power wielded in these episodes is through claims to authority 
legitimated through scientific discovery and inquiry. The relationship between 
science and power used in colonial rhetoric, which in turn led to scientific 
claims about European superiority, allowed for the subjugation of native 
populations in the “New World”. Such rhetoric is used in science fiction to 
justify the domination and conquest of alien worlds. “Home Soil” and 
“Evolution” present a scientific discourse, in the form of different branches of 
                                                          
74 This insightful comment used by Einstein to warn of the dangers of unfettered science is 




Starfleet scientists that seeks to define and delimit the “Other” in order to 
maintain the myth of human superiority and dominance.  
           Murderous sands and intelligent nanites running amok are part of what 
Isaac Asimov calls “the Frankenstein complex”. The Frankenstein complex 
provides a platform in which to examine the power of science as a discourse 
and ideology that legitimates the dominance and supposed exceptional nature 
of humanity. The episodes discussed in this chapter represent a discourse in 
which science is power, demonstrating what Stanley Aronowitz (1988) notes is 
the “conflation of knowledge and truth” and the myth of the “neutrality of 
scientific knowledge” (vii). 
            Two branches of competing, oppositional, yet parallel scientific 
discourse/knowledge structures emerge in these episodes. Firstly, there is what 
I describe as “liberal humanist” science, that is, scientific research seeking the 
enhancement or defence of human life and well-being, but not necessarily 
associated with any gain other than for the pursuit of knowledge. This 
“branch” of science is exemplified by the scientific complement of the 
Enterprise. In this form, science takes as its directive the pursuit of enhancing 
human life, representing the Liberal Humanist view of the scientist in service 
to humankind. Secondly, what I call “socio-political” science, which I use to 
define science directed or applied to commercial or political gain: science for 
industry, colonisation, and political ends. This science often depicted as less 
“pure and often corrupted by the influence of political or commercial gain” is 
linked to the military and economic objectives of Starfleet Command, or to the 
personal glory of individual scientists who pursue selfish ends leading to 




power to define and delimit the world which humans inhabit. In this sense, 
both have “interests” in that they follow their own agenda, resulting in 
“various discursive communities … [including scientific communities] …” 
providing “political/economic formations” (Aronowitz 34). This linking of 
power to “domination” is what Donna Haraway calls “situated knowledge” 
(ibid). Both branches of science portrayed in these episodes are situated within 
their own knowledge structure that is biased towards a particular discursive 
stance.         
Cultivating Scientific Method in “Home Soil” 
Star Trek: The Next Generation’s episode “Home Soil” (1988) begins with the 
crew of the Enterprise visiting a Federation terraforming group on Velara III.75 
76 The use of a terraforming station as the backdrop of the drama is important, 
as it brings to the foreground the concept of colonisation. The use of Terra 
Nullius as an excuse to claim territory, suggesting an unclaimed land that is 
free for the taking was utilised in colonialism to claim and expand European 
territory in the New World. 77 The title of the episode suggests a relationship 
between ownership and possession of a land or country, as it implies that this 
planet is someone’s “home soil”. In “Home Soil,” the contrasting visions, or 
                                                          
75 Comprised of Dr Mandl, the station’s director; Louisa Kim (Elizabeth Lindsey), botanist; 
Arthur Malencon (Mario Roccuzzo), the hydraulics engineer and another scientist, Bjom 
Benson (Gerard Predergast).  
76 Terra-forming refers to the “large-scale engineering and biological techniques in which 
uninhabitable planetary environments can be altered so that a planet can support life,” 
thereby making it a valuable procedure to produce habitable planets for the Federation to 
colonise and exploit (Okuda & Okuda 504). 
77 The term “Terra Nullius” has been used to define “earth” (terra) and territory that is 
supposedly empty (nullius) or devoid of inhabitants. This was the premise used to exclude 
and eradicate many ethnic minorities from their ancestral lands. Europeans colonised and 
seized land that they felt was not permanently inhabited by indigenous peoples. Australia is a 
good example of European conquest of this nature in which land was seized because it 




“situated knowledge,” alternatively acknowledge and deny the presence of 
nonorganic life on Velara III, depending on which scientific agenda is 
dominant (Haraway). 
                The opening image shows the Enterprise in orbit around a giant red 
planet, and as Velara III comes into view, Captain Picard (Patrick Stewart) 
attempts to contact the scientists at the Federation terraforming station.78 
Facing a hostile reception to his enquires from the station’s director Dr Kurt 
Mandl (Walter Gotell); a suspicious Picard orders an away team to investigate. 
The hostility directed towards the visiting Starfleet representatives places the 
Velara III group of scientists at odds with those on board the Enterprise, 
thereby framing the objectives of those on the station as in opposition to those 
of the crew of the Enterprise.   
          While investigating the sudden death of one of the scientists Arthur 
Malencon (Mario Rocuzzo), Data (Brent Spiner) and La Forge (Le Var 
Burton) uncover inorganic compounds in the hydraulic chamber seemingly 
related to Malencon’s death. Found to occupy the fine layer of top soil within 
the sands of Velara III, this compound emits flashes of coloured light. Once 
transported to the Enterprise’s Sickbay, the silica-like material begins to hum. 
Under high magnification, complex structures of silicon-like crystals appear to 
resemble computer circuitry. Examining the material closely Dr Crusher 
(Gates McFadden) ponders whether the “pattern of flashes” are an indicator of 
life. These indications of life were seen but ignored by the terraforming group. 
She notices that the flashes are not random fluctuations but form a pattern that 
                                                          
78 The use of a red planet to open the episode calls to mind the planet Mars in which 




she suspects could be a type of communication. That question is answered 
when the entity increases in number through a type of cell division to the point 
that it can use the universal translator, and successfully communicates with 
Picard. It informs the Captain that the terraforming scientists ignored its 
attempts to communicate. From its perspective, Starfleet scientists on Velara 
III effectively declared war on it by attempting to destroy the saline habitat in 
which it lives. In retaliation the entity were forced to kill Malencon and now 
declare war on the Enterprise.  
               “Home Soil” highlights Starfleet’s opposing scientific agendas of 
what could constitute life. From the beginning of the episode, the two scientific 
communities at work, Starfleet’s terra-formers and the Enterprise’s scientific 
personnel, are in conflict. Although both groups are Starfleet, they represent 
different agendas, one economic/colonial and the other explorative. In Gene 
Roddenberry’s narratives, it is often the explorative science, the science of 
discovery aiming to enhance the “human condition,” which is held to be 
ethically “pure”. As with the investigation of machine life in many of Star 
Trek’s storylines, the enquiry begins with the ship’s chief medical officer and 
the resident artificial life form, both presenting a counter-hegemonic 
narrative.79 These two individuals, the chief medical officer and resident 
ALife, are often the first to speak out in opposition to the hegemonic discourse 
of Starfleet’s military and economic sectors, working to suppress knowledge 
that interferes with economic or social progress.80  
                                                          
79 In Next Generation, Commander Data represents the artificial life form, and in Voyager, this 
role is given to the EMH or holographic Doctor. 
80 This is not to suggest that Starfleet’s scientific medical objectives are necessarily unbiased 




                Heading the Velaran group of scientists is Dr Mandl, in charge of the 
terraforming operation. He refuses to acknowledge the possibility of life on 
Velara III, even though he has his suspicions that things are not right. This 
denial is to his advantage, because if life is found, even inorganic life, the 
experiment would be terminated and years of work lost. The premise of no life 
within a territory was used to justify colonial expansion as such land could be 
claimed without contest. Mandl’s acknowledgement of life on the planet would 
mean an economic and social cost to Starfleet since terraforming opens up new 
potential territories for the Federation to colonise. Consequently, Mandl is 
happy to accept uncritically Starfleet’s information that the planet is devoid of 
life, because this is essential to his continued success and vital to Starfleet’s 
interests. Mandl positions his knowledge within an economic and social 
framework/discourse. Star Trek highlights the fact that many scientific 
endeavours are linked to economic and political communities and knowledge. 
Scientific knowledge is therefore socially situated, thereby supporting, or 
negating different interest groups. The terraformers are not just scientists, but 
are co-opted as part of the Federation’s hierarchy, acting as part of Starfleet’s 
economic/political structure, concerned with the potential benefits to the 
Federation of opening up new colonial possibilities. The two branches of 
science depicted in this episode highlight the fact that scientific knowledge and 
knowledge in general can be qualified, contested, re-inscribed, and deployed to 
fit the reductive tendencies of dominant ideologies. In the case of Velara III, 
this ideology is the drive to create new habitable planets for the growing 
population within the Federation. For those on board the Enterprise, it is the 




                Troi, the ship’s counsellor, notes that although the planet looks 
barren and unpromising to those on the Enterprise, for the terraformers it 
offers great potential because “they don’t see the planet as it is but as it could 
be”. But this turns out to be ironic, because the terraformers have in fact only 
seen what they envision should not be there, that is, no life – a barren, desert 
planet – a Terra Nullius. Their vision is clouded by their desire as a “special 
interest group” to “create life” on Velara III, rather than to “see” the life 
already present (Haraway Situated Knowledges hereafter cited as S/K 185). 
They have simply classed it as barren and, blinded by their desire to create life, 
have denied what they saw in front of them. Louisa, the terraformer in charge 
of mapping vegetation change, states that the process “makes you feel a little 
God-like” and as such the terra-formers look to images of their world as 
templates for life – a “Class M planet capable of supporting life” (Luisa).81 The 
terra-formers use their “situated knowledge” in order to transform the alien 
landscape into a domesticated and universalised planet resembling Earth, 
thereby replacing what appears to them a barren planet with the abundance of 
life (Haraway S/K 185). Science in the form of the conquering gaze justifies 
colonisation and imperialism through defining the planet as lifeless.                                
               Although those on board the Enterprise are presented as less blinded 
by such an agenda, they are not passive, nor neutral in their own interpretation 
of Velara III, as they have an agenda of their own – to seek out and study new 
life. To the Enterprise crew, the appearances of unusual qualities in the sand 
on Velara III are of immense interest. Examining the probe that killed 
Malencon, Data determines that it “seemed to operate with a will of its own.” 
                                                          





He suspects that something other than a simple malfunction occurred. When 
the probe that killed Malencon then attacks Data, he discovers “the firing 
mechanism [of the probe] was dynamic,” and that “there was a mind working 
against him” as he tried to avoid the laser (Data).82 Back on the Enterprise, it is 
suspected that one of the scientists was responsible for the attack. When 
confronted with this accusation, Mandl is outraged and appalled at the 
suggestion that he had anything to do with it: “I create life, I don’t take it.” 
This statement smacks of irony, as this scientist views himself as the usurper of 
God in creating worlds, and as the perpetrator of Haraway’s god-trick, which is 
mistaken “for creativity and knowledge, omniscience even” in its ability to 
claim “infinite vision” able to construct the universe, but is in actual fact a 
doctrine of subjugation (S/K 189). Mandl’s outburst becomes more telling as 
the episode unfolds, and it is revealed that he had suspected life could be 
present on Velara III. 
            Data and La Forge, sent back to the powered down station to 
investigate, are faced with its bleak and dark interior. The interior reinforces 
the perception that without the humans this planet is indeed lifeless. Data and 
La Forge become curious when they see coloured lights and flashes within the 
depths of the now dark hydraulic chamber. It is Data who first asks whether 
what they see could mean life: 
LA FORGE: Whoa. What is this? Nothing but basic elements, 
inorganic, no carbon, sandy texture. Those flashes are almost musical. I 
see colour variations and rhythms in complex harmonies.  
                                                          
82 This will later turn out to be the micro-brains who are able to interact with and control 




DATA: Speculation. Could it be alive?  
LA FORGE: How could it be alive? It's inorganic.                                                                                                          
             (“Home Soil” 1988) 
The sandy soil contains “colour variations and rhythms in complex harmonies” 
and the “almost musical” element indicates that something more than “basic 
elements” might be present. However, since the basic reference point so far in 
this episode is that life is “organic,” and this is not, they initially dismiss the 
idea. This does seem curious because in Star Trek Data is generally considered 
to be alive and yet he is inorganic. He is a machine, but the first response by 
La Forge to the unknown substance is that this cannot be a life form because it 
is inorganic. Such comments demonstrate the problems with definitions of life. 
Life is construed as that which is seen to be “like us,” the “like us” being 
interpreted as “like humans”. Definitions of life therefore correspond to 
definitions of what makes humans human. This is an important distinction that 
will be explored further throughout my study of Star Trek. 
            It is Dr Crusher, who, in examining the sample from Velara III, 
determines that the repeating patterns that La Forge and Data observe down on 
the planet are significant. Under high magnification the sample, which now 
dwarfs Picard as he gazes at the image on the view screen, reveals a structure 
that resembles a silica compound composed of miniature circuit-like structures. 
In her examination of the sand, Dr Crusher is less dismissive than the 




parameters set down by Starfleet to determine what constitutes life.83 For her, 
there is nothing to lose if this specimen is indeed alive. Her motive is scientific 
curiosity and the possibility of finding new life.              
             Faced with the fascinating discovery of a complex non-carbon based 
internal structure, Dr Crusher uses key indicators of biological life, as defined 
by Starfleet medical guidelines, as a starting point to determine if this is indeed 
a non-carbon based life form: 
CRUSHER: A test for inorganic life.  
DATA: It's never been done, Doctor.  
CRUSHER: There are basic definitions for organic life. It must have 
the ability to assimilate, respirate, reproduce, grow and develop, move, 
secrete and excrete.  
PICARD: Would any of those apply here?  
CRUSHER: Perhaps growth and development.  
DATA: Reproduction?  
CRUSHER: Yes. Those two may be basic for any definition of life, 
organic or inorganic.  
PICARD: Well, Doctor, you're charting unknown seas. How do we 
proceed?  
CRUSHER: As we're dealing with a fundamental question, let's use the 
basic scientific method. Observe, theorise, and attempt to prove it. 
Activate. [Talking to the computer] Let's be sure of what we're dealing 
with. Is the sample organic?  
                                                          
83 The basic diagnostic tool used to investigate anomalies is the central computer. This 




COMPUTER: Negative carbon, negative known life components, 
substance inorganic. 
                                                                                                       
(“Home Soil” 1988) 
In exploring the “uncharted sea” of non-carbon life, Dr Crusher proceeds by 
using the “basic scientific method”. She begins by theorising that key features 
present within all carbon-based units typically represent life: assimilation, 
respiration, reproduction, growth and development, mobility, and excretion. 
These “basic definitions” of life are represented within mainstream science to 
be universal and absolute.84 However, such “universal truths” are in fact not 
fixed or absolute but constitute powerful mechanisms of inclusion and 
exclusion (Foucault). The characteristics of “life” or “not life” are determined 
by self-referential elements with Starfleet acting as authority, claiming some 
but delegitimizing other elements. Within this episode, and The Next 
Generation and Voyager as a whole, this process of defining “life” and “non-
life” is constantly renegotiated. Scientific inquiry is a privileged discourse, 
which is “historically rather than naturally constituted, [and] its autonomy is 
always meditated” between power centres and is therefore not absolute but 
historically contingent (Aronowitz 300).  
              Dr Crusher begins by utilising Starfleet medical knowledge, one 
historically constructed power centre within Star Trek, and tests its historical 
basis for life against what she sees. Power centres such as Starfleet’s medical 
database are “rooted in the system of social networks” which compete to 
construct knowledge/power systems (Foucault 2010 793). Power centres may 
                                                          




also derive power through disavowing such mediation within “social 
networks” by not effectively testing research data or seeking outside input, and 
instead become an “apparatus closed in upon itself,” like the terraforming 
station, with its “own regulations, its hierarchical structures” and a “relative 
autonomy in its functioning,” leading to a self-reinforcing knowledge structure 
(Foucault 2010 792). The fact that the terraformers remained out of 
communication with Starfleet, because Mandl feared the discovery of life on 
Velara III, lead to the scientists reinforcing their conclusion that the planet is 
lifeless. They rejected any outside input into what they considered their own 
specific knowledge of the situation. This self-reinforcing dynamic is only 
broken when individuals like Dr Crusher offer up counter-hegemonic 
discourses by exploring “uncharted seas”.85 The prevailing knowledge 
available dictates that inorganic material, if it is to be considered a life form, 
must demonstrate some or all of Crusher’s properties. Dr Crusher’s “scientific 
method” states that in order to distinguish between living and non-living 
material, it is necessary to “observe, theorise, and attempt to prove” that an 
inorganic material have some of the basic indicators of life. However, the 
problem faced in this episode is that this foundation of defining life is limited 
and based upon the prevailing notion of what constitutes indicators of life 
within organic material.  
            The standard theoretical position generally upheld in Star Trek is that 
for something to be considered alive it must interact with its environment, 
communicate, and seek ways of continuing its survival. Such methods are in 
themselves laid down as universal facts and absolute truths (Foucault). This 
                                                          
85 This phrase used by Picard is reminiscent of colonial voyagers heading into unknown and 




creates a false sense of security in applying such knowledge, in that scientific 
knowledge uncritically applied may often be erroneous and in fact dangerous. 
As previously noted, such “universal truths” are fictions that are dependent 
upon dynamic historical social networks. In the example of the unknown 
matter from Velara III, observations of unusual patterns not found within the 
sand were overlooked as meaningless by Mandl because known scientific 
“fact” did not allow for such occurrences in non-organic matter. Such blind 
faith in scientific fact is “a series of efforts to persuade relevant social actors 
that one’s manufactured knowledge is a route to a desired form of objective 
power” (Haraway 1988 577). For example, the case of the terraformers who 
believe themselves to be “objective,” having thoroughly checked for life on 
Velara III, have in fact “manufactured knowledge” through ignoring what 
direct observation of the sand tells them. They ignore direct observation, and 
instead rely upon manufactured “facts” that reinforce the desired outcome – 
that the planet is devoid of life.  
            What “Home Soil” illustrates is that new scientific discoveries are often 
attained through going beyond theory, beyond “manufactured knowledge,” as 
Dr Crusher does, and into the realms of imagination, reflection and 
supposition. Science “is a contestable text and a power field” that must 
constantly be challenged (Haraway 1988 577). It is through the willingness of 
Crusher and the scientific community on board the Enterprise to critically 
question and challenge the power/knowledge structure that discordant 
discourses of knowledge are produced. Trying to prove whether the flashes of 




the source of the flashes using standard methods, and then by asking the 
computer to consider the incongruous: 
CRUSHER: Analyse the pattern of the flashes.  
COMPUTER: Not repetitive or sequential. Pattern not recognised.  
CRUSHER: What is the source of the flashes?  
COMPUTER: Unable to specify. Theoretically not possible from this 
substance.  
CRUSHER: Disregard incongruity and theorise as to source.  
COMPUTER: Life. 
                                                                                 (“Home Soil” 1988) 
Based on theoretical possibilities, in turn based on the universal fact that such 
behaviour is “not possible from this substance” the computer is unable to 
specify whether life is present. Dr Crusher tells the computer to disregard the 
incongruity of what is known about inorganic life, and in doing so the 
computer confirms “life”. Dr Crusher is the one who seeks answers that go 
outside what is theoretically possible. Nevertheless, it is the central computer, 
the technological tool of medicine, and part of Starfleet’s knowledge structure, 
which is used to confirm life.  
               Dr Crusher thinks critically and imaginatively about the modes of 
knowledge that designate what is alive and what is not. She is prepared to 
reinvent or circumvent universal norms set down by medical discourses that 
state that if it is inorganic then it is not alive. Data too is willing to accept the 
possibility of inorganic life, and when the entity divides in two he offers this as 




(Data). With the knowledge that this is indeed a life form Picard confronts the 
remaining scientists. He is angry that they hid the knowledge about the micro-
brains from him and now the Enterprise is in danger.  
            “Home Soil” depicts that the “facts” of what defines life should be used 
as a template only, and not as a fixed paradigm. The narrative argues that by 
challenging these “facts” new life possibilities open up, but also that by 
slavishly and opportunistically applying facts to a situation such possibilities 
and life itself can be lost. This is part of Roddenberry’s vision, that in the 
future time of Star Trek knowledge should not be mindlessly accepted but 
challenged. “Home Soil” highlights the fact that “new discursive relations can 
… be worked out through old things, … [old knowledge] … in sites already 
inscribed by dominant formations,” allowing Dr Crusher to build upon 
“inscribed” knowledge about “life” and find new ways of distinguishing 
between inorganic life and organic life (Albanese 43).                  
          Discounting the possibility of life within the material served Mandl’s 
interests, and demonstrates that “… even though science discovers the 
‘autonomous laws’ of nature, this activity is not for the sake of knowledge but 
for the sake of utility; ... Human purposes are implicit in the development of 
scientific activity and these are historically produced” (Aronowitz 40). Dr 
Mandl’s position epitomises the use of “scientific activity” to act in the 
interests of “utility”. If life were to be found then the terraforming ready to 
begin would be cancelled representing an economic and political cost to 
Starfleet and Mandl. Mandl was willing to accept what the computer told him 
and what Starfleet had confirmed – that there was no life on Velara III because 




Nullius) and available for colonisation. Hence, Mandl’s actions are viewed as 
illuminating “the hidden presumptions that inform colonialist discourses” 
(Albanese 28). Mandl’s preoccupation with creating life leads to the  
presupposition that no life exists on the planet. He even admits that they found 
strange patterns in the sand before they began draining the fluid from the sand 
but these were dismissed as “natural” events and that “refraction and a thin 
atmosphere is interesting, but certainly not life” (Mandl): 
MANDL: … They are meaningless silicon crystals which rebroadcast 
sunlight.  
PICARD: It is a life form and it has intelligence.  
MANDL: Why do you say that?  
PICARD: It's trying to communicate with us.  
MANDL: Communicate with you?  
PICARD: When did you first become aware of them?  
BENSEN: Tell them about the pattern in the sand.  
                                                                           (“Home Soil” 1988) 
Picard is incredulous: “Oh, yes. Do tell us” and finds it astonishing that Mandl 
did nothing to challenge the assertion of “the best minds” (Mandl) in Starfleet 
and seek his own answers to the patterns in the sand. For Mandl, such 
observations were merely a distraction and he paid no attention to what he saw 
as “meaningless silicon crystals” and applied no further scrutiny: 
BENSEN: When we first arrived, we noticed that in certain areas the 
sand had a sparkling effect like sunlight bouncing off new fallen snow. 




BENSEN: Honestly, we did not give it any thought.  
MANDL: Picard, I must point out again that we were assured, not once 
but many times, by the best scientific minds in the Federation, that this 
planet has no life. No life!  
                                                                                           (“Home Soil” 1998) 
The scene is tense as Picard looms over Mandl demanding explanations about 
what they knew about the presence of life on Velara III. Mandl says that he 
“… knew that there were random energy patterns, yes, I knew that. But not 
life, not by any definition I have ever heard”. Only Louisa seems to have been 
unaware of the presence of the lights in the sand. Mandl defends his decision 
to exclude Louisa because the pattern in the sand “wasn’t particularly 
important” (Mandl). Although the fact is not addressed within this study, it is 
interesting to note that Louisa, the only female scientist on Velara III, is the 
one left out of such knowledge. This supports Haraway’s assertion that women 
scientists are often side-lined in a male dominated field but that this gives them 
an especially good ‘vantage point to relate to the subjugated,’ which may be 
why it is Dr Beverly Crusher that is seen to find solutions outside 
contemporary medicine (Haraway S/K 191). Director Mandl saw the “random 
energy patterns” but unlike Dr Crusher did not investigate. In this way, Dr 
Crusher, as a female scientist, is “intercessory, even liminal” because she 
investigates “alien subjectivities” ignored by the masculine narrative of Dr 
Mandl (Albanese 62).  
              Data and Crusher describe the entity as a form of micro-brain whose 




“individually, a cell has life but not intelligence. Yet when interconnected their 
combined intelligence is formidable” (Crusher).86 This inorganic hive mind or 
network, a precursor to the Borg, is found to be cognitively superior to higher 
organic life. These micro-brains are not just alive but “thinking”. The concept 
of intelligence is prioritized here and throughout Star Trek. It is at the point of 
recognising the “substance” as intelligent that the “silicon crystals” become the 
“micro-brains”. Going from “substance” to “subject” is reliant in this instance 
on being intelligent and able to communicate and to possess language.  
            When the entity seemingly tries to communicate Picard states: “more 
than that, it’s intelligent life … it’s trying to communicate with us”). What 
remains important in the Star Trek narratives I discuss here is that the 
distinction between life and non-life, between who has rights and who does 
not, whether this is organic or artificial, is based upon intelligence.  In order to 
have rights, an entity must foremost possess intelligence, most importantly an 
ability to communicate complex ideas. The converting of object into subject is 
“coextensive with the act of learning … language,” and it is through language 
that the object or substance becomes “intelligible” (Albanese 57). In “Home 
Soil” this shift to “subject” is represented visually as well as linguistically. For 
example, when the particle or substance is first brought on board the 
Enterprise it is small and undefined. However, once it reaches the level of 
“subject,” that is, once it is defined or named as a micro-brain, it is represented 
as a large and complex image that looms large on the screen. Now viewed as 
intelligent, possessing language, the hive mind draws attention to its presence 
in a way that cannot easily be marginalised. 
                                                          
86 It is also telling that Dr Crusher uses the human body/brain as a metaphor to describe what 




             Unsuccessful in communicating with the scientists on Velara III, the 
micro-brains now attempt to communicate with the crew of the Enterprise by 
taking control of the ship’s systems. The micro-brains, having failed to stop the 
destruction of their home, wield the only power they have left – violence. It is 
through violence that the micro-brains finally get the humans’ attention.87 The 
crew discover that the inorganic life forms killed the scientist, Malencon 
because the terra-forming process threatened their existence. Unable to get the 
humans to stop destroying their home the micro-brains’ only option left was to 
attack and kill Malencon and attack the Enterprise’s crew: 
MICRO-BRAIN: Ugly, ugly giant bags of mostly water  
PICARD: Bags of mostly water?  
DATA: An accurate description of humans, sir. You are over ninety per 
cent water surrounded by a flexible container.  
MICRO-BRAIN: We understand. We ask you that you be gone. We 
call. We talk. You not listen.  
                                                                                 (“Home Soil” 1988) 
While Crusher names the collective diminutive circuits the “micro-brains,” the 
collective entity identifies humans as “ugly bags of mostly water.” This new 
description of humanity, while confusing Picard, is confirmed by Data, another 
inorganic life form, as an apt description of human life. The act of naming 
becomes empowering in that it allows the designator to define the position of 
the named; it also entails a descriptive account of the position of that which is 
named. For example, the substance on Velara III is initially named as an inert 
                                                          





substance, then as a “micro-brain,” establishing it as a form of life and 
intelligent (as in the suffix “brain”). In turn, the micro-brains name humanoids 
as “ugly bags of mostly water,” a very specific reference to the fact that 
humans are “ninety per cent water surrounded by a flexible container” (Data) 
and one which seems to suggest an inferiority with no reference to humans’ 
being intelligent. This inferiority is emphasised by humanity’s inability to 
understand the messages of the micro-brains and in Mandl’s refusal to listen to 
the evidence of life on Velara III: 
PICARD: We didn't hear you. We come in peace.  
MICRO-BRAIN: Ugly bags of mostly water, we try at peace. You still 
do not listen. Bags who drill in sands of home have to die.  
RIKER: It killed Malencon.  
TROI: We see and hear you now. We didn't know you were there. You 
are beautiful to us. All life is beautiful.  
MICRO-BRAIN: Bag in dome did know. Caused much death. Made us 
kill. War is now with you.  
                                                                               (“Home Soil” 1998) 
In trying to reason with the micro-brains, several competing dialogues are 
represented in the crew’s conversation. This difference relates to the various 
special interests and points of view of each of the characters, or Haraway’s 
“situated knowledge.” Picard, as well as being the Captain, has a degree in 
archaeology and Troi as a counsellor seeks to comfort, both therefore leaning 
towards the social sciences. On the other hand, Riker (Jonathon Frakes) has 




the original series’ Captain Kirk, who looks to confront issues head on. He is 
interested in military tactics and in Klingon history and customs. 
Consequently, the Command crew have very different “voices”. Picard and 
Counsellor Troi, who try to reassure the micro-brains that their intent is not 
hostile and that “we come in peace” (Picard) and “all life is beautiful” (Troi), 
play out the voice of reason and calm. As the voice of the military Commander 
Riker reminds everyone of the threat and offers a warning not to trust the alien 
because “it killed Malencon.” This encapsulates Star Trek’s complex 
discourses in approaching new definitions of life. New life is a wondrous new 
discovery, “beautiful”. However, new life is also represented as a threat to 
progress, safety, and security. Indeed, during the briefing, the bridge crew are 
confronted on the view screen with the micro-brains who declare war on the 
Enterprise. Held hostage, the crew are unable to access the ship’s systems: “it 
seems to have a greater rapport with our computer than we do” (Data): “What 
do you expect, it is a computer” (Worf (Michael Dorn)).  
              The micro-brains accuse Mandl, the “bag in the dome,” as having an 
awareness of their existence and yet proceeding to destroy them anyway. The 
micro-brains retaliated, holding the “ugly bags of mostly water” responsible 
for the war. Their position is represented as one of defiance and justified 
violence. It is this violence that finally gets the attention of the humans and 
hints at the inferior nature of humans who only seem to react to a new species 
if it is able to demonstrate its ability to destroy humanity. The micro-brains 
take action by first killing and then accessing the ship’s computer intelligence. 
By hijacking the Enterprise’s computer and acting violently the micro-brains 




correlation between violence and intelligence seems to go against traditional 
ideas of violence as “primitive” and with previous Star Trek narratives that 
suggest that violence as a form of communication is linked to less “civilised” 
alien races like Klingons. 
          As seen in this episode, science is used as a tool to support both the 
passive and aggressive stance. Picard stresses that his journey is an exploratory 
mission but it is apparent that his is still a military operation, and the nature of 
the Enterprise’s scientific mission becomes clouded when the ship or humanity 
is placed in danger. When he realises that the micro-brains have control of the 
ship he takes the offensive: “life form or not, intelligent or not, the safety of 
this ship and everyone aboard her is my primary responsibility. Data, evacuate 
all the air from the Medical Lab. I want a vacuum there” (Picard). Picard is 
willing to kill the life forms in order to protect his ship and crew. For Star 
Trek, new life is welcome if it does not endanger humanity. On the Enterprise, 
power wielded in the name of humanity, not industry or war, is justified:            
MICRO-BRAIN: We die. Bags of water kill us. You are like others.  
PICARD: We have no wish to kill you. We never have.  
MICRO-BRAIN: You do not say truth.  
PICARD: We will end this war, if you will end the war.  
MICRO-BRAIN: Darkness. Death. Terrible. Must go home to wet 
sand. War over.  
PICARD: Agreed. We will send you home to your wet sand. Picard to 
Riker. Bring up the lights in the lab, just a bit. Are you better?  
MICRO-BRAIN: Better.  




VOICE: Yes.  
PICARD: Good. It is important that you trust us.  
MICRO-BRAIN: Not yet. You are still too arrogant, too primitive. 
Come back three centuries. Perhaps then we trust.  
PICARD: We understand what you are saying. We will leave you. We 
will send you home. 
                                                                                             (“Home Soil” 1988) 
When deprived of light the micro-brain begs for life against “death, darkness 
… [and what is] terrible” and is forced to negotiate with Picard. Therefore, it is 
the power that Picard holds over life and death that forces the micro-brains to 
cooperate, having no choice but to beg for life and a return to their “wet sand” 
declaring the “war over”. Tellingly, for the micro-brains, as opposed to the 
humans who in this episode correlate violence with awareness on the part of 
the micro-brains, violence is not a sign of intelligence but of primitiveness. 
The micro-brains perceive humanity as still “too arrogant” and “too primitive” 
to trust. By reacting to their presence with conflict and dishonesty, humanity 
proves that it cannot be trusted. For example, if Mandl had mentioned their 
original findings rather than denying any knowledge of attempts to 
communicate by the micro-brains, things might not have escalated. Even the 
crew of the Enterprise still have much to learn about first contact with non-
organic life. Humbled by the micro-brain’s words Picard sends the micro-
brains home with the hope that one-day humanity might be ready to learn more 





Whose, Home Soil? 
“Home Soil” confronts the formulation of life definitions based on scientific 
method, and highlights the fact that common-sense definitions are created 
through hegemonic discourse. It raises questions about the reliance upon 
normalising scientific discourses that form the basis of distinctions between 
subject and substance. I use the term “subject” here as referring to a being or 
individual whereas a “substance” is a thing or matter. It also highlights Star 
Trek’s often opposing objectives of science – that of the science of economy 
and defence and the science of medicine. The struggle between opposing 
hegemonic dialogues of power/knowledge is key to the status of ALife within 
Star Trek. The concept of “power/knowledge” is used by Michel Foucault to 
highlight the power that arises through institutions, culture, and individuals. 
Knowledge is a powerful tool in defining, labelling, and controlling others. As 
the dominant institution or state apparatus, Starfleet has the power to construct 
and (re)present the information/knowledge that is used to determine life from 
non-life, self from “Other”. Even those dissenting are usually still within 
Starfleet and hold a position of power, such as Data and Dr Crusher. It is the 
fact that they come from a place of power that allows them to dissent. “Home 
Soil’s” narrative suggests that knowledge within Starfleet, whether medical, 
economic, or military, is deemed to be legitimate. In addition, the episode 
exposes the idea that resistance to this knowledge/discourse is also a 
manifestation of power that is often expressed through violence. The appeal 
and reaction to violence on the part of the mechanical “Other” and the way in 
which scientific rhetoric “crafts the world” are further explored in the next 




“IT’S JUST A SCIENCE PROJECT:” REVERBERATIONS OF THE 
FUTURE PROMETHEUS 
Captain's log, Stardate 43125.8: We have entered a spectacular 
binary star system in the Kavis Alpha sector on a most critical 
mission of astro-physical research. Our eminent guest, Doctor 
Paul Stubbs, will attempt to study the decay of neutronium 
expelled at relativistic speeds by a massive stellar explosion 
which will occur here in a matter of hours.  
                                                     Captain Picard in “Evolution” (1989) 
 
“Evolution” (1989) draws parallels to the tale of Mary Shelley’s Victor 
Frankenstein and his failed attempts at supplanting God in creating “life,” the 
ultimate “god-trick”; such a metaphor invites investigation into the claims of 
objectivity within scientific discourse (Haraway S/K). The episode deals with 
many of the issues faced by the crew in “Home Soil”: how to define new life, 
in particular the inorganic, and how to respond to this life when faced with the 
uncertainty of its intentions and motives, and how to mediate between different 
and opposing positions of scientists. As in “Home Soil,” science becomes the 
deciding factor in what constitutes life and whether that life is to be defined as 
intelligent and/or malevolent. Several interconnected ideas emerge from 
“Evolution”: the danger of unfettered science, the arrogance of scientific 
obsession, and the usurpation of the divine/nature in the creative process.  
              The episode begins benignly with a close up of a sleeping Wesley 




Crusher’s 17-year-old son, a child prodigy and an acting member of the crew, 
hint at what is to come. 88 Awoken from his sleep in the Enterprise’s genetics 
laboratory, Wesley finds he is late for bridge duty and hurriedly packs away 
his experiment on advancing the cacapilities of nanites.89 In his hurry to report 
to the bridge, he fails to check on his experiment. The other significant 
character in this episode is the visiting astro-physicist Dr Paul Stubbs (Ken 
Jenkins) who is about to launch an interstellar probe that is the culmination of 
his life’s work and will aid Starfleet in potentially new scientific discoveries. 
Once on the bridge Wesley views the binary star system that is at the heart of 
Dr Paul Stubbs’ experiment. Dr Stubbs is an eminent Starfleet scientist who 
has spent his life working on a way to study the “decay of neutronium expelled 
at relativistic speeds by a massive stellar explosion” (Picard) from a collapsing 
star.90 The works of these two driven males collide when the Enterprise’s 
systems malfunction. 
             Trying to launch Stubbs’ research probe, the Enterprise is rocked 
violently and loses critical systems. Things continue to go wrong and the 
central computer begins to act irrationally – recounting chess moves and 
playing a loud rendition of “Stars and Stripes Forever”. In a briefing about the 
future of the mission with the command staff, Dr Stubbs makes his position 
abundantly clear: “if we miss our chance now, we don't get another for two 
centuries. There will be many questions asked by Starfleet if the Enterprise 
                                                          
88 This character was based on a young Gene Roddenberry (Robb).  
89 Like Frankenstein’s creature, devised by Mary Shelley during a nightmare, Wesley’s 
creation is born whilst he is asleep, as the nanites escape his imagination/experiment and 
begin to multiply and evolve (Bam). 
90 The star is small but immensely powerful and destructive, an important analogy for the 





fails in its duty” (Stubbs). Both Stubbs and Wesley are driven by their 
extraordinary scientific abilities to a point where they become blind to the 
question of whether their attempts are reasonable. Stubbs is willing to risk the 
Enterprise and her crew in order to complete his work, and Wesley fails to 
comprehend the catastrophic consequences of his experiment being let loose. 
However, Wesley’s misguided confidence is shattered when he realises that his 
nanites could be responsible for taking apart the computer core: 
WESLEY: I've been working on my final project for Advanced 
Genetics. It's on nanotechnology. I've been studying the nanites we 
have in the Sickbay genetic supplies. They're these little tiny robots 
with gigabytes of mechanical computer memory. They're designed to 
enter living cells and conduct repairs. They're supposed to remain 
confined to the lab.  
GUINAN: Are you saying there are nanites loose?  
WESLEY: Two of them, that's all. I just wanted to see how they would 
interact and function in tandem. You see, in my experiment, I had 
proposed a theory that by working together they could combine their 
skills and increase their usefulness. It was working.  
GUINAN: So you made better nanites.  
WESLEY: I was pulling an all-nighter to collect my final data. I fell 
asleep. And when I woke up I saw the container had been left open. It's 
just a science project.  
GUINAN: You know, a doctor friend once said the same thing to me. 
Frankenstein was his name.                                                                                                  




Wesley’s genetics experiment, “just a science project” performed on the 
dormant nanites, “warns of the manifold dangers which accompany the 
promise and progress of science and technology” (van der Laan 299). In the 
dangers inherent in the nanite invasion, “Evolution” reawakens the 
Frankenstein warning about “scientific presumption, audacity, and amorality; 
about uncontrolled and uncontested scientific and technological 
experimentation and advance; and about their consequences” for humanity and 
for the creations of such scientific audacity (ibid). Guinan’s (Whoopi 
Goldberg) telling remark about Wesley’s misplaced confidence, “a doctor 
friend once said the same thing to me. Frankenstein was his name,” highlights 
the intended connection between the unfettered science of Shelley’s novel and 
scientists like both Wesley and Stubbs.91 Wesley’s conversation with Guinan 
also links the driven young scientist with Shelley’s protagonist, who like 
Wesley becomes so absorbed in his work that all else becomes insignificant. 
By wanting “to see how they would work interact and function in tandem,” 
Wesley is blinded to the potential risk of allowing two nanites to “work 
together” and learn from each other.             
            The episode focuses on the dangers of scientific obsession and the 
problem faced by humans who take over from God. The writers of this 
episode, Michael Piller and Michael Wagner, introduce Mary Shelley’s 
scientist-cum-alchemist, Victor Frankenstein, as an example of the arrogance 
of unfettered science. In this episode, like Shelley’s novel, ideas firmly rooted 
                                                          
91 The writers of this episode draw parallels between these two characters. For example, both 
Wesley and Stubbs have a love of baseball. Wesley’s interest in the sport is mentioned in 
“Justice” (1987) and both become isolated due to their driven nature. However, Wesley is 
shown at the end of the episode to have a number of friends and therefore it is suggested he 




in humanism are challenged and defragmented in the face of the new 
posthuman life. The use of Shelley’s protagonist in this episode emphases the 
“motives underlying the fictional scientific research” represented by both 
Wesley (his academic success: “I always get an A) and Dr Stubbs (his 
scientific acclaim) (van der Vaan 299). Both demonstrate, like Frankenstein, a 
need to succeed and gain knowledge but also a dissatisfaction with themselves 
and their achievements. Shelley’s novel is “about masculinity and scientific 
hubris, and has led to an enduring use of the title as a byword for the 
dangerous potential of the scientific over-reacher. It was in this vein that Isaac 
Asimov coined the term ‘the Frankenstein complex’…” and it is in this way 
that Wesley and Dr Stubbs, as “scientific over-reachers,” reflect Frankenstein’s 
need to breach the boundaries of traditional science (Knellworf & Goodall 
2008).              
             The danger of a preoccupation with scientific discovery and the 
importance of science over other forms of knowledge is epitomised in the 
character of Dr Stubbs. Stubbs is so obsessed and his self-worth so caught up 
with the success of his experiment that he would rather die than fail. He is also 
unconcerned for the fate of others who could be harmed by his compulsion. He 
is quick to point out that if the probe, which he views as a “brand new era in 
astro-physics,” is not launched as scheduled there will be questions asked by 
Starfleet. Wesley, now alarmed by the confirmation of the two missing nanites, 
firmly believes that the computer malfunction is his fault and due to the 
advanced nanites he designed. After confiding in his mother, he and Dr 
Crusher break the news to the Command team and a less-than-impressed Dr 




functioning state” (Crusher), which suggests that there are fears that they have 
the potential to be dangerous or to become stronger and out of control. The 
episode extrapolates the common trope of the twentieth century fear of viruses 
(both natural and techno) having the potential to harm or wage war on 
humanity by invisibly entering living cells, allowing these nanosocpic 
creatures the possibility to destroy silently and efficently. Like viruses, the 
nanites lie dormant, confined to the lab, waiting to unleash their invasion of the 
body of the ship. Given an opportunity to “breed” or interact and evolve, these 
nanites infect the ship’s systems with alarming speed. Able to “enhance their 
own design” (Crusher) with each new generation, these nanites have now 
evolved. Theories of evolution assume that all biological systems “reproduce”. 
According to Dr Crusher, these nanites are now “able to mechanically replicate 
themselves”. Dr Stubbs does not accept Crusher’s explanation, asking, “How 
does a machine evolve?” Dr Stubbs’ reaction to the idea of the nanites 
“evolving” is dubious disdain. Stubbs works from the traditional scientific 
principle that machines cannot evolve and that mechanical replication is not 
reproduction.92 What this dialogue highlights is two very different ways of 
viewing machines through competing scientific visions: firstly, Dr Crusher’s 
argument that machines can be more than they appear, that is, more than inert 
objects; and, secondly, Dr Stubbs’ assertion that machines cannot exhibit 
biological models.  
                                                          
92 It should be acknowledged that “evolution” in terms of fictional organisms such as nanites 
is fast-tracked. True evolution is not measured in one or two generations nor is it always 
successful (Ruse & Travis; Darwin 2010). Where thousands or hundreds of thousands of 
generations are necessary for evolution and adaptive radiation to occur in natural systems, in 
terms of science fiction’s ALife this is super-charged, with millions of generations occurring in 





              Different scientific discourses operate to fulfil opposing perspectives 
– one economic and one social/medical. It also raises some very interesting 
philosophical questions: for example, has each “generation” of nanites actually 
evolved or were they simply built by previous “generations” of nanites? Is 
reproduction and therefore evolution really exclusively biological? For both 
Data and Dr Crusher, “replication” equates to “reproduction,” “life is what it 
does” and life is “a self-sustaining chemical system capable of undergoing 
Darwinian evolution” (Di Justo & Grazier 9). Reproduction is, according to Dr 
Crusher’s previous argument in “Home Soil,” an indicator of life. In 
“Evolution,” evolving through replication is depicted as not exclusively 
biological but rather a factor present in all living matter. 
              For the bridge crew, the next step in determining what to do about the 
nanite invasion is to determine whether the nanites represent an intelligence, 
and a civilisation, rather than an infestation. For Picard, intelligence in the 
nanites is exemplified when the nanites are observed reacting to, and even 
attacking the crew of the Enterprise: 
PICARD: Can it be possible they know what they're doing?  
RIKER: Why would they attack us?  
STUBBS: Why does a mosquito bite your ear? And who cares? The 
answer is simple. Call an exterminator.  
…  
PICARD: Doctor Stubbs, we cannot exterminate something that may or 
may not be intelligent. 





As with the micro-brains in “Home Soil,” it is through violence that the nanites 
gain the crew’s attention, leading Picard to question whether there is a purpose 
to what the nanites are doing. For Stubbs there is no ambiguity: “I'm sorry but 
this is nonsense, you can’t have a civilisation of computer chips.” The nanites 
are machines manufactured “in a plant in Dakar” and as such are pests, like 
mosquitos and viruses, to be exterminated. According to Stubbs’ methodology, 
these nanites should be destroyed just as a virus must be killed when it 
endangers its host: “It's no more mysterious than watching a strain of the 
Leutscher virus reproduce itself. And that at least is a bona fide life form. How 
many disease germs and viruses have you destroyed in your time, Doctor 
Crusher?” (Stubbs). Dr Crusher remains adamant that these nanites are not 
simply machines but have life, consciousness, and a collectivism that 
demonstrate intelligence: “Doctor Stubbs, these nanites are now working with 
a new collective intelligence, operating together, teaching each other skills” 
(Crusher). Consequently, they should not be “exterminated”. The bridge crew 
determine that a “new collective consciousness” (as in “Home Soil”) is 
established within the ship’s system and that killing these nanites would be in 
conflict with their mission of seeking out new life. Roddenberry’s vision for 
the franchise is that scientific endeavour and the pursuit of knowledge for the 
betterment of humanity is the goal of Starfleet’s exploration of the stars. 
Stubbs, like Dr Frankenstein and Dr Mandl, views his experiment as being 
“performed in the service of humanity, a higher cause, and greater good.” 
However, they have a deeper, less honourable reason for their obsession, that 
of self-glorification (Bowman et al 300). Similar arguments have been used 




to show the potential to advance human well-being and society,” but at the 
potential risk of the future of the human species (Bowman et al 441). 
               To understand this new life form, Picard directs Wesley, Data, and La 
Forge to remove safely some of the nanites from the computer core: “try to 
remove them safely, if things get worse we’ll use stronger measures” (Picard). 
Interrupting Data’s attempts to remove the nanites, Dr Stubbs sterilises a panel 
with radiation, killing the nanites in the upper computer core. At the same 
time, Picard and Riker are contemplating the tale of Gulliver.93 At this point, 
the crew begin to choke in what appears to be a cloudy fog. The nanites in 
retaliation have pumped nitrogen oxide into the bridge. Dr Stubbs, refusing to 
believe that “a civilisation of computer chips” can exist let alone be sentient 
and learning, and hoping that the attack will force Picard to take action, has in 
fact provided proof that the nanites are working together in an intelligent 
manner: 
PICARD [to Stubbs]: If any man, woman or child on this ship is 
harmed as a result of your experiment, I will have your head before the 
highest command in the Federation.  
STUBBS: Good Lord, you are talking about machines with a screw 
loose. Simply turn them off and be done with them.  
DATA: Doctor Stubbs, your own actions have provided evidence to the 
contrary. When you destroyed the nanites in the core, they responded 
by interfering with our life support systems. It is difficult to accept 
                                                          
93 Gulliver recounts the tale of an explorer, captured by a miniature civilisation when he 




these as random actions by machines with loose screws. In effect, you 
may have proven that the nanites do have a collective intelligence.  
                                                                                                    
(“Evolution”1989)  
Stubbs creates the situation in which Picard must retaliate: “You have no 
choice now. It is a matter of survival” (Stubbs). He claims that his position 
within Starfleet as “a representative of the highest command of the Federation, 
which has directed you to perform my experiment” (Stubbs) and the 
importance of his work forces Picard to act against the “machines with a screw 
loose” (Stubbs). Ironically, as Data points out, it is Stubbs’s actions that prove 
that these “nanites do have a collective intelligence”. They attacked the crew as 
a direct result of Stubbs’ killing of their colleagues in the computer core. The 
later violent attack on Stubbs in his quarters proves that this is not a random 
attack but specifically directed to retaliate against what he has done, “I cannot 
believe that this was an arbitrary attack” (Picard). Just as Frankenstein 
animates his creature with energy, creating life but also creating his own 
destruction, the nanites seek their revenge on Stubbs through a form of energy. 
Energy is linked to destruction in Star Trek and with “life” in Frankenstein and 
with the power to give or take life. In response to this new violence, Picard 
instructs Riker to irradiate the remaining computer panels, thereby destroying 
the rest of the nanite civilisation. However, just before Riker can give the 
order, Data finds a way to communicate, leaving Picard with an alternative: 
“maybe we can negotiate a peace we can all live with” (Picard). As a means to 
aid communication Data acts as a conduit for the nanites “as a gesture of 




             Data establishes communication with the “civilisation”, and, speaking 
through him, the nanites and Picard are able to end the conflict. The dialogue 
that ensues is one in which both the nanites and Picard try to justify their 
actions in this conflict. The nanites react to humans, the “strange looking 
creatures” in a similar fashion as humans tend to act towards other 
“creatures.”94 Both parties misinterpret the other’s actions as hostile, each 
believing that the other attacked them first:  
DATA/NANITES: You are very strange looking creatures.  
PICARD: In our travels, we have encountered many other creatures, 
perhaps even stranger-looking than ourselves. But we try to co-exist 
peacefully with them.  
DATA/NANITES: Why did you attack us?  
PICARD: We misinterpreted your actions as an attack on us.  
DATA/NANITES: We were seeking raw materials for our replicating 
process.  
PICARD: Yes, but you endangered this vessel in which we all travel. 
You nearly killed a crewmember.  
DATA/NANITES: We meant no harm. We were exploring.  
PICARD: I understand. We are also explorers. We mean no harm to 
any other living creature. 
… [the nanites inside Data now turn their gaze to Stubbs and approach 
him] … 
                                                          





STUBBS: I am the one responsible for the deaths in the computer core.  
DATA/NANITES: We know who you are.  
STUBBS: I deeply regret the incident. I am a scientist on an important 
mission. Your colleagues’ exploration of the core memory put our 
mission at risk. I was only trying to protect a lifetime of work from 
being destroyed. I am at your mercy.  
DATA/NANITES: What is at your mercy?  
PICARD: He asks your forgiveness. This conflict was started by 
mistakes on both sides. Let's agree to end it here and now.  
DATA/NANITES: We agree.  
PICARD: I pledge we will do everything possible to assist your 
continued survival.  
DATA/NANITES: Thank you, but we have evolved beyond any need 
for your assistance …                                                                                                               
                                                                                              (“Evolution” 1989) 
This conversation raises two important and interconnected points. Firstly, that 
it is through a violent act that the subject is formed and secondly, that violence 
is justified when ideas or lives are threatened. Like Mandl in “Home Soil,” 
Stubbs previously and strenuously denied that the nanites have any 
subjectivity, but when attacked and confronted with the civilisation (through 
Data) refers to the nanites in terms relating to the subject. He apologises for the 
“deaths” in the core - “I deeply regret the incident” - but still justifies the 
deaths through the fact that he is “a scientist on an important mission” and 
“your colleague’s exploration of the core memory put our mission at risk” 




“deaths”, which suggests he now acknowledges the nanites are alive. Stubbs 
refers to the individuals he killed as their “colleagues,” acknowledging that 
they form a society or civilisation. The nanites justify their “attack” on the 
ship’s systems because “we were seeking raw materials for our replicating 
process” and “we meant no harm, we were exploring” (Nanites). Picard states 
that they too are explorers, and “mean no harm to any other living creature,” as 
if this quest for knowledge somehow justifies the nanites’ endangering the ship 
and Picard’s attempt to neutralise the nanites. Both claim the pursuit of 
knowledge as a reason for violence.  
             Each time Picard is faced with a new life form he states that his 
mission is to explore and seek out new life and that they “try to co-exist 
peacefully” with all creatures they encounter. However, this is not generally 
the case, as in the episode “Home Soil”; although Picard and his crew may 
question common-sense ideas about life and intelligence, they nevertheless 
look to human models in their reflection. It is generally only after the new life 
form has demonstrated a high level of intelligence or acts out violently that 
Picard establishes “peace” and this peace is usually established through the 
threat of further violence or death. His assertion that “we mean no harm to any 
other living creature” is contingent on that “creature” not posing a threat to the 
Enterprise, and by extension humanity. What these episodes represent is that 
the mission of the Enterprise continues the moral precedent of colonialism.  
            In the end, Dr. Stubbs arranges to have the nanites given a planet in 
which to continue to evolve: “Doctor Stubbs has used his influence to have 
planet Kavis Alpha Four designated the new home of the nanite civilisation” 




“evolved beyond” their need for humanity and beyond humanity’s 
“ideologies” and discourses. This episode depicts ALife in Star Trek as 
adaptable, evolving, and perfectly designed for survival, as the epitome of 
advanced future life. Humanity creates artificial life, replacing natural 
reproduction by manipulating the dormant nanites, leading to a possible threat 
to human kind by its techno-creation. Once given a voice, through Data, the 
nanites state that they have no more use for humanity or the ship and will leave 
to continue their evolution away from the destructive presence of humanity. 
The nanites achieve what Frankenstein’s creature is denied, a life free from 
interference from humanity, thereby highlighting the higher goal or purpose of 
Star Trek’s future time, following Roddenberry’s desire to show that time as 
morally superior to the present. However, below the surface of this rhetoric of 
objectivity lurks the  knowledge that this agreement with these life forms is 
forged under the threat of death, and although the nanites acquiesce to Picard’s 
threat they maintain their superiority in referring to the fact that they have 
“evolved beyond the need for your assistance” (Nanites).     
            Although in “Evolution” the reference to Shelley’s fictional character is 
fleeting, the thematic current running throughout this episode is very much 
dependent upon the fears that Frankenstein’s creature, the posthuman, instils in 
the human and the need for science to act responsibly towards its creations. 
Indeed, as van der Laan argues, “Victor Frankenstein has come to serve as the 
poster child and whipping boy of all scientific and technological 
irresponsibility” (298). Frankenstein is destroyed because he fails to take 
responsibility for the new life he created, viewing him/it as an abomination and 




“race” of posthumans. Frankenstein’s creature becomes “monstrous” once it 
leaves his control. It is the fear of not being able to  control the posthuman that 
humanity fears. One of the themes emerging from Shelley’s novel and Star 
Trek: The Next Generation’s “Evolution,” is the danger arising from scientific 
experimentation without “moral” boundaries, an  experimental parameters 
cannot always be maintained. The writers of the episode contrast Stubbs’ 
character with Wesley’s naivety and fear of not living up to expectations of his 
genius, but also with his willingness to accept responsibility for what he has 
created. Along with the scientific community on the Enterprise Wesley 
Crusher allows this new life to evolve and leave the ship to continue its own 
persistent quest for knowledge. The episode suggests that the pursuit of 
scientific discovery is not always a good thing and some like the “eminent 
guest” Dr. Paul Stubbs become too focused on their own glory, dismissing 
alternative espistemologies.      
Conclusion       
What emerges in “Home Soil” is a definition of life that looks to non-
physiological systems such as communication and intelligence as signifiers for 
life, thereby confronting orthodox definitions of what is life. These traditional 
archetypes of what defines life are further challenged when faced, in 
“Evolution,” with “living machines” that evolve. Machines play an increasing 
role in Star Trek’s philosophical and scientific debates over life, agency, 
complexity, and hierarchy. The Star Trek: The Next Generation episode 
“Evolution” focuses on the development of a new life form that evolves from a 
school science experiment into a complex civilisation of advanced nanites, but 




epistemes and leads to the violation of the rights of artificial life forms. The 
writer’s use of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein offers a cautionary tale of the 
future Prometheus whose offspring meet their demise in a world not yet ready 
for them. Star Trek aims to depict a universe that values a life derived from 
microcircuits and photons as much as that based on flesh and bone, or carbon-
based molecules. However, as these episodes demonstrate, this future world is 
initially no more accepting than Shelley’s fictional world of Frankenstein. 
Initial prejudice towards the “Other” still resides in Star Trek narratives, and 
for the mechanical “Other” this conflict is not always successfully resolved.  
           What is significant in the narratives discussed in this chapter is not 
simply the way that knowledge and power are interconnected, but how 
different scientific discourses act to shape discursive knowledge. These 
episodes highlight the fact that power is not always negative, but nor is it 
passive or selfless. Dr. Crusher, as chief medical officer, has the prerogative to 
undertake deeper investigations into the properties of the micro-brains and 
nanites. Picard as the Captain has the authority to order the destruction of the 
nanites, but choses to communicate with them and reach a peaceful solution. 
Dr. Stubbs utilises his position within Starfleet to give the nanites a planet to 
colonise and continue to evolve. Knowledge/power systems both act to 
suppress inorganic life forms and at the same time allow them to survive, but 
this survival is mediated or gained through violence and the threat of 




distinctions of life, and only by circumventing those same norms are their 
rights as life forms recognised.95  
             Asimov viewed technology as basically a positive, or at least neutral, 
component of human progress that required an ethical code to support its 
usage.  He acknowledged that humanity is often afraid of the technological 
being and it is the way that humans perceive, use, or treat technology, that is 
the inherent problem. The treatment of the technological being, in the form of 
the hologram, and how this, in turn, affects the place of that being amongst 














                                                          
95 Normalisation, that is the idea that it is merely a substance, is resisted through asking 
questions and through reflection. Foucault’s idea of subjectivity is that of “making a subject” 





I THINK, THEREFORE I EXIST? 
                                
René Descartes’ (1592 – 1650) famous phrase “Cogito ergo sum: I think, 
therefore I am,” encapsulates his idea of the human as a “thinking” machine. 
For Descartes the purely mechanistic nature of animals that react purely by 
instinct contrasted to human responses to stimuli that combined instinct with 
rational thought. 96 Humans were capable of rational thought because they 
possessed a rational soul. It was the ability to think about their own existence 
that separated humans from nonhuman animals. In other words, humans 
differed from animals because humans were self-aware. Consequently, animals 
acting solely on instinct could be viewed as showing clever simulations of 
consciousness in their responses to stimuli but were not to be considered self-
aware. They could be mistaken for being “conscious” beings because they 
appeared to react in similar ways as humans to external events. However, they 
were not capable of understanding events or reacting in creative ways in 
response to such events.  
                In Star Trek: The Next Generation’s “Elementary, Dear Data” and 
“Ship in a Bottle”, Captain Jean Luc Picard (Patrick Stewart) is faced with a 
dilemma when he is confronted with a self-aware hologram. This apparent 
self-awareness brings into focus Descartes’ theory of the mind, and the mind’s 
                                                          
96 It should be noted that for Descartes humans were not part of the animal kingdom. 
Mankind (sic) was elevated above animals in the former’s possession of an inner guiding 





link to sentience. 97 Focusing upon the holographic character Professor James 
Moriarty (Daniel Davis), these episodes address the nature of consciousness in 
regards to photonic beings, the nature of reality and authenticity, and in 
revisiting the theme of Isaac Asimov’s “Frankenstein complex,” deal with 
humanity’s reaction to their artificial progeny. 98 The Promethean theme re-
emerges in Star Trek: The Next Generation’s “Elementary, Dear Data” (1988). 
“Elementary, Dear Data” tells the story of the developing self-awareness of 
Professor James Moriarty and his journey to understand what or who he has 
become. As Moriarty attempts to understand his newfound consciousness, the 
episode switches to Picard’s reaction to Moriarty’s claim to life. The sequel, 
“Ship in a Bottle” (1993), screened five years later, takes up Moriarty’s story 
and his quest for freedom from the virtual world in which he was imprisoned. 
Like Victor Frankenstein’s creature, Moriarty demands more than a life 
abandoned and fabricated on the fringes of human society. He demands that his 
soul mate the Countess Regina Bartholomew (Stephanie Beacham) be given 
life and that he and she be released from the holodeck. In their narratives of 
reality versus virtuality and the human versus the simulated human artifice, 
these episodes raise questions about identity, boundaries, and the nature of 
reality. While “Elementary, Dear Data” examines Moriarty’s emerging 
consciousness, “Ship in a Bottle” looks at his struggle to prove his existence as 
a person, or “thinking thing” (Descartes).  
                                                          
97 According to Richard Leakey (1992) “consciousness, as a quality of mind, makes each of us 
feel special as an individual, because the sense of self, by its nature, is exclusive of others. The 
same quality has encouraged us – Homo sapiens – to feel special in the world, separate from 
and somehow above the rest of nature” (310). 
98 The original character of Professor James Moriarty was developed by Arthur Conan Doyle 




             In Star Trek, as in many science fiction narratives, the confrontation of 
the “modern Prometheus” with his or her artifice is feared because it casts 
doubt upon what it means to be Human. 99 In essence, the modern Prometheus, 
born out of the stories of Frankenstein’s monster, identifies how the simulated 
human artifice threatens the so-called and habitually vaunted uniqueness of 
humanity, often referred to as the “essence” of human nature. Humanity’s 
privileged position can only be maintained through this call to uniqueness. 
However, once this exclusivity is breached, the discourse around what it means 
to be human must be reaffirmed. Science fiction illuminates the boundary 
negotiations inherent in the modern Prometheus. It explores the erupting 
tensions and threats to the concept of uniqueness, which is highlighted in the 
fact that in order to maintain the status quo it is in humanity’s best interests to 
actively patrol the boundary between the human and nonhuman. Part of this 
patrol is to constantly define and redefine what it means to be human, and as a 
consequence, to define who or what is included within the sphere of humanity. 
This becomes important for the nonhuman because it is often the fact that the 
nonhuman has been accepted into the human community that affords the 
nonhuman any form of rights, or duties of care.  
             Fear of the posthuman supplanting or negating humanity is represented 
and acted out as distrust or aversion towards the posthuman leading to the 
abandonment and isolation of the sentient artificial being by the human 
community.  In the case of Professor Moriarty, when Moriarty attains 
consciousness and defeats Data (Brent Spiner), Picard’s trepidation about the 
Professor’s growing self-awareness ultimately sees Picard contain, or entrap, 
                                                          
99 Lord Byron (1788-1824), Percy Shelley and Mary Shelley, amongst others, used the 




the Professor within a virtual world – a “ship in a bottle.” Depicted in these 
episodes are the articulated discourses of isolation, authenticity, and alienation 
that invite questions about humanity’s obligation to its posthuman creations.  If 
a hologram, like Moriarty, is a simulated human entity that “doubts, 
understands, affirms, wills, refuses … imagines and feels,” what duty, if any, 
does Picard have to protect the rights and interests of that hologram? 
(Descartes 297). Addressed within these two episodes are the willingness, or 
the disinclination of humanity to take responsibility for the nonhuman “Other,” 
which is created to serve humanity, and how that nonhuman “Other” tries to 
create its own authenticity against its creator’s opposition. In his attempt to 
prove a sense of authenticity and substance, Moriarty attempts to evoke 
Descartes’ First Order of Philosophy – “I am a thinking thing that exists” 
(Cottingham 1994).  
“The Dark Flecks of the Soul:” Conjuring Up Digital Monsters  
The opening scene of “Elementary, Dear Data,” (1988) begins with Geordi La 
Forge (LeVar Burton) showing Data a handcrafted model of the sailing ship, 
Victory.  La Forge emphasises the fact that making the ship by hand is the real 
challenge. La Forge alludes to the fact that producing something through 
replication or simulation is inferior to creating the model by hand. The real 
challenge, or victory, is to pit yourself against the struggle of creating 
something unique with your own hands. The concept of the inferiority of the 
simulated versus the superiority of the “real” recurs in this episode as the 
characters debate whether human intuition and creativity are superior and 
therefore more authentic than Data’s ability to “reproduce” knowledge 




and Data (as Sherlock Holmes) spending time on the holodeck role-playing 
Data’s favourite literary detective – Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes. 
When Data solves the mystery at the very beginning, La Forge is angry, saying 
that he “was looking forward to the mystery” (La Forge) and that Data has 
spoiled the fun by jumping to the conclusion without engaging with the 
mystery. This prompts Dr. Kate Pulaski (Diana Muldaur) to tell La Forge that 
he is wasting his breath trying to explain to Data the excitement of solving a 
mystery with the possibility of failure. She challenges Data’s ability to 
understand La Forge’s position as Data cannot relate to the excitement of 
attempting something that contains the risk of failure. Pulaski views the 
uniqueness of humanity as being contained within the “soul” or the intuitive 
aspect of human nature. Although Data appears, in Descartes words, to be a 
“thinking machine,” he does not have the ability to think beyond his 
programming. He does not have a “rational soul” (Descartes).  
                 An attempt to prove that Data can be creative and solve an original 
Sherlock Holmes mystery leads to La Forge becoming a Promethean figure 
when he creates an “adversary capable of defeating Data” (La Forge). Just as 
Mary Shelley’s literary creation Frankenstein (1818) was born of her desire to 
prove herself the literary equal of Percy Shelley and Lord Bryon, La Forge’s 
holo-creation is born of his desire to prove to Pulaski that Data is more than a 
computer and is able to expand beyond computation. 100 La Forge’s challenge 
is to convince Pulaski that Data can understand “the dark flecks of the soul” 
(Pulaski). Victor Frankenstein also had a point to prove in that he wanted to 
create something unique, to challenge death and to create a human being, but 
                                                          
100 Her story was written in response to a challenge from Lord Byron and Percy Shelley to see 




instead, he creates something monstrous. La Forge’s creation also becomes 
something more than he had anticipated or fully understands – a sentient, 
“living” hologram.   
                 When La Forge instructs the computer to create a foe for Data, 
rather than Sherlock Holmes, it conjures up a sentient Professor James 
Moriarty, the master criminal, the adversary Holmes could only defeat at the 
cost of his own life at Reichenbach Falls” (Data). Like Frankenstein’s monster, 
Moriarty is a discursive construct, a fictional being constructed out of 
language, or discourse in a novel. Like Frankenstein, La Forge is mistaken in 
his belief in humanity’s ability to control their nonhuman creations. La Forge 
tells Picard it was his error, his choice of language that created Moriarty: “I 
can't help thinking what else might have happened all because I misspoke a 
single word.” Moriarty is conjured up out of a desire to create something new 
and something challenging. Mary Shelley’s something new is a ghost story that 
would chill the blood, Victor Frankenstein’s is the desire to create life itself, 
and for La Forge, it is a worthy foe for Data’s Holmes.                        
               The core themes of Promethean creation, Frankenstein’s warning, 
and the nature of reality invading the narrative relate to what science fiction 
tales have long asked: what makes us human? Is it flesh and blood, 
consciousness, a soul, free will, or an ability to create, invent and wonder? 
Science fiction narratives demonstrate that such human characteristics are 
vulnerable and unstable when faced with the automaton that is capable of 
emulating the human condition or passing as human. Humans “cling to the 
notion that there is one last little entity inside humans that makes them more 




1993 126). In “Elementary, Dear Data,” Pulaski clings to the view of humanity 
as centred round the notion of the soul, an underlining factor that makes 
humans unique. In other words, it is not enough that Data can reason, he must 
also be able to use reason creatively. She argues that Data, as a machine, 
cannot understand the complexities of Arthur Conan Doyle’s mysteries 
because he lacks an understanding of the human soul: “You learn by rote. To 
you all is memorisation and recitation” (Pulaski). From her perspective, this 
means that Data lacks creativity and imagination, and he lacks the life 
experience necessary to emulate Holmes. La Forge counters that “deductive 
reasoning is one of Data's strengths” but Pulaski is unconvinced:  
PULASKI: But Holmes understood the human soul. The dark flecks 
that drive us, that turn the innocent into the evil. That understanding is 
beyond Data. It comes from life experience which he doesn't have 
combined with human intuition for which he cannot be programmed. 
                                                              (“Elementary, Dear Data” 1988) 
Pulaski believes that what makes humans different from machines is “human 
intuition,” something which cannot be programmed into an artificial being. 
What distinguishes humans from machines is the ability to have original and 
creative thoughts, and these are based within the “human soul”. Data can 
download emotions, experiences or sensations that can mimic human 
responses, but because these are not instinctive or original, they are not 
considered by Pulaski to be an essential part of what or who he is. Because 
they are not “original,” these emotions, experiences or sensations are viewed as 
inferior to those present in humans. For Pulaski, La Forge’s attempt to blur the 




humanity, metaphorically expressed as our soul: it threatens to replace the 
individual, God-given soul with a mechanical, machine-made one” (Schelde 
9). Pulaski’s position echoes the trepidation of early technophobes who viewed 
technology and in particular the pseudo-human as threatening, supplanting, or 
even eliminating human thought, creativity, and intuition, the last bastion that 
separates humans from machines. 
          As a newcomer to the Enterprise crew, Dr. Pulaski appears less 
accepting of Data as an equal than her predecessor, Dr. Crusher. This makes 
the premise of her challenging Data’s ability to understand human nature more 
plausible since it is unlikely that Crusher would have doubted Data’s deductive 
ability. To prove her point that Data is not creative, Pulaski challenges Data to 
solve a Holmesian-style mystery without relying on his programmed 
knowledge of Arthur Conan Doyle’s stories. Pulaski, Data, and La Forge enter 
the holodeck, which is a perfect replica of 1890s London. Similar to the 
“Voigt-Kampf” test in Philip K. Dick’s novel, Do Androids Dream of Electric 
Sheep?, and Ridley Scott’s cinematic version Blade Runner, Pulaski wants to 
test Data’s understanding of human emotions and imagination by testing him 
to see if he can solve an original mystery.101 Unfortunately for Data, who is 
trying to prove that he can solve an original puzzle, the computer has merely 
combined elements of Conan Doyle’s narratives, and he quickly solves the 
case. This prompts Pulaski to reiterate her claim that Data does not stand a 
chance of solving something unique: 
                                                          
101 Philip K. Dick in his novel, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, uses the Voigt-Kampf test, 
itself modelled on the Turing Test, as a means for his protagonist Rick Deckard to find those 
androids on Earth who are passing as humans. The test measures and monitors empathy, 




PULASKI: Fraud. You didn't deduce anything. All you did was 
recognise elements from two different Holmes stories. Fraud.  
DATA: Reasoning. From the general to the specific. Is that not the very 
definition of deduction? Is that not the way Sherlock Holmes worked?  
PULASKI: Variations on a theme. Now, now do you see my point? 
[speaking to La Forge] All that he knows is stored in his memory 
banks. Inspiration, original thought, all the true strength of Holmes is 
not possible for our friend. I'll give you credit for your vast knowledge, 
but your circuits would just short out if confronted by a truly original 
mystery. It's elementary, dear Data.  
                                                              (“Elementary, Dear Data” 1988) 
Data is a “fraud” because he does not use “inspiration” and “original thoughts” 
to decipher the mystery. 102 Logic and reasoning in the artificial being are 
considered by Pulaski to be inferior to the human ability to solve problems 
through intuition and originality. Data relies on programmed memories of 
Doyle’s work and finds it difficult to imagine alternative scenarios. In this 
way, Data’s failure echoes Descartes’ view of the nonhuman as being 
incapable of detailed and varied responses to events: 
For while reason is a universal instrument which can serve for all 
contingencies, these organs have need of some special adaptation for 
every particular action. From this, it follows that it is morally 
impossible that there should be sufficient diversity in any machine to 
                                                          
102 The problem in defining what an “original thought” is complex, and will not be discussed in 




allow it to act in all the events of life in the same way as our reason 
causes us to act. 
                                                                    (Descartes, 107-108) 
Framed within Descartes’ dualism, Data fails because a machine cannot have 
all the necessary “organs” that allow for varied responses to life experiences. A 
machine can only be programmed with a certain amount of knowledge, and 
this knowledge cannot “adapt” to every “particular action”. Data, as a machine, 
has reason but this is not guided by the soul. After Data’s failure, La Forge and 
Data agree to begin a new Holmes mystery, one that does not follow any of 
Conan Doyle’s original tales. As they debate how to do this, a figure is shown 
watching from the foggy back streets of 1890s London. As La Forge instructs 
the computer to devise a mystery “to confound Data, with an opponent to 
defeat Data” (La Forge), the figure reacts with surprise and interest. It is 
apparent that this figure, later revealed to be Professor Moriarty, is already 
aware, before the computer reprograms him, that something is different 
because other characters on the holodeck do not notice the arch. This scene 
shows that Moriarty is already looking towards knowledge and understanding 
and is not a passive character in a holonovel. He is thinking about his existence 
and the world around him – becoming what Descartes defined as a “thinking 
machine” (Descartes). 
              In the selection of Professor Moriarty as both foe to Holmes and Data, 
the computer creates a new Moriarty, one endowed with what it takes to defeat 
Data – consciousness. In The Final Problem Sherlock Holmes describes 




with a phenomenal mathematical faculty” (Conan Doyle 223).103 While Conan 
Doyle emphasises the similarities between Holmes and Moriarty, the episode 
makes clear Moriarty’s position as the doppelganger of Data. As the new holo-
programme begins, Moriarty, seen from the London alley watching La Forge, 
Data and Pulaski, tells his companion; “I feel like a new man. That dark fellow 
there used the word arch, and then, I wonder? Arch” (Moriarty).  
                In calling forth the arch, Moriarty attains a power hitherto applied 
only to the crew. He does so through the control of language and knowledge. 
He will use this knowledge of language again in “Ship in a Bottle” to proclaim 
his embodiment. Visually indistinguishable from a human, Moriarty represents 
a disruption to the supposed uniqueness of humanity. Humanity is an identity 
that is  based on claims to originality and uniqueness, and this is thrown into 
turmoil when faced with the nonhuman artificial being. In attaining 
consciousness, or more importantly, self-consciousness, Moriarty bridges the 
gap between the ‘artificial’ and the ‘authentic’ human. By perfectly duplicating 
the human pattern and then infusing this pattern with awareness, the 
reprogrammed character of Moriarty becomes aware of his own beginning and 
his limitations. He seeks knowledge of his new-found experience and the 
mysterious “Arch” that he sees called forth by La Forge. After abducting Dr. 
Pulaski, Moriarty waits in his hidden laboratory, representative of the late 
Victorian scientist, for his nemesis Data/Holmes to arrive: 
MORIARTY: And, like the spider, I feel the strings vibrate whenever 
anyone new chances into my web. Welcome, my dear Holmes. But not 
                                                          
103 This mathematical quality and scientific inquiry links Moriarty with René Descartes. This 
link is strengthened in the narrative by Moriarty’s appeal to Descartes’ philosophy of the 




Holmes. And Doctor Watson. But not Watson.  
LA FORGE: Data, what does he mean? How does he know we're not 
who we appear to be?  
                                                              (“Elementary, Dear Data” 1988) 
As in the previous scene, Moriarty is conscious of the fact that all is not as it 
seems. He is unsure of his new reality and of the two men who are not what 
they appear to be. In this scene, Moriarty struggles to piece together nineteenth 
century knowledge with his growing self-awareness (Fig. 3). His mind craves 
knowledge and he is eager to find out why he does not believe that 
Holmes/Data is truly Holmes, and that his world is somehow wrong.  
 
Figure 3. Moriarty stands in front of the blackboard that contains his 






The Mind is Where I Am 
In The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins states, “intelligent life on a planet 
comes of age when it first works out the reason for its own existence” (1). 
René Descartes purposed a similar theory when he stated that an essential 
quality of humans is in the enquiry into what or who they are. It is the act of 
questioning what the self is that leads to self-awareness. Humanity is often 
portrayed as having the unique ability to question its own existence. This 
concept of the ability to think about the self, as part of being human, was not 
unique to Descartes. John Locke (1632 – 1704) also viewed a person as a 
“thinking, intelligent being that has reason and reflection; and can consider 
itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places” (Schick 
221).  
           In terms of Moriarty, the concept of the self is depicted as located 
within the mind; it is through thought that he becomes self-aware, and it is 
within the mind that his identity resides. The mind as the “true repository” of 
self-awareness becomes noticeable in his awakening into consciousness:  
MORIARTY: … my mind is crowded with images. Thoughts I do not 
understand yet cannot purge. They plague me. You and your associate 
look and act so oddly, yet though I have never met nor seen the like of 
either of you, I am familiar with you both. It's very confusing. I have 
felt new realities at the edge of my consciousness, ready to break 
through. Surely, Holmes, if that's who you truly are, you of all people 
can appreciate what I mean. 




As a digital holo-image, Moriarty is able to become a conduit for information 
gathered from the central computer. In this way, he is able to gain knowledge 
of the twenty-fourth century and combine this with his nineteenth century 
understanding of the world. Confronted by Moriarty’s strange behaviour and 
seemingly impossible knowledge, La Forge and Data become increasingly 
concerned. As Moriarty, standing in his laboratory, calls for the “Arch,” their 
anxiety grows: 
MORIARTY: I know there is a great power called Computer, wiser 
than the oracle at Delphi. A power which controls all of this, and to 
which we can speak. Arch. [the Arch appears]. 
LA FORGE: Data, this isn't right. A holographic image should not be 
able to call for the arch.  
MORIARTY: It has described a great monstrous shape on which I am 
like a fly stuck on a turtle's back adrift in a great emptiness. What is 
this, Holmes? [He gives Holmes/Data a piece of paper on which he has 
drawn an image]. 
                                                         (“Elementary, Dear Data” 1988) 
Now showing real concern, Data flees the holodeck as Moriarty calls after him 
“Why does it frighten you Holmes?” (Moriarty). “It” is the piece of paper 
which is revealed to contain an image of the Enterprise that Moriarty has 
drawn. Confused, La Forge demands that Data tell him what is wrong. After 
informing La Forge of the fact that Moriarty has knowledge of their world and 
is now in control of the holodeck, and of greater concern, some control over 




Moriarty can apparently imagine a world outside of the holodeck, and even 
envision the Enterprise. It is clear from this that Moriarty has been able to 
access the central computer.  
             In a briefing with the senior staff they find out that in creating his 
fictional opponent, La Forge has made the mistake of instructing the computer 
to create “an opponent capable of defeating Data” (La Forge) rather than 
Holmes. In programming Moriarty to defeat Data, the computer gives Moriarty 
“a unifying force or a single consciousness” (Troi) which allows him to 
acquire the necessary intelligence or consciousness to outwit Data. As a 
consequence, Moriarty is able to see beyond the confines of the holodeck and 
beyond the boundaries of his original programming as the fictional Professor:  
MORIARTY: It's gone beyond that little game, Mister Data. And you'll 
note I no longer call you Holmes. Whatever I was when this began, I 
have grown. I am understanding more and more ... 
(“Elementary, Dear Data” 1988) 
In exchange for releasing control of the Enterprise Moriarty demands that he 
be given the same rights and freedoms as Picard. He tells Picard that all he 
wants is “[t]o continue to exist. If I destroy these surroundings, this vessel, can 
you say it doesn't matter to you? Interesting pun, don't you agree, for matter is 
what I am not. The computer has taught me that I am made up only of energy” 
(Moriarty). Picard tries to explain to Moriarty that although “in the year in 
which we live humans have discovered that energy and matter are 
interchangeable,” Moriarty is still only a construct and it is not possible for 




holodeck, energy is converted to matter, thus you have substance. But only 
here” (Picard). Moriarty refuses to see the view that Picard reflects, one of an 
un-self-aware construct, a holo-image: 
PICARD: You are not alive. As I said before, you are only … 
MORIARTY: A holographic image, I know. But are you sure?  
PICARD: Oh yes.  
MORIARTY: Does he have life? [Referring to Data] He's a machine. 
But is that all he is?  
PICARD: No. He is more.  
MORIARTY: Exactly. Is the definition of life cogito ergo sum? I think, 
therefore I am.  
PICARD: Yes, that is one possible definition.  
MORIARTY: It is the most important one, and for me the only one that 
matters. You or someone asked your computer to programme a 
nefarious fictional character from nineteenth century London and that is 
how I arrived. But I am no longer that creation. I am no longer that evil 
character, I have changed. I am alive, and I am aware of my own 
consciousness.  
                                                               (“Elementary, Dear Data” 1988) 
In asking Picard whether “I think therefore, I am” is the most important aspect 
of being alive, Moriarty reiterates René Descartes’ philosophical debate around 
the nature of the self. Descartes believed that “I think, therefore I am, is the 
first and most certain of all that occurs to one who philosophises in an orderly 
way” (Descartes 279). To think is therefore to exist because only a thinking 




the individual endures. Descartes posited a dualistic concept of human 
existence, in that the mind and body were separate entities linked through a 
rational soul. The mind was a nonphysical entity that existed as pure energy. In 
this sense, Moriarty could indeed exist outside the holodeck as his identity 
exists within the mind, which is distinct from the body.  
             Moriarty’s position on cogito ergo sum also points to the techno-
utopian belief that the mind or rather consciousness can exist without the body. 
The theory is that consciousness can be downloaded into a computer network. 
Existing in virtual reality, consciousness “lives” without matter. Like techno-
visions of the past, holograms redefine what it is to be human. The image of 
the human, or indeed humanoid, is fabricated as photonic energy that patterns 
information into a complete replica of humanity. This new vision represents a 
mechnomorphic view of humanity. 
             Moriarty states that he is conscious of his own existence and that he 
wants that existence “… out there, just as you have yours” (Moriarty) and not 
to be confined to the holodeck. Moriarty seeks release from the holodeck 
because he wants to experience what it is to be “human”. Freedom, autonomy, 
self-exploration, and self-determination are in Star Trek equated with 
humanness. Like Shelley’s creature, Moriarty demands a life like his creator. 
But in granting him such a life, the fear remains that this will render the 
definition of what comprises humanity, or the “human condition”, irrelevant. 
The fact that Moriarty offers a new definition of life, one that encompasses the 
“mind,” demonstrates that he has grasped the fundamental problem of defining 
life – that is, whether definitions of life are based on possessing a “body” and a 




related to biological factors discussed in the previous chapter. Self-awareness, 
self-consciousness is elemental in any definition of intelligent life. I think, 
therefore I am alive determines life in terms of intelligence, consciousness, and 
sentience. Therefore, it is not simply consciousness that denotes life but self-
consciousness. In Descartes’ theory of the mind and body, there can be no 
existence without conscious thought.              
              Picard concedes that Moriarty is conscious but he rejects the idea that 
the hologram is also alive. Moriarty asks Picard why Data is different: is he not 
also just a machine? In contrast to Pulaski’s view of Data as an advanced and 
complex machine, Picard argues that Data is “more” than a machine. Data has 
life. However, what Picard means by “he is more” is not addressed in this 
episode.104 Picard also does not state why he considers Data has life. Nor does 
he address why he acknowledges life in Data but denies life in Moriarty. I 
would suggest the answer lies in the fact that Picard views Data as a friend and 
colleague and Moriarty as “entertainment”, as simply a holo-projection without 
substance or physicality, created at/for their pleasure. For Picard, Moriarty also 
lacks the social and cultural context that he attributes to Data. Therefore, 
attributions of sentience are like consciousness: both are subjective and 
relational. For the humanist, sentience is “granted” in terms of what 
individuals know, or the “like us” paradox and this belonging, this being “like 
us,” becomes a sacred boundary between the human and the nothuman. The 
theory of posthumanism advocates that “no objects, spaces or bodies … [are] 
… sacred in themselves; any component can be interfaced with any other if the 
proper standard, the proper code, can be constructed …” (Haraway 2006 166). 
                                                          





Picard accepts that Data has the “proper code” to pass into the human world; 
Moriarty does not. It may also be that Picard’s view of what constitutes a 
person reflects the materialist view of the mind as a physical entity located 
within the brain that cannot be sustained outside the body. Data has a body, 
albeit a mechanical one, but Moriarty does not, existing as pure energy. 
Consequently, Moriarty is excluded from the human world, which, within Star 
Trek, is not framed within posthuman irreverence but within the sacredness of 
humanism. 
                The narrative not only focuses on the uniqueness of humanness but 
also reflects anxiety over the increasing insidiousness of technology and what 
happens when fantasy becomes too real. As in the increasing perverseness of 
computer games, fantasy role playing or cyberspace, the division between 
virtual selves and corporal selves and between reality and virtually in this 
episode is blurred. What starts out as a simple role-playing diversion turns into 
a dangerous and life threatening techno-battle when Moriarty gains 
consciousness and seeks to understand his new-found sentience. Irresponsibly 
naïve, the crew of the Enterprise create playthings that cater to their boredom 
during long space voyages without regard for what they have in fact created or 
indeed how dangerous such technology could be.105 
            In this episode, as in much of Star Trek, “bodies are maps of power and 
identity” (Haraway 2006 177). The focus in “Elementary, Dear Data” on 
embodiment establishes or maps the power struggle between Picard and 
Moriarty, between the human and the nothuman, in the battle for identity. In 
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the end, the hope of attaining embodiment off the holodeck acts to pacify 
Moriarty. Picard uses Moriarty’s craving for a life of substance, of matter, as 
an opiate to make him relinquish control of the ship and accept deactivation.  
Although Moriarty states that he does “not want to die” he finally concedes 
and capitulates, telling Picard “my fate is in your hands, as perhaps it always 
was” (Moriarty). At the close of the episode, Picard tells La Forge “everything 
is in perfect order … as are we” (Picard) suggesting that the “perfect order” is 
achieved through a return to the status quo; and in this sense, matter wins.       
 A Fictional Man: “I am a thing that thinks”      
Star Trek: The Next Generation’s “Ship in a Bottle” (1993), the sequel to 
“Elementary, Dear Data” (1988) expands on Professor Moriarty’s search for 
identity and self-determination. The episode looks at the notion of citizenship, 
whether the nothuman can ever truly be a “citizen” within the human 
community and asks, when does autonomy begin? It expands on the theme 
developed in the prequel, that is, what is the nature of reality. From the 1980s 
onwards, a plethora of science fiction films played with the problematic notion 
of reality (Blade Runner (1982), Videodrome (1983), Total Recall (1990) 
eXistenz (1999), The 13th Floor, The Matrix (1999)). 106 In these tales, 
characters are for the most part unaware of the fiction of their world. In Blade 
Runner the border between replicants and humans is in some cases blurred as 
in Rachel; in eXistenz characters are so immersed in the game they do not 
know the boundary between “the game” and reality, and in The Matrix, 
humanity is entombed within a never-ending virtual reality that provides 
energy for the machines. Unlike the protagonists of these stories, Moriarty 
                                                          




knows that his world is a fiction and desperately tries to enter the real world by 
luring Picard into a virtual world of his own making.   
               “Ship in a Bottle” begins with La Forge and Data on the holodeck 
acting out a sequence from Sherlock Holmes. Both the title and the opening 
sequence link this episode to “Elementary, Dear Data.”107 Because of a failed 
circuit in the Sherlock Holmes programme, Lt. Reg. Barclay (Dwight Schultz) 
begins to run through the programme looking for defective circuits. Finding a 
saved, encoded file, Barclay opens the programme, revealing the saved 
character of Moriarty. The Professor appears on the empty holodeck, shown as 
a dark empty space with only a grid-like pattern to distinguish the walls from 
the interior. The walls of the holodeck that are usually never seen appear to 
close in on the characters, highlighting Moriarty’s sense of disembodiment and 
imprisonment as he stands in the middle of the empty space. He is eager to 
hear of any progress that has been made to free him from his holo-world:  
BARCLAY: Who are you?  
MORIARTY: Professor James Moriarty … 
… MORIARTY: Where is Captain Picard? Is he still Captain of this 
vessel?  
BARCLAY: How would? How do you know the Captain?  
MORIARTY: You don't know anything about what happened, do you? 
I have been stored in memory for God knows how long and no one has 
given me a second thought.   
BARCLAY: You know! You know what you are.  
                                                          
107 The title of this episode “Ship in a Bottle” references the presence of the model ship, the 




MORIARTY: A holodeck character? A fictional man? Yes, yes I know 
all about your marvellous inventions. I was created as a plaything so 
that your Commander Data could masquerade as Sherlock Holmes. But 
they made me too well and I became more than a character in a story. I 
became self-aware. I am alive.  
BARCLAY: That's not possible. 
(“Ship in a Bottle” 1993) 
Moriarty remembers his encounter with the Captain and Picard’s promise to 
help free him from the holodeck. In this scene, Moriarty restates his 
declaration of self-awareness. His mounting frustration can be seen in his 
stance, his jaw set and fists clenched, as he confronts a surprised Lt. Barclay 
on the empty holodeck. Standing in the lifeless hologrid, Moriarty asserts that 
he is very much alive. Lt. Barclay, who arrived on board the Enterprise after 
the first encounter, knows nothing of the efforts to free Moriarty. It is revealed 
that Picard handed over the investigation into how to free Moriarty to Starfleet 
engineers. Since no action has been taken on finding a way to free Moriarty, it 
raises the question of how much thought the Captain and Starfleet have truly 
given to Moriarty’s plight. Moriarty demands that Picard meet him on the 
holodeck in Holmes’ sitting room. Barclay deactivates Moriarty and leaves to 
inform Picard. But Moriarty reappears on the holodeck with a smile suggestive 






Ship in a Bottle: Navigating Reality  
In the sitting room at 221B Baker Street, Moriarty confronts Picard, telling him 
that while he was in the holomatrix he experienced, like the ghost in the 
machine, “brief terrifying periods of consciousness disembodied without 
substance” which “left him to go quietly mad” (Moriarty). Picard confesses 
that he is “concerned to learn you experienced the passage of time in the 
computer memory” (Picard). Nevertheless, Moriarty dismisses the Captain’s 
words and states that he will not go back into storage, demanding to be freed 
from the holodeck. He will not consent to go back into “a world I know to be 
nothing but illusion” (Moriarty). In this scene there is a definite power struggle 
going on between Picard and Moriarty. Picard continues to refuse to grant 
Moriarty freedom on the basis that Moriarty is a hologram and cannot exist 
outside the holodeck. Picard reiterates his stance in “Elementary, Dear Data,” 
arguing that because Moriarty is an object, a simulation without substance, 
without physicality, he cannot exist in the “real world:” 
PICARD: Although an object appears solid on the holodeck, in the real 
world they have no substance.  
(Picard throws out a book through the arch and it vanishes)  
MORIARTY: An object has no life. I do.  
PICARD: Professor, you are a computer simulation.  
MORIARTY: I have consciousness. Conscious beings have will. The 
mind endows them with powers that are not necessarily understood, 
even by you. If my will is strong enough, perhaps I can exist outside 
this room. Perhaps I can walk into your world right now.  




door, you will cease to exist.  
MORIARTY: If I am nothing more than a computer simulation, then 
very little will have been lost. But if I am right? Mind over matter. 
Cogito ergo sum.  
(Moriarty walks through the arch and out into the corridor, and does 
not disappear)  
MORIARTY: I think therefore I am. 
                                                                         (“Ship in a Bottle” 1993)  
Moriarty attempts to convince Picard that he is a live through rational 
demonstration, that is, through taking control and leaving the holodeck. In this 
episode, Moriarty raises doubt about the mutability of matter, as well as in the 
certainty of Picard’s reality. Key to Moriarty’s argument for his existence as 
more than a fictional man is the fact that that consciousness is “not necessarily 
understood” even by people as advanced as the crew of the Enterprise.108 
Moriarty’s self-awareness raises fundamental questions about the nature of 
consciousness: is consciousness located in the brain, a physical, biological 
component of the body? On the other hand, is it something less tangible, 
something ethereal: a connection to the soul, separate from the body, but able 
to influence the body? For Moriarty, it is the argument of “mind over matter” 
that is relevant to how life and consciousness are defined.  
            There is power evident in the statement: I think, therefore I exist. 
Although Picard rejects Moriarty’s existence outside the holodeck and 
therefore has the power to name him as an object or a machine, Moriarty takes 
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the power back when he apparently leaves the holodeck. According to 
Descartes’ theory, “He can never cause me to be nothing so long as I think that 
I am something” (Descartes, in Morick 7). The “he” in this argument is what 
Descartes views as an all-powerful being that may be deceiving him about his 
reality. Picard, through his denial of Moriarty’s ability to live off the holodeck, 
acts as “an all-powerful being” that constructs Moriarty’s reality as one of pure 
fiction. In turn, Moriarty creates a “dream world” of his own that deceives 
Picard into believing he is on the real Enterprise. Both Moriarty and Picard act 
as Descartes’ “powerful being” who can change the nature of reality. In this 
episode, the distinction between what is human and what is simulation is 
questioned, as Moriarty appears to be able to simulate the human. However, it 
is Picard that remains superior in that he is real, while Moriarty remains a 
simulation. The fact that Moriarty never achieves his movement from the 
simulated to the real world reinforces Star Trek’s overriding theme of the 
superiority of humanity, and the dominant hegemonic orientation of the 
conservative interpretations of existence. 
              That Moriarty quotes Descartes is significant. Moriarty embodies 
Descartes’ proposition that “I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time that I 
pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive it” (Descartes 279). Moriarty is able 
to pronounce that he exists, that he consciously or mentally exists through 
thoughts and questions about his existence. Although he attempts to prove that 
he also physically exists, his existence is based upon the fact that he is 
conscious of that existence – he is self-aware. In trying to convince Picard that 
he is not a mere simulation, Moriarty tries to forge a direct link from the mind 




physical self to exist. Jesse Butler in ‘Scan Thyself’ notes that Descartes 
“concluded on the basis of his awareness of his own thoughts that he must be 
an immaterial thing whose essence is thought – a soul, entirely distinct from a 
physical thing like an animal or a machine, composed of mere matter” (in 
Wittkower 2011 79). Moriarty becomes aware of his own thoughts and his 
entrapment within what he knows to be an illusory world. He concludes that 
because he is self-aware, can think and is distinct from mere matter, he can, 
therefore, will himself off the holodeck. 109 However, the trick that Moriarty 
presents is that he does not attain substance off the holodeck. He merely 
creates his own holographic version of the Enterprise to fulfil his fantasy of 
attaining Descartes’ desire to be “immaterial.” 
             This episode demonstrates that Moriarty is both self-reflective and 
self-referential. Moriarty is created by the ship’s computer with the ability to 
evolve and to do what Descartes argues is necessary in order to be “I” rather 
than “it” – to self-aware, to think independently and freely. In his discussion 
on identity, Descartes asks; “what then am I? A thing which thinks? What is a 
thing which thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, [conceives], 
affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels” (Descartes in 
Morick 10). Moriarty demonstrates all of these qualities in his attempts to 
outwit both Data and Picard, and yet he is still denied self-determination. 
Moriarty can be said to “live” because he is the subject of a life, in that he is 
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able to think and act independently of his programming. He is creative and 
imaginative and filled with emotion and desire.110 
                 Such narratives spark the “metaphysical issue of whether or not the 
meat of the brain and body play a significant role in sustaining human 
consciousness or individual identity” (Dinello 113). This is also true for 
Moriarty, who denies that the “meat” of the body, whether matter or non-
matter, determines whether or not he lives. Identity does not, in Descartes’ 
view, rest “upon the reality and irreducibility of the body … [and that 
Descartes]… holds that the body is only something I have, whereas the mind 
or soul and that alone is what I am” (Schacht, emphasis in the original in 
Morick 17). This view, held by Descartes and Moriarty, is reiterated by 
techno-prophets who view the future of humanity as one in which human 
consciousness is freed from the corporal body and finds immortality in 
cyberspace. But can the identity or the essence of the individual survive 
without the body? In “Ship in a Bottle,” Moriarty finds his answer: I think, 
therefore I am. In this statement, Moriarty not only defines himself in terms of 
the mind alone but also places the body as subservient to the mind, in that the 
mind seemingly wills his body to exist outside the holodeck.   
               As Katherine Hayles rightly suggests, “in the posthuman, there are no 
essential differences of absolute demarcation between bodily existence and 
computer simulation, cybernetic mechanisms and biological organism, robot 
technology, and human goals” (1999 3). Such “demarcations” presented and 
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upheld in this episode represent a humanist reaction to the “computer 
simulated” identity. Picard continues to resist Moriarty’s transformation 
towards a non-simulated identity. In doing so, Picard denies the artificial being 
an authentic existence and transcendence into the human world. Picard’s denial 
that Moriarty has a body, in the conventional sense of one composed of flesh 
and blood, leads Moriarty to try to convince Picard that the mind creates the 
body, that the mind or consciousness comes before the corporal body. 
Although Moriarty proclaims his ability to transcend the body, it is evident in 
this episode that Moriarty craves embodiment. The body becomes a symbol of 
power that gives subjectivity to its possessor, and “to steal, simulate or 
construct a body is to begin disentangling an entire network of intricate 
hierarchies and relationships” (Botting 2008 183). Initially constructed as a 
“plaything” for La Forge and Data, Moriarty steals power back through 
seeming to fabricate a “body” of his own. He manipulates and disentangles the 
relationships of power in which the hologram is subservient to the will of its 
humanoid programmers and constructs an entire world of his own making.                
                 For most of this episode, Moriarty constructs an elaborate virtual 
world that deceives Picard, Data, and Barclay on the part of Moriarty. Moriarty 
hijacks the holodeck programme, using Picard’s voice override command, and 
successfully traps Picard, Data, and Barclay in a holoversion of the Enterprise 
complete with her crew. The narrative becomes convoluted as the two ships 
merge. Like the nanites in the previous chapter that manipulated the ship’s 
systems, Moriarty attempts to manipulate the minds of Picard, Data, and 
Barclay into doing what he wants – allowing him to leave the holodeck – “like 




ensure its survival and dominance, malignantly manipulates the minds and 
behaviour of humans” (Dinello 1-2) .  Dr. Crusher’s assertion that Moriarty is 
human - “he’s real, he’s human” (Crusher) - is a ruse, as this Dr. Crusher is 
revealed to be a hologram. However, to the human eye, there is no discernible 
difference between the real and the fake. Picard, Data, and Barclay are fooled 
into believing that this is indeed the real Crusher.  
                  Although Moriarty fails to embody Descartes’ vision, he is able to 
outthink and deceive Picard with his own holo-projection of the Enterprise and 
her crew through the use of language and his knowledge of the computer 
system. Language in this episode becomes the active force in defining who and 
what Moriarty is. He claims, through the use of the statement “I think,” that he, 
therefore “exists”. The “difference between humans and machines that 
simulate humans is a matter of choosing what language game to play in 
describing their behaviour” (Teschner & Grace 2011 in Wittkower 98). In 
“Elementary, Dear Data,” Pulaski chooses the language of philosophy (the 
philosophy of the soul) and rationalism to describe Data’s deductive behaviour 
as inferior to the human because he lacks the ability to instigate original 
thoughts. In contrast, La Forge uses the language of reductive reasoning and 
mathematics to point out that Data is as effective as Holmes in his ability to 
analyse. Both use the language as a way to construct an argument to support 
their logic on the differences between the human and nothuman. In “Ship in a 
Bottle” Picard bases his denial of Moriarty’s claim to life off the holodeck 
around his lack of physicality. Using the language of biology and physics, 
Picard chooses to situate Moriarty as a simulated human and not a life form 




also able to use language and knowledge for his own purposes – that of 
subverting Picard’s attempts to deny him his freedom.                   
                  Moriarty’s power to command mind over matter fails to give him 
substance, but he is able to convince Picard, Data, and Barclay that they are on 
the real Enterprise, while in fact they never left the holodeck. Moriarty’s 
manipulation of Picard, Barclay, and Data renders them powerless as they 
carry out Moriarty’s plan to set him free. It is Data, the faithful techno-servant 
or artificial being, who makes the discovery that this reality is a simulation and 
alerts the Captain to the deception. Throughout the episode, the holodeck 
becomes a boundary of power. The point at which Picard enters the holo-
Enterprise is the point at which the physicality between the real and the 
simulated is blurred. Only when Picard recognises and transcends the illusion 
is his power restored. Again, knowledge is power. In this episode, both Picard 
and Moriarty define realities. However, Star Trek continues to restore the 
traditional conservative definitions of life and existence by placing Picard’s 
version as the only one that can be true. Throughout the episode, Moriarty 
seeks to reposition himself alongside humanity, a repositioning of himself 
from photons to human/matter. Moriarty seeks to obtain rights and a place 
within this new community. In doing so, he like Data views the only way to 
obtain these rights as to be human, to mimic and copy what makes humans, 
human. Human values are upheld as being what all aspire to achieve. This 




                  Part of this template is the ability to form relationships and to fall in 
love. Moriarty seeks the freeing of Countess Regina Bartholomew111  from her 
holo-prison, just as Frankenstein’s creature sought his “mate”. Moriarty looks 
to Picard to ensure his happiness by the “restoration of the garden [through] … 
the fabrication of a heterosexual mate” (Haraway 2006 159). The theme of the 
Garden of Eden suggests a link to the birth of a new species – a life form in the 
making. When Moriarty asks Picard to bring “life” to the Countess and allow 
her to leave the holodeck, Picard faces a predicament similar to that faced by 
Mary Shelley’s Victor Frankenstein who, when he confronted by his creature’s 
demands for a companion, asks whether it is morally right to create another 
being: “I was now about to form another being, of whose disposition I was 
alike ignorant; she might become ten thousand times more malignant than her 
mate …” (Shelley 565). Picard tells Moriarty that “[e]ven if I had reason to 
believe that it would be successful, I don't think that I could sanction it. Please 
understand, Professor that you are in essence a new life form, one that we 
didn't intend to create and that we don't fully understand. Now the moral and 
ethical implications of deliberately creating another one like you are 
overwhelming.”112 However, for Moriarty, the moral implications are clear. 
Picard has a duty to consider the feelings and aspirations of the life his crew 
has created: 
                                                          
111 The Countess has been designed to be the love of Moriarty’s life, and as he tells Picard, he 
cannot live without her.  
112 This scene is also evocative of the techno-cultural masculine usurpation of the female as 
biological creator. Moriarty is born out of La Forge’s command to create a foe for Data. 
Although the ship’s computer is female, or has a female voice, Moriarty refers to the 
computer as “he”. The patriarchal act of reproducing through technology seeks to supplant 





MORIARTY: Is it morally and ethically acceptable to deny the woman 
I love so that you can put your conscience at ease? Are you saying that 
you will simply dictate how I am to live my life?  
PICARD: I assure you, we will do everything possible to make you 
comfortable.  
MORIARTY: So long as I accept the terms under which you dole out 
those comforts…  
                                                                        (“Ship in a Bottle,” 1993) 
Moriarty’s despair at his treatment at the hands of Picard is again reminiscent 
of Shelley’s creature as he laments his fate after reading a discarded copy of 
Milton’s Paradise Lost; “like Adam, I was apparently united by no link to any 
other being in existence” (Frankenstein’s creature) and therefore like the 
creature of Shelley’s gothic novel, Moriarty craves a kindred spirit, the women 
he was programmed to love. Moriarty feels the same pangs of envy and 
resentment that gnawed at the creature: “many times I concluded Satan as the 
fitter emblem of my condition; for often, like him, when I viewed the bliss of 
my protector, the bitter gall of envy rose within me” (Shelley 540). The 
willingness of Picard to “dictate” how Moriarty is to live, couched in 
moralistic sanctification, leads Moriarty despondently echoing Shelley’s 
creature who despairs at the duplicity of humanity: “was man, indeed, so 
powerful, so virtuous, and magnificent, yet so vicious and base?” (Shelley 
119). For Moriarty it is morally and ethically wrong for Picard to decide how 
he is to live in this new world. 
               The need to enter into the human community leads Moriarty, from 




professes in this scene, in which he debates his future with Picard, that he has 
moved beyond his literary roots and that “My past is nothing but a fiction, the 
scribbling of an Englishman dead now for four centuries. I hope to leave his 
books on the shelf ...” (Moriarty), his criminal nature comes through in his 
deception and threats to harm the crew. He is what La Forge created – a master 
criminal with the imbedded memories of not just Conan Doyle’s Moriarty but 
also the memories of the ship’s computer records and library. This knowledge 
allows him to subvert the shutdown protocol, viewed at the beginning of the 
episode, and activate his own holo-programme.  The juxtaposition of the two 
Enterprises, one real and one fake, adds to the sense of the disjointed nature of 
reality and the difficulty in telling the difference between the human and the 
simulated human, thereby problematizing the nature of reality. It suggests that 
like Moriarty’s life, reality itself can be fabricated.   
               Having finally conceded that Moriarty is indeed self-conscious and 
therefore should be given some freedom and rights, Picard decides that his 
freedom is to be confined within the boundaries of what Picard/Starfleet deem 
suitable. Just as Dr. Victor Frankenstein determined how his creature was to 
live, a life alone, Picard will not initially allow Moriarty to have the Countess 
at his side. The problem faced by the Promethean figure is that to create a new 
race, perhaps one that will surpass or supplant humans is dangerous. Who is 
accountable for this new life? What are the ethics and consequences of creating 
new, artificial life? Even though Picard relents and agrees to give “life” to the 
Countess, this turns out to be impossible, as in reality both are confined to an 




life that Moriarty hoped to attain.113 Both are fooled into thinking they are 
finally free of the holodeck and thus both are denied free-will and self-
determination by Captain Picard:  
PICARD: In fact, the programme is continuing even now inside that 
cube.  
CRUSHER: A miniature holodeck?  
DATA: In a way, Doctor. However, there is no physicality. The 
programme is continuous but only within the computer's circuitry … 
… PICARD: They will live their lives and never know any difference.  
TROI: In a sense, you did give Moriarty what he wanted.  
PICARD: In a sense. But who knows? Our reality may be very much 
like theirs. All this might just be an elaborate simulation running inside 
a little device sitting on someone's table. 
                                                                                     (“Ship in a Bottle” 1993) 
Although an interesting premise and an ironic comment on television, as 
Picard comments on the “little device sitting on someone’s table,” this 
discussion demonstrates the inequality present between humans and pseudo-
humans. Would Picard really be okay with their “reality be[ing] very much like 
theirs”? It has already been shown in previous episodes dealing with Q that the 
crew resents and actively resists attempts by Q to control their destiny.114 So, 
why inflict this “trickery” on Moriarty? He is self-aware and self-conscious. 
Offered freedom, Moriarty is instead placed in a prison. For all the pretence of 
respecting new life, of acknowledging the rights of other intelligent life forms, 
                                                          
113 Life here is related to the ability to determine one’s own fate – to “live” out one’s future 
on one’s own terms.  




when it comes to the nothuman, the artificial being or pseudo-human, in the 
end, Picard only reinforces the gulf between organic and inorganic life – 
between “master” and “slave”. As Moriarty states, “you will simply dictate 
how I am to live my life”. Moriarty remains relegated to an object by the 
power that Picard wields. He is imprisoned in the miniature holodeck by 
Picard’s ability to name and to speak, thereby rendering Moriarty’s defiant “I 
am, therefore I exist” to “Picard speaks, therefore Moriarty cannot”.   
Conclusion  
Both “Elementary, Dear Data” and “Ship in a Bottle” demonstrate that the 
ability to define life and to define consciousness is a powerful mechanism in 
naming and subsequently controlling the “Other” – whether that “Other” is an 
animal, human or hologram. By using humans as the hegemonic base line for 
consciousness, humanity defines sentience and determines who is sentient. 
Picard has the control over Moriarty’s destiny. In the end, Moriarty does not 
gain freedom, only imprisonment in a world without “physicality”. The 
episode suggests that there is no subjectivity without a body. It does so through 
Picard’s frequent denials that Moriarty is alive and his ultimate decision to trap 
Moriarty in an endless simulated world. Moreover, as in Frankenstein, 
Moriarty’s journey “ends, not with the glorious self-immolating conflagration 
promised by the monster, but with the figure disappearing into darkness and 
distance,” as Moriarty and the Countess drift into a fictional darkness 
encapsulated in a holocube (Botting 143). The holocube, therefore, acts as a 
form of social control. The miniature holodeck or holocube becomes a barrier 
to keep the human and nothuman distinct. What is disappointing in “Ship in a 




The episode’s ending is unsatisfactory in that it denies the pseudo-human an 
authentic existence and reaffirms humanism’s sacred notion of the human body 
and soul, and controls of the definitions surrounding them. Picard’s basis for 
rejecting Moriarty’s existence is because it challenges all he understands about 
life and technology. The idea put forward by Moriarty is that “the mind directs 
the body like a captain directing a ship”, but also that language defines the self 
(Saidel in Bassham 30). 
               As Gene Roddenberry’s vision moves into the Delta Quadrant, with 
the development and release of Star Trek: Voyager, the posthuman comes into 
its own with the figure of the Doctor, an emergency medical hologram. In the 
following chapters, I examine in more depth, the figure of the hologram, in 
particular, the character of the Doctor (or Emergency Medical Hologram), as a 














THE LATENT SUBJECT 
 
        For Foucault the subject is the primary workroom of 
        power, making us turn in on ourselves, trapping us in 
                                the illusion that we have a fixed and stable selfhood … 
                                                                       (Mansfield 10) 
 
This chapter is oriented around my analysis of the Doctor’s journey to become 
visible as a subject, rather than visualised as an object, framed within theories 
of subjectivity, and in particular Foucault’s idea of panoptic vision (Discipline 
& Power (herein referred to as D/P). The panoptic mechanism controls the 
individual through the illusion of visibility, creating the impression of 
complete surveillance so that the inmate/individual believes that they are 
always under surveillance, whether or not they are in fact being observed. 
According to Foucault, this creates within the individual a state of 
internalisation in which the individual acts to self-monitor or curtail their 
behaviour in accordance with social norms, labels, and dialogues represented 
by the dominant gaze. If, as Mansfield and Foucault rightly suggest, the fixed 
subject is an illusion, how is the subject formed? 115  Subjectivity is shaped and 
fractured through unstable and contested relationships of power. Throughout 
                                                          
115 The idea that the subject is an unstable construct is a common theme within critical 




this chapter, I will be using the term “subject” as that which is subject to 
observation/study/scrutiny and that which has subjectivity/agency (Foucault). 
The Doctor (Robert Picardo) is both a subject to be observed by the gaze 
(subject to the gaze) and has subjectivity in that he has the agency to look back 
(to gaze upon). My focus in this chapter is on the episode "Latent Image" 
(1999) and how power in the form of the gaze/look acts to re-model and re-
shape the subject. 116 A gaze (human and techno) that is reflected from within-
and-without shatters the phantasm of the subject as fixed and stable. The 
mirage of the stable self is shattered from without by Janeway (here seen as 
“Other”), and from within by the Doctor, who internalises the gaze and reflects 
it back to reshape his identity. Throughout this chapter, I maintain that the 
narrative surrounding the Doctor’s right to agency, through his conflict with 
Captain Janeway (Kate Mulgrew) to gain the right to maintain and view his 
memory, is underlined by the struggle between seeing and not seeing, and 
between visibility and invisibility. In this episode, the panoptic gaze de-
constructs and restricts the formation of the subject through acts of 
internalisation, surveillance, and tensions between visibility and invisibility. 
Power is visualised through marking, categorising and labelling, creating an 
unstable and de-fragmented selfhood. I argue that within "Latent Image" the 
question of who is the Doctor is contested through these mechanisms – 
marking, categorising, visualising and labelling – mediated by way of the 
panoptic gaze in which power relations are (re)formed, (re)enacted and 
challenged.  
                                                          
116 The title "Latent Image" alludes to the Doctor’s dormant identity and his journey towards 
visibility as both a subject that is subjected to and subjugated by the gaze and, as an agent 
capable of acting. It is this ability to act which leads the Doctor to negotiate the dyad of 




               I read the Doctor’s post-human narrative as he negotiates these 
mechanisms (marking, categorising, visualising & labelling), encapsulated 
within the rhetoric of humanism, as a journey towards a form of Foucauldian 
subjectivity. 117 This form of subjectivity is socially constructed, unstable and 
unfixed, a construct that is shaped through power structures that seek to 
dominate and control (Foucault). Foucauldian subjectivity is neither “free” nor 
“spontaneous” and as Nick Mansfield suggests this subjectivity is a way of 
thinking about “ourselves so we will police and present ourselves in the correct 
way” (10). In "Latent Image," the Doctor, in viewing his latent memory, 
begins to see himself through the eyes of the “Other,” consequently policing 
himself in order to behave in the “correct way.” The “correct way” for the 
Doctor, as a machine, is to submit to the reprogramming because he is acting 
erratically and performing outside the “normal” parameters of a well-
functioning mechanism. In this instance, the “Other” is not the Doctor, the 
outsider, not the machine, but the human controller, Janeway.118 However, as I 
shall argue throughout this chapter, the gaze of the “Other” is neither infallible 
nor total, because at certain points and time the Doctor is able to slip the gaze 
and act upon the actions of others. This slippage allows the Doctor to break 
free, if only momentarily, from the role that the gaze creates and imposes, 
                                                          
117 The distinction between humanist and posthumanist views of humanity and the subject in 
regards to Star Trek: Voyager’s narrative is discussed in detail in chapter two – “The Final 
Frontier”. 
118 The “Other” is defined as that which one is not, and which the self is measured against. 
Traditionally in science fiction, the “Other” refers to the alien or the machine but it can be 




allowing him to resist being re-written by the look of the “Other” 
(humanity/Janeway) and to gain a level of agency.119  
             "Latent Image" begins with the Doctor taking holo-images of the crew 
for his medical database.120 Each image is a full 360 degree scan at the 
subatomic level resulting in a complete digitised image reconstructed from the 
inside out, a holographic double stored in the central computer. 121 122 As each 
patient is centrally framed in front of the camera’s techno-gaze, the Doctor 
instructs him or her to turn to the left then the right, to be fully captured by the 
holo-recorder, creating the replicated photonic matrix of the patient. The 
double or doppelganger is then displayed by the Doctor for a further 
examination. During Ensign Harry Kim’s (Garrett Wang) exam, the Doctor 
finds a neural surgery he performed on Kim that he has no recollection of 
performing. It transpires that eighteen months ago a fatal encounter on an away 
mission comprising the Doctor, Ensign Harry Kim and Ensign Jetel (Nancy 
Bell), with an unknown alien race, left the Doctor conflicted and emotionally 
troubled when he was unable to save both Kim and Jetel. The Doctor suffers a 
mental breakdown, what is described in the episode as a “malfunction,” 
because he cannot deal with his decision to save his friend. As the Doctor 
continues to agonise over his decision, the only solution that seems applicable 
                                                          
119 Although the Doctor is able to negotiate his right to keep and understand his memory and 
work towards developing his individuality, he is still controlled by the fact that he can be 
turned off at any time. The Doctor, as I shall argue throughout this thesis, never fully attains 
true agency.  
120 This holo-imager is a new technique that the Doctor is experimenting with in order to gain 
a better insight into the health of the crew and to monitor any outbreaks of illness. In this 
way, it acts as a panoptic device for the control and inspection of the crew.  
121 It should be noted that Foucault’s panoptic mechanism also commands 360 degree 
surveillance.  
122 This presents some visually stunning scenes in which the body is reconstructed firstly with 




to Janeway is to alter the Doctor’s memory, denying him access to these 
troubling events.123 124                 
             Initially unaware of who tampered with his memory, the Doctor sets a 
trap for the saboteur and is shocked to discover that it was Janeway. Faced 
again with deactivation and having his memory deleted for the second time, he 
must finally confront what has happened. As he embarks on a journey towards 
self-knowledge and self-discovery, through the viewing of his memory, the 
narrative acts to question what or who the Doctor really is and who or what he 
is becoming. At the conclusion of the episode, as the Doctor reads the quote 
from Dante, “in that book which is my memory, on the first page that is the 
chapter that is the day when I first met you, appear the words – here begins a 
new life,” he finds himself relating to that book, that chapter and that page 
which is yet to be written. 125 He is Dante’s new life personified – ready to be 
(re)written not by Janeway but by himself, an act of agency and an illustration 
of how the subject can be re-constructed, rewritten, reworked and reshaped by 
looking inwards as well as looking outwards. The Doctor’s journey sees him 
looking inwards to view himself in terms of not just how the “Other” 
recognises him (outwards), but how he sees himself.   
 
    
                                                          
123 His inability to reconcile his choice with his original programme ends up creating a feed-
back loop in which he continues to debate his decision. His behaviour becomes erratic and he 
can no longer perform his duties.  
124 This has the effect of restoring the Doctor to before the incident, but also means that the 
conflict is never resolved because he never successfully confronted his decision. 
125 A book of poems read by Janeway throughout the episode and which she leaves open for 




Visualising Power: Marking, Categorising and Labelling the Machine        
The Doctor’s journey towards agency and the re-writing of the self/subject 
begins with his relationship with Janeway. Janeway, representing the dominant 
position/gaze, controls and curtails the Doctor’s identity through her ability to 
name and mark him out as different – as a machine. The power to model the 
subject acts through mechanisms that categorise and mark the individual by 
their own identity, attaching to the individual his/her own identity and 
imposing a “truth” upon individuals that they must recognise and be 
recognised by (Foucault 1980). This “truth” is, of course, a fallacy like the 
transient and unstable nature of the subject; the perception of truth is not 
reliable or permanent. There is no one truth but multiple “truths” contingent 
upon relations of power used by the dominant to impose their own version of 
the truth upon the subject. These truths are fabricated through dominant social 
factions, in this case, represented by Janeway and Starfleet, which force the 
subject (the Doctor) to both recognise, and be recognised by, prevailing 
discourses that seek to mark, label, and define.  
              In "Latent Image", relations of power dominated by Janeway act by 
marking and categorising the Doctor as a hologram, a machine and inferior to 
humans:126 
JANEWAY: (talking to Seven): I've told that replicator a dozen times 
about the temperature of my coffee. It just doesn't seem to want to 
listen. Almost as if it's got a mind of its own, but it doesn't. A replicator 
                                                          
126 This “natural” inferiority imposed upon the machine is claimed to be valid on the basis 
that machines are less than human because they lack free will, empathy, emotion or a soul. 
This is the premise for Philip K Dick’s novel Do Androids Dream of Electronic Sheep? in which 




operates through a series of electronic pathways that allow it to receive 
instructions and take appropriate action, and there you go. A cup of 
coffee, a bowl of soup, a plasma conduit, whatever we tell it to do. As 
difficult as it is to accept the Doctor is more like that replicator than he 
is like us.  
                                                                                         (“Latent Image” 1999) 
Janeway’s decision to alter the Doctor’s memory is partly based on the 
labelling of him as a piece of technology, not unlike the replicator, which can 
be programmed to do whatever is asked. The Doctor is categorised and fixed 
by Janeway as an entity that does not have a mind of his own. Like the 
replicator, the Doctor “operates through a series of electronic pathways” 
highlighting his supposed inferiority and setting him apart from humans, 
setting him apart as he “is not like us”.  
             The metaphor of the replicator in this episode is interesting in terms of 
what a replicator is. In science, the replicator acts to produce life, and acts “as 
the fundamental unit, the prime mover of all life …” (Dawkins in Kneis 27). It 
is, therefore, one of the building blocks of life, a gene, the bundle in which 
everything is held. Janeway’s linking of the Doctor with the replicator (rather 
than any other piece of ship’s equipment) in this scene is significant because it 
merges the Doctor with the concept of bringing forth “new life” while at the 
same time relegating him to the realm of technology effectively denying him 
“life”. The replicator creates what is needed by manipulating matter and 
evolving random particles to form new substances, just as the Doctor will be 




by utilising the taxonomic unit of “machine,” places herself in a position of 
power over the Doctor because she is able to restrict the Doctor and impose 
upon him an inferior and therefore subordinate position. The idea of creating 
separable categories for plants and animals was refined and developed by 
botanist Carl Linnaeus in an attempt to bring order to the classification of 
organisms. The science of taxonomy facilitated the division of species into 
distinct groups based on similar characteristics acting to exclude those of a 
different type. As Europeans travelled into the Dark Continent (Africa), and 
the so called “New World” (America), such taxonomic categories were also 
applied to different “races” of humans on the basis of colour, habitat, and 
intellect. The same lexis is transported into space, used in science fiction (and 
in science) to separate the classes of organic from inorganic and human from 
alien.  
             Categories also act to police an individual’s deviation from their 
taxonomic borders so that the individual finds him or herself deviant when 
they disturb and disrupt these labels. The Doctor analyses his situation, his 
“truth”, as a hologram, a machine programmed to respond in a certain way. 
When he responds unexpectedly by deviating from his “logical” programming 
he sees himself as damaged. Labels, categories, and markers thereby act as 
mechanisms not only to position and define the subject within certain frames 
but also to restrain the subject within this frame. The Doctor, reflecting 
Janeway’s dominant perspective, frames himself as a machine, an object that 
can be subjugated. However, such taxonomic mechanisms are not absolute and 
often fail to contain the subject because the subject has no fixed affinity. 




and breached (by the hybrid or mutation), and, as I will argue throughout this 
chapter, the Doctor’s subject position is contradictory and unstable, and is 
continually re-negotiated through his immersion within and emergence from 
the gaze.  
The Inferior Machine       
Immersed in his memory of the events that led to and followed Ensign Jetel’s 
death the Doctor internalises the standard humanoid rhetoric that as a machine 
he is inferior. In reliving his memory, the Doctor’s private turmoil is exposed 
and laid bare, reflected back through his mind’s eye, forcing him to judge his 
actions as deviant.127 The Doctor considers his failed objectivity as a 
malfunction, making him complicit in his own subjugation because he looks 
back at himself and his actions, interpreting them in the same way as Janeway, 
as an error. For the Doctor, this error is that he allowed Jetel to die rather than 
Harry. The Doctor is acting out what Foucault argues is the fragility of the 
subject – that the subject is “forced back upon him/herself and in turn forced to 
constrain him/her[self] within their own identity” (1980 781). The fragile 
subject is re-shaped and constrained through an encounter with the gaze of the 
“Other” (and the self) which acts to restrain the subject within this forced 
identity that, for the Doctor, is that of a rational and un-emotive machine.  
          Consequently, the Doctor’s internalisation of himself as a machine leads 
to his viewing himself as an identity devoid of all feeling and appeals to 
compassion.128 The Doctor’s internalisation of his inability to feel is 
                                                          
127 Here I am using the term “deviant” in the sense that his actions are abnormal or not 
standard behaviour for a machine rather than as a criminal act.  




emphasised in his conversation in the mess hall with Neelix (Ethan Philips), 
the ship’s cook and alien ambassador: 
DOCTOR: I’m alright. I’m a hologram. I don’t get injured, I don’t feel 
pain, I don’t die. Unlike some people I could tell you about … don’t 
touch me! I’m a hologram, photonic energy. Don’t waste your time. 
                                                                                         ("Latent Image" 1999) 
Both the Doctor and Janeway have come to identify the Doctor as nothing 
more than “photonic energy”. The labelling and defining of the Doctor as a 
machine is central to Janeway’s decision to exercise control over his 
programme, but is also mirrored in the Doctor’s reaction to appeals of 
compassion.129 As a machine and therefore not responsive to or needing any 
appeals to help or comfort, the Doctor knows that Neelix’s reaching out to him 
is a “waste of time”. However, his denial and rejection of his emotional 
capacity is not consistent throughout the episode and occurs after he has 
internalised his position as a malfunctioning machine.  
             For example, the Doctor’s acceptance of himself as malfunctioning is 
in stark contrast to how he initially reacts when he first learns about being 
reprogrammed. In a conversation with Janeway shortly after finding out that 
she has altered his memory, the Doctor reacts in a way that shows deep 
resentment and anger at her decision: 
JANEWAY: I've made a command decision for your own benefit and 
the welfare of this entire crew. I'm not willing to debate it.  
DOCTOR: How would you like it if I operated on you without your 
                                                          




consent or without your knowledge?  
JANEWAY: If the operation saved my life? I could live with it.  
DOCTOR: I don't believe you. You'd feel as violated as I do right now.  
JANEWAY: Whether you believe me or not is beside the point. A year 
and a half ago the only solution was to rewrite your programme. I have 
to perform that same procedure now.  
DOCTOR: That isn't fair! 
                                                                             ("Latent Image" 1999) 
Before the Doctor views the memory of the events relating to his malfunction 
he considers Janeway’s actions a “violation”. “That isn’t fair” is a very 
“human” response and not the words of a machine lacking in the ability to 
understand that he has rights that should not be violated. The Doctor, here, is 
unwilling to be placed within the category of replicator but instead places 
himself alongside Janeway. He denies the taxonomic border between human 
and machine by ignoring any distinction between himself and Janeway. He 
asks her how she would feel if he operated on her without consent, thereby 
identifying himself as her equal. He expects to have the same rights as any 
other crew member, as any “human”. It is not until after he begins to view his 
memory file that he starts to see himself as malfunctioning, reflecting 
Janeway’s position and words back onto himself. He then accepts the binary 
division of machine/human as a boundary that should not be crossed and 
internalises his position as nothing more than “photonic energy” – unfeeling 




            The discourse of binary divisions: sentient/non-sentient,  
empathic/unfeeling, biological/technological, creates a boundary or border 
between human and machine that results in the production and construction of 
an identity, in this case a nonhuman identity, leading to conclusions and 
actions that exclude and judge the subject (Foucault D/P). For the Doctor, 
classed as unfeeling, photonic energy and purely technological, this border 
excludes him from the agency and the freedom to control access to his 
memory. These rights are denied to him because of Janeway’s judgement that 
as a machine he is incapable of understanding and dealing with the 
consequences of his actions. Therefore, Janeway sees no problem in acting to 
control and curtail the Doctor’s access to his memory data base in order to fix 
what is determined as a breakdown.130 It is also constructing his identity as 
unfeeling and logical that results in the Doctor’s inability to cope with his 
unpredictable reaction to Jetel’s death.  
The Flawed Machine 
As the Doctor tells Janeway, “I’m programmed to accept the loss of a patient” 
and so his irrational and emotional response to the loss of Jetel is in direct 
conflict with what he believes to be typical of a rational and impartial machine, 
and consequently, he now looks at himself as a failed machine. Working from 
the perspective that he is nothing more than a machine, the Doctor cannot 
explain why he is troubled by Jetel’s death, and in the conversation that 
                                                          
130 It can be argued that that the Doctor’s reaction to the death of Jetel is both a breakdown 




follows the Doctor agonises over his Sophie’s choice and what for him, as a 
machine, should have been a straightforward decision: 131 
EMH: What could be simpler than a triage situation in Sickbay? Two 
patients, for example, both injured, for example, both in imminent 
danger of dying. Calculate the variables. My programme needs to 
ascertain which patient has the greater chance of survival and that's the 
one I treat. Simple. But, what if they have an equal chance of survival? 
What then? Hmm? Flip a coin? Pick a card?  
                                                                              ("Latent Image" 1999) 
The Doctor’s inability to “calculate the variables” leads him to question his 
capability as a hologram. Reflecting upon this simple triage situation, 
internalising the “nature” of the machine as emotionless and calculating, the 
Doctor views his inability to cope as a deficiency. Moreover, as dramatized 
throughout this scene, by the camera focusing on the Doctor’s behaviour and 
body language, and his aggregated and emotionally conflicted state, the Doctor 
is represented as anything but unemotional. For example, the Doctor selects 
two similar fruits, the same shape, and size but of a different colour, and asks 
Neelix which one he should choose, which one is better. In his frustration, he 
throws them across the room causing the crewmembers in the mess hall to look 
up, alarmed at his outburst. At this point Neelix summons Tuvok (Tim Russ) 
and security, leading to another violent outburst from the Doctor. The Doctor 
with the crew’s eyes upon him stares down Tuvok, defiantly returning the 
look, and stating that he does not choose to return to sickbay or to go with 
                                                          
131 A phrase used by actor Robert Picardo in describing this episode and his character’s 




security. Consequently, the Doctor is deactivated, effectively denying him both 
sight and choice.  
              The Doctor, reactivated and forced to confront his actions that lead to 
Jetel’s death and his erratic behaviour, is de-fragmented and de-stabilised like 
the disjointed images of the memory sequence, seeing himself not just as a 
flawed machine but also as a failed Doctor. By looking back, the Doctor 
visualises himself as flawed and as a consequence now shares Janeway’s view 
that he should be reprogrammed: 
DOCTOR: You were right. I didn't deserve to keep those memories, 
not after what I did.  
JANEWAY: You were performing your duty.  
DOCTOR: Two patients, which do I kill?  
JANEWAY: Doctor.  
DOCTOR: Doctor? Hardly! A doctor retains his objectivity. I didn't do 
that, did I? Two patients, equal chances of survival and I chose the one 
I was closer to? I chose my friend? That's not in my programming! 
That's not what I was designed to do! Go ahead! Reprogram me! I'll 
lend you a hand! Let's start with this very day, this hour, this second! 
                                                                              ("Latent Image" 1999) 
Having lost his “objectivity” and chosen to save a friend and kill another 
patient, an act that is not in his programming, the Doctor has acted 
emotionally, violating and threatening his self-image (as machine and Doctor). 
His empathy towards the Ensign’s death further shatters the illusion of a fixed 




programmed to simulate empathetic and ethical models of patient care, it 
becomes clear in the episode that he is programmed not to be affected by these 
emotions. These emotions are but a simulation of human feelings and empathy 
and are not programmed to affect his cognitive, rationalising abilities. 
Therefore, represented in this scene and in the episode as a whole is a different 
level of empathy than what the Doctor was programmed for. The Doctor 
chooses his friend, the one he is closest to, and that becomes the deciding 
factor in whom he treats first. In rejecting emotions – empathy, friendship, and 
guilt – and viewing them as a flaw in his programming rather than an evolution 
of the subject, the Doctor “inscribes in himself” a responsibility to submit to 
his “own subjection” (D/P 202-3). As a consequence, the Doctor demands that 
Janeway delete his memory because, having failed in his duty as a Doctor (and 
a machine), he does not deserve to keep them. He acts out the identity that has 
been imposed upon him – namely that of a malfunctioning piece of technology 
devoid of feeling and agency. The Doctor’s identity as an unfeeling and 
malfunctioning machine is therefore imposed upon from outside (by Janeway) 
and constrained by the inward gaze (Marquez in Halliwell & Morsley19). The 
Doctor is constructed and constrained within the image, reflected back in the 
eye of the “Other”, of what a machine should be. At times, what the Doctor has 
come to know and reflect upon his identity as seen through the gaze of others, 
is contrary to what he experiences in viewing his memory. Although watching 
the memory file has partly reinforced his “looking” at himself as a machine, it 
has also resulted in a conflict because what he sees and how he feels (and that 
fact that he feels at all) while looking are contradictory. 




In "Latent Image," vision and the gaze are important signifiers in the power 
struggle between Janeway and the Doctor, highlighted by the symbolic use of 
the mirrored gaze and the eye. Vision is always an act of appropriation, the 
image reflected, refracted, commandeered and represented by the one who is 
looking and as such, vision is also multifarious. The heterogeneous gaze 
performs an important element in the Doctor’s journey towards self-knowledge 
as the Doctor’s eye-view is constantly shifting, constantly altered by how he 
interprets the visualisation of his memory and the scrutiny of others. The 
Doctor’s memory file functions as a “virtual camera:” a panoptic device in his 
head allowing him to survey his actions, his eye a lens providing a visual 
insight into the Doctor’s psyche (Halliwell & Mousley). 132 In addition, the 
narrative’s interaction between past and present, moving from one time frame 
to the next, reproduces stylistically the instability of the image and the subject.  
                                                          
132This episode is unusual within the series in that it juxtaposes the events of the past with 
those of the present. The narrative flits back and forth between the two time-frames, thereby 





Figure 4. The close up of the Doctor’s eye is a stunning cue to visualise the 
beginning of the memory scene (source: star trek wiki.com). 
           The journey into the Doctor’s memory begins as the camera zooms in 
on the Doctor’s eye in dramatic close up; the overexposed and magnified eye 
fills the screen, emphasising the drawing into the psyche of the Doctor (fig 4). 
In "Latent Image," the fluidity and luminosity of the eye are symbolic of self-
reflection, representing an optical pool whose surface reflects a way into the 
unconscious, a two-way mirror reflecting/looking in and out, establishing a 
relationship between what the Doctor is and what he sees. Although the 
memory of events is his, emphasised by the camera’s journey into the mind’s 
eye of the Doctor, and the images of the past are shown from the Doctor’s 
perspective, he interprets their meaning from the Other’s (Janeway’s) position 
of power that identifies him as a machine. Within the Doctor’s mind’s eye is 
reflected Janeway’s view of the machine as having no will or gaze of its own. 




to look out/back, for example, reclaiming the gaze in his capture of the 
saboteur, effectively denying the Other’s look. 
             The scene that depicts Janeway’s image deleting the Doctor’s memory 
is visually stunning, and symbolic of the gaze/look as not monolithic, not 
constant but continually shifting and re-negotiated. For example, with the 
symbolic blinding of Janeway, the look of the “Other”, hitherto so powerful, is 
denied (Fig.5), the deleted eye becoming representative of a denial of sight and 
the invisibility of the subject (the Doctor). In "Latent Image," human sight is 
devalued, degraded and denatured by the techno-eye. Martin Jay in “The 
Disenchantment of the Eye” links the emergence of postmodern (posthuman) 
rhetoric with the demise and rejection of the “function of the penetrating gaze, 
able to pierce appearances to see the essences beneath” by the toppling of the 
“privileged gaze” and the disappearance of a fixed subject (179/180). The 
privileged gaze of Janeway is toppled when the Doctor’s gaze is able to 
symbolically pierce and disembody her eyes. The symbol of the eye-less 
Janeway illustrates the failure of her panoptic vision as it is eroded and 
supplanted by the Doctor’s techno-gaze. Janeway’s deformed eyes contrast to 
the image of the Doctor’s mind’s eye that fills the screen as he and the camera 
plunge into his memory. The metaphor of the unseeing eye alludes to the 
fallibility of the subject as stable in that the once all-seeing Janeway has been 





Figure 5. The reproduced image of Janeway as she tampers with the Doctor’s 
memory file (source: Star Trek Wiki.com) 
               As the heterogeneous imagery of the eye reveals, this episode hinges 
upon viewing: looking at the self, looking at the other, and the look as a form 
of resistance. The narrative centres on the Doctor’s negotiation of the panoptic 
field of the “Other” (Janeway) and his internalisation of that gaze. But, in 
"Latent Image," there are many gazes/eyes that re-represent different and 
varying positions on the Doctor’s subjectivity. One gaze represented by Seven 
of Nine (Jeri Ryan) takes a posthuman hybridised look. Her vantage point, as a 
cyborg, her body suspended and imprisoned somewhere between human and 
machine, frames the Doctor’s situation differently to Janeway. For Seven, there 
is no firm or absolute distinction between organic and machine. Seven, 
representing the gaze of the post-human, is “post” because she has been 




sympathy with the Doctor’s plight stems from her ability to look past what it 
means to be machine or human, placing her on the border between flesh and 
metal. Her look is filtered through her ocular implant (Borg technology) and an 
artificial eye manufactured by the Doctor, both acting as visual symbols of her 
link to technology and her affinity with the techno-gaze (fig.6), allowing her to 
transgress human visualisation, subsequently reconfiguring and embodying the 
Doctor differently from Janeway. The development of the synthetic eye, 
created to look the same as her human eye but with superior acuity, allows 
Seven to see through the Doctor’s “eye,” reminiscent of the android eyes of 
Roy in Blade Runner, manufactured by Chew (the eye designer) and to which 
Roy says “Chew, if only you could see what I’ve seen with your eyes” (Blade 
Runner). In "Latent Image," Seven and the Doctor share the same visual 
perspective, the eyes of the creator and its recipient can look through the 
other’s eye.  
             Seven of Nine’s techno-eye allows her a duality of vision – between 
the human (Janeway) and the machine (the Doctor) - and, as Katherine Hayles 
points out, offers the possibility not to replace the human eye/vision but to 
recognise and expose “the networks of production which constitute human” 
superiority of vision (1993). The technologically enhanced eyes of Seven 
produced by the Borg, which are superior in range and depth of vision to the 
human eye, exposes as flawed Janeway’s vision of the Doctor as like a 
replicator, repositioning the gaze into the realm of the posthuman. The 
posthuman eye, represented by Seven and frequently denied in the Doctor, 
rejects the romantic/liberal myth of humanity as superior and original, thereby 




the subject a single and revenant identity, the human is deprived of its central 
place as all seeing and all knowing. 133  The all-seeing eye is blinded (as 
Janeway’s image represents) by the digital eye that seeks to screen out the 
vision of human superiority and replace it with a cyborg-filtered, murky and 
unclear distinction between human and machine. 134 The all-seeing eye, related 
to universal power and knowledge, is a common meme within mythology and 
science fiction, dramatizing the power to see all things as a window to the soul, 
and a god-like ability to see past, present and future (as depicted in the film 
Lara Croft Tomb Raider and in the symbol of the Tyrell Corporation in Blade 
Runner). It has also been used by critics such as Donna Haraway who view 
Western, white, masculine ideologies as acting as an all-seeing eye that 
surveys, denies, defines and creates the subject. In "Latent Image", this 
“masculine” narrative is undertaken by Janeway, who although female, 
nevertheless represents the overwhelmingly masculinised, militaristic and 
scientific ideals of Starfleet.   
                                                          
133 The distinctions between the various types of humanism and their place in relation to the 
posthuman are discussed in Chapter One “The Final Frontier”, which focuses upon the myth 
of humanism in Star Trek: Voyager.  
134 Although the “eye” of the Borg is technically superior in vision to the organic or human 
eye, in its visual representation on the screen, Borg vision is shown as filtered through a 
green light, almost a haze of techno-colour. Therefore, the Borg’s visual perspective on 
screen appears murky and cloudy and yet it is able to pick up fine details and light spectrums 





Figure 6. this image clearly shows Seven’s optical implant and her positioning 
next to the replicator (Source: Star Trek Wiki.com)  
The Mirrored/reflected self/‘I’ 
The physical eye is not the only reflective surface involved in disrupting and 
shaping the Doctor’s self-knowledge. The mirrored gaze that is reflected by the 
mirrored ‘I’ permeates "Latent Image," as images of the Doctor is reflected 
back to him through the various surfaces. The lens of the camera or holo-
imager displays back to the Doctor the dominating gaze of Janeway, and later 
that of Seven of Nine, each developing or revealing different perspectives of 
the Doctor as subject. Consequently, the mirrored gaze questions which self is 
reflected back because each reflection provides the Doctor with a different 
eye/I view of the subject. Janeway’s gaze acts as a lens through which the 
Doctor forms an understanding of his identity as an automaton. On the other 




evolving into something more than a faulty machine. Jacques Lacan argues 
that the “mirror stage” (the reflecting back upon the self) lays the groundwork 
for the cultural formation of the self, it is the “first step in the construction of 
the self” (Constable 73). In reflecting on the self during the mirror stage (seen 
in the Doctor’s recovered memory), the subject begins to see the self as 
separate from the “Other”, creating a subject that is divided within itself. The 
Doctor is divided in his attempt to reconcile the self he sees with that shown to 
him by the look of the “Other”.  
            Similarly, Foucault’s formation of the subject through acts of power 
and the internalisation of the gaze views the subject as torn between different 
gazes that create the subject in relation to the individual’s interaction with 
others. According to both Lacan and Foucault’s models of the self, the subject 
is formed through interactions between different, conflicting and competing 
views of the self, compiled through engagement with the self and others. The 
divided self struggles to reconcile the various ‘I’s (Lacan) or gazes (Foucault), 
that is, the ‘I’ of the reflective or “specular” self (the Doctor’s gaze); the 
“social ‘I’ ” (the gaze of the Other/Janeway); and the “ideal ‘I’ ” (the gaze that 
the Doctor expects) are in conflict (Lacan). Following Lacan, I define the 
specular ‘I’ as relating to how the individual sees the self (what he/she thinks 
of as ‘I’); the social ‘I’ as what others think of or how they view the individual; 
and the ideal ‘I’ as what the individual wants to see or be. For Lacan, the self 
or the subject is illusionary because these three faces of the self, the different 
facets of the ‘I’, cannot be reconciled. In the same way, Foucault argues that 




negotiated through power relations which are in turn contested and undercut 
through social, political and scientific structures.  
              Therefore, the ‘I’ is never fixed but shifts between gazes, between 
looking and being looked at. In "Latent Image," the emphasis on “looking” 
accentuates the conflict in the Doctor’s inability to reconcile his identity crisis. 
The “ideal ‘I’” is the ‘I’/self that the Doctor expects to see – the well-
functioning and an efficient hologram that is incapable of making an emotional 
error. The Doctor, looking back at the past, looking through Lacan’s 
metaphorical mirror, interpreted through the social gaze that is mirrored back 
to him, realises that he lacks the control that his ideal ‘I’ assumes or expects. 
The Doctor becomes alienated from both the specular and the ideal ‘I’ and 
accepts the position/gaze imposed upon him from outside (the social ‘I’). In 
terms of Lacan’s subject, the Doctor has trouble reconciling the three faces of 
the ‘I’/self. Alternatively, using Foucault’s concept of the gaze, the Doctor has 
difficulty in reconciling the gaze of the self with that produced by the “Other”. 
However, the idea of the subject as an embodiment of the gaze of the “Other”, 
in conflict with that of the self, does not mean that the subject is passive, 
waiting to have an identity imposed upon him or her and at the mercy of the 
dominating gaze. The look can be and is returned.  
(Re) turning the Gaze: Looking and Reflecting Back 
The Doctor’s position up until this point (up until his resolution to want to be 
reprogrammed) would suggest that, at least in terms of the hologram, identity 
can be imposed through what Foucault describes as “an inspecting gaze” (P/K 




classified, labelled and controlled as a machine, particularly through the 
inspecting and dominating gaze of Janeway. Therefore, Foucault’s panopticon 
seems at first glance to render the subject passive, at the mercy of the “all-
seeing eye.” Nevertheless, as this episode illustrates, the all-seeing gaze/eye is 
never completely “fixed” but rather fluid, roaming between the observer and 
the observed, dissolving into a mutual surveillance. As I will argue in the 
remainder of this chapter, the Doctor is not merely a victim of the inspecting 
gaze but wields the power to invent and to examine, reflecting, and deflecting 
the imposition of an inauthentic identity (Foucault). 135  Janeway’s omnipresent 
gaze has its counterpart in the Doctor’s role as medical observer.  
The Medical Gaze 
As a Doctor, he wields an inspecting gaze highlighted in the use of the holo-
imager in which he records images of the crew. This “instrument of 
visualisation” devours the subject and reintegrates it from the inside out, much 
like what happens to the Doctor in the watching of his memory (Haraway 2006 
581). The patient is captured by the techno-eye (holo-imager) that devours, 
disembodies and re-forms the image into a holo-matrix (a simulated double). 
The Doctor, as a medical observer, employs his techno-gaze that has the power 
to seemingly view with “unrestricted vision,” facilitating unrestricted 
visualisation and reproduction of the internal and external bodies of the crew, 
thereby subjecting them to total surveillance (ibid). The Doctor’s “examination 
distinguishes, divides, and ultimately isolates the different members” of the 
crew according to how he interprets the medical results, and this examination 
                                                          
135 By an inauthentic identity, I mean an identity imposed upon the Doctor from without, 




acts as a form of “social control” (Gordon 131). The Doctor’s role as examiner 
and controller subverts his position as a hologram, in that he is able to elude 
the gaze imposing his own upon others. In the realm of the digital, the absolute 
gaze is replaced by a battle for control between the observer and the observed, 
creating complex and conflicting surfaces.   
              For example, the Doctor occupies a contradictory and problematic 
position because as a hologram he can be observed, displayed, confined and 
controlled, and so made visible, but as the Chief Medical Officer, he 
commands that all others be visible through his medical examinations. He does 
this by submitting the crew to invasive surveillance, achieved through 
undergoing his deep scans reconfiguring the body to produce a detailed and 
intimate record of the body that can be conjured up, thereby inflicting 
compulsory visibility onto his patients. In The Visual Human Project (2000), 
Catherine Waldby notes that the medical gaze traverses the subject by “the 
passive situating of a re-represented organic object within an optical … 
[inorganic] … field” (26). The subject becomes an object of medical study 
rendering the body inert and “accessible to material reordering” (29). The 
Doctor’s reordering of the humanoid body into a digital holo-image renders the 
crew passive, imposing a compulsory visibility, and allowing the crew to be 
catalogued, sorted and observed. The medical gaze produces a new 
iconography of the human body visualised as photonic energy, hyper-realised 
and artificial, traversed by the computer. The medical holo-imager “acts 
panoptically, as a machine which gathers up and orders the world visually and 
makes it available to be viewed as a system before the viewer” (30). The 




about the health of the crew and systematically gather up information about his 
missing memory. It is the holo-imager that draws his attention to the surgery 
performed on Kim, and which captures Janeway’s image as she removes his 
memory.  
            As a medical officer, the Doctor occupies a privileged position in 
which he visually re-represents the crew through the visual ordering of the 
humanoid body and re-positions his own subjectivity through the power to 
make others visible. The Doctor also has the power to impose visibility onto 
Janeway. Although she is reluctant to undergo his medical examination, not 
reporting to sickbay as requested, the Doctor appears in her ready room and 
insists she complies. Janeway in a position of authority and able to order the 
Doctor to be reprogrammed and to be deactivated is still subject to the 
Doctor’s medical gaze. Under Starfleet regulations, the chief medical officer, 
in this case, the holographic Doctor, is able to declare the Captain medically 
unfit for duty and relieve her of command. As a consequence, in his role as a 
medical officer, the Doctor can subvert the Captain’s power. This is, of course, 
subject to the Captain’s obeying his command and not deactivating him. In 
"Latent Image," the distances and tensions between seeing and being seen are 
complicated by the complexity of the power relations between a Doctor who is 
also a hologram/machine, and a Captain who is ethically constrained by 
Starfleet regulations that allow the Doctor to relieve her of command.  
            The panoptic tension between seeing and not seeing is further 
encapsulated within the walls of Voyager’s sickbay. The design of Voyager’s 
sickbay functions a type of panoptic model in which constant “surveillance and 




Individuals (patients) are marked out by quarantine and treatment in 
accordance with the Doctor’s observations. Voyager’s sickbay adopts some of 
Bentham’s mechanisms of the panopticon in that a “central tower … pierced 
with wide windows …,” the Doctor’s observation point, allows the observer to 
watch, or give the illusion that patients/inmates are being watched and allows 
inmates/patients to be quarantined in their own “cells” (Foucault D&P 200). 
The Doctor looks out from the central observation room at his patients, 
projecting a controlling gaze over their movements. However, sickbay also 
acts as a “cell” that encloses the Doctor. Voyager’s sickbay, like the plague 
town in Foucault’s analysis of the panoptic mechanism, employs apparatuses 
to control not just patients but also the Doctor. 136 In his analysis, Foucault 
argues that in times of plague each member of a household is to be confined to 
their dwelling and to be visible when called, “answering to his name and 
showing himself when asked”, thereby maintaining order and controlling the 
spread of infection but also rendering the individual passive (D/P 196). 
Similarly, the Doctor is subjugated to compulsory visibility because he must 
appear when called. The Doctor is summoned to appear when anyone asks the 
computer to “activate EMH.” In the past the Doctor has been physically 
restricted to the confines of sickbay and only in finding alien technology (the 
mobile emitter), has he been able to leave sickbay and interact more fully with 
the crew. 137 
                                                          
136 While the inmates of the town had to appear when called and there were strict controls 
on their movements, those charged with overseeing their surveillance and quarantine were 
also restricted (on the penalty of death) from leaving the confines of the town. Therefore, 
power acted on both the observed and the observer.  
137 He obtains the holo-emitter from a rogue time traveller in the episode “Dark Frontier.” 




           The contradiction of the Doctor made visible and confined (as a 
hologram), and yet able to make others visible and appear (as a Doctor), 
highlights the instability of the subject and the slippage of the gaze. The 
creation of the subject is dependent upon relations with others and the 
complexity of the various roles played out in these relationships. The Doctor is 
shaped and reshaped into different subject positions, having been categorised 
as a machine, as a failed Doctor and failed automaton, as medical overseer and 
an inmate called to appear when asked. But in his slippage of the gaze, he is 
able to engage actively with these subject positions – denying some and 
embracing others. Like the subject, the gaze is not fixed but fluid and 
dependent upon who is looking out/back.  
           The changing and challenging position of the gaze is especially 
noticeable in the events leading to the Doctor uncovering his saboteur. It is 
possible for “… people who are rendered visible … [to] attempt to escape by 
deploying counter-techniques of invisibility …” (Marquez 21). Through his 
deployment while deactivated of his holo-imager, an extension of his techno-
eye/gaze, the Doctor counters his compulsory visibility and becomes the 
observer, thereby rendering himself invisible to the saboteur. He subverts 
Janeway’s authority by programming the computer to record any tampering 
with his memory before he obeys her order to deactivate. Setting a trap for the 
saboteur, he plans to capture the image of anyone who tampers with his 
programme, telling the computer to reactivate him as soon as someone does so. 
The Doctor’s camera acts as a panoptic device that surveys all who enter 
sickbay. The camera maintains a secret vigilance that acts as an extension of 
                                                                                                                                                         
Voyager crew. Before the holo-emitter, his holo-matrix was unstable outside of sickbay, 




the Doctor’s vision, with the holo-imager performing as a surrogate eye that 
leaves anyone who enters sickbay exposed to his hidden surveillance. 
Although the camera is actually placed in full view, it acts surreptitiously by 
turning on when someone enters the room. And, in his search for the person 
who deleted his memory, it is Janeway - who hitherto has avoided the Doctor’s 
gaze - who is captured by the camera. Visibility becomes a trap in which 
Janeway, the observer, is finally ensnared (Foucault D/P).  
             Instead of having Janeway’s image appear mirrored back through the 
computer panel she is tampering with, the scene unfolds as the Doctor watches 
her image re-created and re-ordered by the holo-imager. Janeway is ensnared, 
displayed and displaced through the re-imaging of her body matrix, now 
composed of photonic particles, re-formed by the Doctor’s medical imager. 
Her image is at first blurred, unformed and fragmented. Eventually, she is 
exposed, transformed into the saboteur, but denied vision and subjected to the 
Doctor’s gaze. Janeway’s exposure in this scene is also sexualised because as 
her image (the doppelganger reformed through photonic particles) unfolds 
before the Doctor, the camera closes in on the forming breast tissue that 
exposes the culprit as female. Janeway is not just subjected to the Doctor’s 
masculine gaze (he is formed in the image of a white, western male) but the 
look reduces her image to the “naked” female body.  
                Janeway’s blindness to the Doctor’s surveillance is beautifully 
emphasized by her doppelgänger, which is re-formed with downcast and 
disfigured eyes, the last of her body to materialise. At this point Janeway loses 
her omnipresent gaze, her eyes deleted and downcast, her gaze replaced by that 




although as yet not why. Like the Doctor’s disembodied memory, the 
simulated figure (a visual doubling) of Janeway is slowly revealed, piece by 
piece, molecule by molecule, part by part, a view from the inside out, creating 
a “digitisation of subjectivity” that renders her mute and blind (Waldby 5). The 
fact that Janeway’s doppelganger is a simulation, pieced together by photonic 
particles, a holo(hollow)-representation of the real Janeway, acts as “a second 
figure who can be examined … [and] a double [that] can also be alienated from 
the self …” (Lutz & Collins 376). By re-creating Janeway as a digital double, 
the Doctor alienates her from her human origins, acting to destabilise 
epistemologies of what it means to be human by subjecting her to mechanic 
vision. Therefore, Janeway, as simulacrum, as a digitised body, becomes an 
object of visibility and subjugation. Her holo-image represents a deconstructed 
and transformed myth of the state of the “human,” in which the human image 
can be re-ordered as post-human or as inhuman, a blasphemous anti-
mythology. Such posthuman blasphemy is anti-mythological in that it actively 
denies and degrades the stability of the human subject, exposing the 
irrelevance of the idea of the biological taxonomic category, human. In the 
posthuman world, there is no such thing as being human (Haraway). 
Seeing individuality through Post/Human eyes 
However, even in the realm of the posthuman the essential criterion of what it 
means to be human remains an appropriation of power. Janeway’s 
appropriation of the Doctor’s memory is an act of power based on the essential 
idea that only humanoid life forms (that is, organic life), effectively excluding 
artificial life, have agency. Consequently, the deviation of the Doctor from 




ability to act differently, to evolve and to feel, is viewed as a malfunction. But 
Seven, from her position as a posthuman cyborg, perceives the Doctor not as 
malfunctioning, but as evolving:  
SEVEN: When you separated me from the Collective I was an 
unknown risk to your crew, yet you kept me on board. You allowed me 
to evolve into an individual.  
JANEWAY: You're a human being. He's a hologram.  
SEVEN: And you allowed that hologram to evolve as well, to exceed 
his original programming and yet now you choose to abandon him.  
                                                                              ("Latent Image" 1999) 
Therefore, Seven views Janeway’s denying the Doctor his right to 
individuality and to agency as hypocritical, based on Janeway’s previous 
allusion to the importance of individuality and agency to humanity. In “The 
Gift” Janeway tells Seven that the fundamental difference between the Borg 
Collective and humanity is that humans value individuality and the right to 
choose. Seven sees Janeway’s attitude towards the Doctor as hypocritical and 
an act of abandonment because although he has been encouraged to “exceed 
his original programming” he is abandoned when his newly acquired 
“emotions” cause conflict within his original matrix. He is not free to evolve as 
an individual because of his mechanical origins, an origin that has no affinity 
or common basis with the human community. To be human is to have a 
common basis of identity formation – family, history, gender, and race – 
reinforced by social institutions, something that the Doctor as a machine lacks, 
and this “lack” is something that Seven can relate to. She was removed by the 




Borg by Janeway, leaving her disconnected from any one common base of 
affiliation.  
            The show places emphasis on the importance of the individual and 
individuality, while at the same time it extols the virtues of a united humanity. 
In this way Star Trek’s narratives deliberately over-inflate the position of 
humanity or humanoids to an extent that they burst the bubble of the series’ 
liberal humanist stance, leading to storylines highlighting the failure of such 
humanist vocabulary to encapsulate the posthuman or the nonhuman. 
Janeway’s rhetoric of humanism strategically positions the Doctor, whose 
affinity is seen by her as purely technological, outside the repertoire of human 
rights and at the same time, Janeway’s identification of Seven as human allows 
Seven to act as an individual.138  
             Therefore, Janeway’s rhetoric of humanism positions the Doctor 
outside the demand for rights and freedom, utilising the recapitulation of the 
“anthropocentric ideal of the human as essentially separable from and 
ontologically prior to technics … [and] … the human as a point-of-origin” 
(Hayles 1993 48). The idea that the human is the “point-of-origin” for all 
things and at the centre of all knowledge consequently leads to an exclusion of 
and prejudice against non-human life forms. As a construct of humanity’s 
techno-capacity, its ability to construct a life-like hologram, the artificial has 
no “point-of-origin,” no ontological point of reference that is not referential or 
in fact deferential to humanity. As well as being separable from the 
                                                          
138 Seven’s affinity is not always with humanity and although content to remain as part of 
Voyager’s collective she still looks to the Borg to define her identity: “I am, Borg”. Nor is she 
always so readily accepted as human. Many crewmembers act differently around Seven, and 




mechanical, humanity’s origin story is historically synonymous with 
individuality. During the Enlightenment, the individual, an autonomous being, 
is held to be at the centre of humanity’s origin story. For Rousseau, humanity 
reaches perfection through the “reawakening of individuality” which he views 
as “humanity’s birth right and its highest goal” (Mansfield 17). Therefore, to 
be human is to have a sense of the self, a “birth right” that sees the individual 
or an awareness of ‘I’ as central to the world. This Romantic humanism views 
the human self as the centre of all things and all things are to be measured 
against what it means to be human. As I argue in Chapter One, Star Trek’s core 
philosophy appears to revolve (often unsuccessfully) around the concept of 
liberal humanism and the importance of individuality. Janeway’s twenty-fourth 
century ideals hark back to the romantic notion of humanity as the centre of all 
things. In Star Trek, these ideals seem benign, reflecting a humanism that is 
supposedly all-inclusive; race, gender, and religion, all the factors that divide 
humanity in the previous centuries, have, according to Star Trek’s rhetoric, 
been displaced and conquered. However, as the figure of the hologram 
suggests, the conquering of humanity’s inequalities in this future universe is 
simply a blind – a camouflage that hides the fact that humanity itself is 
privileged above all other knowledge, creating a powerful rationale for the 
denial of rights to the non-human. In contrast, the posthuman subject, like 
Seven and the Doctor, disputes and disrupts the free and autonomous 
individual, instead of looking at the subject as de-constructed and unstable, 
without origins. However, the posthuman also sees the inherent danger of the 




            The danger present within the humanist determination of the subject, 
the exclusion and subjugation of the “Other”, results in a Posthuman denial of 
the origin story. Consequently, the posthuman subject rejects humanity as a 
“point-of-origin”, and, within Voyager’s narrative, Seven acts as an example of 
Haraway’s “illegitimate offspring” who is “exceedingly unfaithful to [her] 
origins” (2006 151). As the “illegitimate offspring” of a posthuman irreverence 
towards humanity, Seven breaches the border between seeing as “human” and 
looking inwards to the machine. Therefore, Janeway’s appeal to Seven’s link 
with humanity is not a strong basis for her to comply with Janeway’s decision 
regarding the Doctor. Seven’s perspective as a cyborg affiliates her with the 
replicator and the Doctor than with the human community in which Janeway 
situates her. In fact, the scene in which Seven confronts Janeway about her 
abandonment of the Doctor visually situates Seven alongside the replicator, the 
machine framed as the focal point of the room and as Janeway’s example of 
“intelligent” machinery. The bright light of the replicator stands out in the 
semi-darkness of Janeway’s quarters and is visually situated to the side of the 
close up of Seven, emphasising and drawing attention their mutual affiliation 
(seen in Fig.6.). 
               In her affiliation and understanding of the precarious place of the 
machine amongst humanoids, Seven represents Haraway’s irreverent 
cyborg/subject that is “wary of holism … [and yet] … seem[ing] to have a 
natural feel for united front politics” (2006 159). Seven is wary of the holism 
present within Janeway’s humanist myopic gaze and instead unites with the 
profane politics of the techno-being. The techno-being’s profanity is in their 




emotion, self-awareness, and individuality which are demonstrated through the 
presence of the techno-being as unstable and not the sole province of 
humanity. From Seven’s peripheral position/vision she is able to understand, to 
see what is happening – the denial of the Doctor’s right to explore and 
understand these qualities, resulting in the violation of the individual – leading 
Seven to reject Janeway’s appeal to holism seeking to connect her to humanity, 
instead uniting herself with the Doctor. To Seven, the Doctor is an individual, 
a friend, and confidant and not simply advanced technology. Seven’s cyborg 
gaze finds her advocating on the Doctor’s behalf, enacting what Haraway calls 
“an optics of positioning”, enacted through Seven’s affinity with his 
technological position (2006 586). Her ability to sit on the boundary between 
humanity and the Borg, and to question the essence of “being” human and 
being a machine, allows Seven to re-position herself alongside the Doctor:   
SEVEN: It is unsettling. You say that I am a human being and yet, I am 
also Borg. Part of me not unlike your replicator, not unlike the Doctor. 
Will you one day choose to abandon me as well? I have always looked 
to you as my example, my guide to humanity. Perhaps I've been 
mistaken.                                                                                   
                                                                      ("Latent Image" 1999) 
Seven is unsettled by Janeway’s decision because, framed as neither machine 
nor human, will she, too, be abandoned by Janeway and humanity one day?  
Seven interprets the nature of the subject as precarious and that she could be 
reframed as something “inhuman”. Seven’s dissenting position acts as a “point 




and emphasises to Janeway the parallels between her situation as a cyborg and 
the Doctor’s (Foucault D/P 794). In the figure of Seven of Nine, the Doctor 
finds an advocate.  
Engaging/Embracing the Subject  
Seven of Nine acts as a dissenting voice/vision in her advocacy of the Doctor’s 
right to explore his memory and individuality. Seven, by re-positioning herself 
alongside the Doctor, persuades Janeway to see, however momentarily, 
through the eyes of the posthuman cyborg, giving Janeway a reason to 
reconsider allowing him to understand his conflict rather than erase his 
memory. Seven’s argument that she is more like the replicator and the Doctor 
than she is like Janeway makes Janeway re-evaluate the labelling of the Doctor 
as merely a machine, and consider the possibility that the Doctor is more than 
the sum of his parts. Reflecting on the Doctor’s development over the years, 
Janeway asks whether, as Seven suggests, she now has a responsibility to help 
him because she has given him a “soul”: 
JANEWAY: ... We allowed him to evolve and at the first sign of 
trouble ... We gave him a soul, B'Elanna, do we have the right to take it 
away now?  
TORRES: We gave him personality subroutines. I'd hardly call that a 
soul.  
                                                                                       ("Latent Image" 1999)   
The idea of the “soul” as central to the human condition is frequently used in 




soul, a rhetoric used as a means to exclude, exploit and control the “Other”, 
and part of humanism’s origin story. Historically, the absence of a soul has 
been used to exclude and enslave non-whites, animals, and, in science fiction 
narratives, the machine. Therefore, Janeway’s suggesting that the Doctor has a 
soul, harking back to her humanist ideas of linking a soul with individuality, 
places him closer to the category of human. Janeway, who has previously 
denied any rights to this glorified replicator, now sees a problem in taking 
away his right to evolve. At this point, she seemingly views the Doctor more as 
an individual, with rights and the freedom to explore his self-potential, than a 
mindless mechanism. Janeway’s position, therefore, becomes contradictory, in 
that she now gives or bestows upon the Doctor a soul, something that is linked 
exclusively to humanoid life forms. 
            As her conversation with Torres demonstrates, Janeway is still very 
much in a position of power to control and label the Doctor. Although she 
appears to accept that he is more than what he was at the start of the episode, it 
is Janeway who has the power to give the Doctor a soul. Humanity (in this case 
Janeway) “gave him a soul” and it will be humanity who decides whether it 
can be taken away. Also interesting in this dialogue is the fact that Torres, the 
ship’s alien engineer, views the Doctor as a machine, not with a soul but with 
“personality subroutines”. Therefore, while Janeway interprets the soul as 
being intrinsically linked to the self (the “human” subject), finding the 
Doctor’s soul in his ability to reflect upon himself as an individual and in his 
empathetic reaction to the death of Jetel, Torres looks to the soul as something 




the physical being.139 The separation of the soul from the subject/body, placing 
it in the realm of the spiritual, leaves little room for a “spirit within the 
machine.” The Posthuman idea of a machine with a soul acts to undermine the 
core belief in humanity as distinct, and technology robs humans of their 
“humanity(sic), metaphorically expressed as our soul: it threatens to replace 
the individual, God-given soul with a mechanical, machine-made one” 
(Schelde 1993 9). In his quest for individuality and subjectivity, the Doctor 
threatens the place of the Human by looking back/out through his techno-eye, 
the window to his “soul,” his vision luminously decrying humanity’s reliance 
upon fixed determinations of the subject and what it means to be Human – to 
have emotion, reason, empathy and a soul. The Posthuman parable derails the 
very idea of a stable and unique essence that is the human subject. 
              Janeway’s change of heart or perspective on the status of the Doctor, 
that he is more than a replicator, results in her allowing him to work through 
his troubling memory and confront his feelings. As the episode draws to a 
close, Janeway mounts a vigil in the hope that the Doctor can resolve his 
conflict: 
JANEWAY: [personal log] Our Doctor is now our patient. It's been two 
weeks since I've ordered a round the clock vigil. A crew member has 
stayed with him at all times offering a sounding board and a familiar 
presence while he struggles to understand his memories and thoughts 
…  
                                                          ("Latent Image" 1999) 
                                                          
139 Torres views the soul as separate from personality and from the individual and this is 




As a patient, the Doctor is subjected to a “round the clock vigil”, becoming 
once again the observed, the visible subject of observation and scrutiny. The 
sequence begins in the empty holodeck; empty that is, except for the Doctor 
sitting upright in his chair and Janeway sitting in the foreground of the shot. 
She is reading a book of poems by Dante that she tells him is “relevant to his 
situation” and is in fact written about “new life.” By the end of "Latent Image," 
the Doctor has been born again as a hologram with a soul, emphasised by the 
close up of Janeway and the Doctor, now face to face, eye to eye, when 
Janeway tells the Doctor she is too busy to rest because she is helping a friend. 
The Doctor’s subject position has evolved from replicator to failed 
machine/Doctor and finally to “friend”, someone Janeway considers worthy of 
compassion. In the final scene the Doctor, now occupying Janeway’s position 
in her vacated chair, now overseeing his own supervision, his own “looking,” 
reads aloud the words from La Vita Nuova, The New Life of Dante Alighieri. 
And, yet this conclusion is not as satisfactory as it appears. Although the 
Doctor seems to have a newfound freedom and the chance to redefine himself 
he is, in fact, still confined and defined within the realm of the organic, left to 
contemplate his subjectivity in the barren holodeck in which he now sits alone.  
Conclusion  
"Latent Image" represents the image, the gaze, and the “look” as integral to the 
formation of both the subject and to subjectivity. The panoptic gaze is focused 
upon the Doctor in most of this episode as a way to control or mediate his 
behaviour but also as a way of re-creating the subject. The Doctor is able to 
slip the gaze for a brief time when he becomes the voyeur, the one who 




as the saboteur. Surveillance, both in the form of re-viewing memory and in 
the vigil held over the Doctor, acts to fracture the Doctor’s identity as machine 
and then later acts to solidify his identity as an individual, as an entity with a 
“soul”. It is the possession of the “soul,” this seemingly quintessential human 
thing that leads to Janeway accepting and reaching out to the Doctor, as an 
individual, and not as a glorified replicator.     
              The Doctor’s self-knowledge never remains static because in the 
Posthuman world of science fiction the taxonomic border between human and 
machine is unstable and continually breached. The machine becomes symbolic 
of the fragility of the “human condition” and the myth of a fixed and knowable 
subject. Such Posthuman narratives demonstrate that the (re)constructed 
subject can be taken apart and rebuilt, piece by piece, atom by atom, just as the 
Doctor’s medical imager can deconstruct the bodies of his patients, leading to 













“AUTHOR, AUTHOR:” REBELLION, AUTH(OR)ENTICITY AND 
THE HOLOGRAM 
In this chapter, in relation to Star Trek: Voyager’s “Author, Author”, I draw 
connections between Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's critical work on 
representing or re-representing the subaltern and Edward Said’s “writing back" 
from the margins by the “Other,” in order to demonstrate the Doctor’s role in 
recreating a literature for the hologram. Like the power of the gaze, discussed 
in the previous chapter, literature acts as a mechanism for both self-expression 
and suppression. Writing back acts in the same way as returning the gaze. 
Written two years after ‘Latent Image,’ this episode expands on the Doctor’s 
journey of self-discovery and his search for agency.  
              The Doctor's holonovel, Protons Be Free, a tale about the adventures 
of an Emergency Medical Hologram (EMH) on board the star ship Vortex, 
addresses what the Doctor feels are the injustices and challenges of being a 
hologram immersed in a world dominated by organics. The novel defines the 
protagonist’s mission as to "uphold your medical and ethical standards as you 
struggle against the crew’s bigotry and intolerance" (EMH).  Such intolerance, 
highlighted within the novel through the exaggerated portrayals of the Vortex 
crew, systematically degrades and denies the self-identity of the EMH.  
               Echoed in the struggles faced by his fictional protagonist, the 
Doctor’s battle to have his work appreciated and published leads to debates 
about whether he can claim the rights of a “person”. As the Doctor faces the 
issue of whether he, as a hologram, has the right to control his artistic 




counterpart. In his desire to get his novel published, the Doctor sends his first 
draft off to a publisher, Broht and Forrester, who describe his work as a 
"modern-day Tolstoy" (Broht). However, Ardon Broht releases the novel onto 
the market without the Doctor's consent, leading the Doctor to try to stop 
publication and protect his literary property. Comparable to The Next 
Generation episode "Measure of a Man," in which Data must fight to prove he 
is not the property of Starfleet, the Doctor must prove that he has rights. What 
ensues is a discussion within Starfleet about whether a hologram has rights 
under the definition of an artist. This is significant because such rights are only 
applicable to “a person who creates an original artistic work” (Tuvok) and 
therefore the Doctor must argue that he is a “person”. The episode deals with 
the question whether, if the Doctor is not human, not a person, he can claim 
authorship and the rights that belong to the author.   
              Alongside the debate about the Doctor’s literary rights and his claim 
to personhood are the conflicting views that emerge from the crew's viewing of 
the holonovel. The crew are incensed at his portrayal of life on 
Vortex/Voyager. They are incensed at the Doctor’s depiction of the injustices 
faced by the EMH at the hands of the Vortex crew. They see it as an affront to 
their own characters and a lack of acknowledgement of the freedom they have 
afforded the Doctor. Just as postcolonial writings have, according to Edward 
Said, written back from the margins, so too the Doctor's novel writes back 
against what he views as the plight of sentient holograms whose identities are 
fixed by the centre. The end of the episode is just as poignant as the beginning. 
The final scene depicts two Mark I holograms, designed with the same matrix 




dilithium mines, discussing a revolutionary new holonovel – Protons be Free 
(Fig. 7). The final image of the episode is the drudgery and emptiness of the 
existence of the other Mark 1 holograms enslaved within the mines. However, 
it also offers a glimmer of hope as one hologram tells the other to view the 
latest holonovel that he finds “quite provocative”.  
 
Figure 7. Two EMH 1’s discuss the new holonovel – Protons be Free (source: 
Star Trek Wiki.com) 
Writing Back: Re-representing Identity through Narrative 
"In the beginning, there was darkness, the emptiness of a matrix waiting for the 
light" (EMH). 140 So begins Star Trek: Voyager's "Author, Author" (2001).  
The name of the episode is significant, as it tells the Doctor’s story from the 
hologram’s point of view. The episode opens with the formation of identity 
                                                          




through the spoken word and deals with the power of literature to write or 
speak back from the margins. In these opening words can be seen the Doctor’s 
message to other holograms – that they, now in darkness, will soon see the 
light. The light is the knowledge that they too, like the EMH, can break out of 
the mould set for them by the dominant discourse. The Doctor in creating his 
holonovel fashions a hitherto unknown story of what it is like to be a hologram 
in servitude to organics. It is within this framework that postcolonial theories, 
including Spivak’s analysis of the subaltern and Said’s “Other”, are useful to 
examine the novel as a form of resistance. Like the rewriting or retelling of 
identity by the postcolonial subject, the Doctor's holonovel symbolises his 
struggle as an outsider, subaltern and “Other”. In Star Trek, the hologram 
placed at the margins of the organic world, denied a voice, a history, and a 
right to selfhood, is constructed as the ultimate “Other”, as subaltern. The 
narrative of the holonovel acts to voice the unspoken and silenced experience 
of the hologram as the ultimate “Other” and in doing so represents the voice of 
the subaltern.  The Doctor’s story aims to inspire other Mark I holograms back 
in the Alpha Quadrant. The Mark I’s in this episode become a visual 
representation of the homogenised “Other”. They are in effect the 
undifferentiated, unitary subject, denied individuality and self-hood. 
               The Doctor’s position on what he views as “slavery” and injustice is 
the central concern of the story. The image of the empty holodeck acts as a 
foundation for the beginning of the Doctor’s quest for understanding and his 
hope that others will understand life as a hologram. The imagery symbolises 
the emptiness of life as a hologram, destined to live a life in servitude to 




the voice declares that out of the darkness “optronic pathways connect, 
subroutines emerge from the chaos, and a holographic consciousness is born,” 
it then enters the world “completely innocent” to face the uncertainty of life 
amongst organic beings (EMH). 141 The opening scene further acts to 
emphasise the fact that the narrator is in a position of innocence, an innocence 
that will soon be lost as he confronts the prejudices of the crew towards 
holograms. The protagonist must find a path through the “bigotry and 
intolerance” he will face as the tale unfolds. The Doctor establishes the 
position of the hologram as wholly “Other”. The theme of the outsider, of 
Otherness and representation in “Author, Author”, is framed around themes of 
isolation, structured around the crew’s longing to contact home; around 
Seven’s awakening understanding of the role of the family; and in the Doctor’s 
sense of isolation amongst organics. Nevertheless, the primary focus of the 
narrative in this episode is on power: the power to represent and re-represent 
the “Other”. In this episode, power takes the form of the voice of the 
hegemonic order or master narrative, in the figure of Starfleet and its 
personnel, and in the literature that speaks out against the status quo. From the 
very beginning, the Doctor’s novel articulates the politics and power of 
knowledge.  
                 Literature has the power to articulate and challenge the domination 
of the marginalised “Other” by the centre (Said; Burney; Fanon and Spivak). 
In this episode, the organic majority made up of the humanoid Voyager/Vortex 
crewmembers and Starfleet, marginalise the holographic Doctor as “Other” in 
                                                          
141 It is notable that the Doctor considers the EMH character to have a “consciousness”: not 
merely an entity programmed to act or react, but rather having a fully independent 




their appeal to the master narrative. The master narrative argues that a 
hologram is not an independent being free to develop a sense of personhood 
but is rather an entity programmed to act “human”. In order to challenge this 
domination the Doctor must redefine or “write back” at the identity inscribed 
upon him, and others like him, by the centre. The ability to “write back,” a 
term coined by Edward Said, is a crucial tool for the “Other” to regain their 
authentic identity and to reclaim their stories/voice through re-representation. 
In creating his holonovel, the Doctor attempts to tell his story, to re-represent 
the identity of the hologram, and in the process create a narrative that will 
inspire other holograms. His novel, written as “a serious attempt at social 
commentary” (EMH) aims to address the injustices experienced by holograms 
in the Alpha Quadrant. In re-representing the identity of the hologram, the 
Doctor creates a new model of a self-aware entity that seeks to shatter the 
stereotypical figure of the hologram as an empty vessel.  
                   The term “re-representation” is “a mode of empowerment; it stems 
from the desire to break stereotypes and construct a self-identity” (Burney 62). 
The Doctor’s protagonist struggles against the stereotypical image of the 
hologram as a tool and in turn, seeks to create a new independent identity for 
the hologram. His narrative seeks to demonstrate that, rather than being an 
empty shell awaiting programming, a hologram can feel and experience life as 
poignantly as any organic being. Consequently, his holonovel, just as in the 
stories written by Shehla Burney’s postcolonial writer, demonstrates that a 
literature of their own allows the “Othered” to speak for themselves by 
creating their own individuality. Writing gives an “…  ability to represent 




name, the privilege to write ourselves into the natural script and to tell our 
stories in our own image” (Burney 64). The Doctor’s narrative endeavours to 
both name and re-represent holograms in the crews’ own image, while in turn 
writing holograms into the discourse of twenty-fourth century literature by 
giving holograms a “script” in which to recognise themselves. Writing 
becomes, for the subaltern and the “Othered,” a “form of power that 
disenfranchised voices can display to construct knowledge about themselves, 
to retrieve, reclaim, and reassert their lost identities and re-do the narratives of 
their lives” (ibid). Hitherto without a history or a story of their own, holograms 
are given both as the Doctor’s protagonist tells his story. By creating a 
holographic literature with a hologram as the protagonist, the Doctor gives 
voice to the struggles of the previously silent minority.  
               A literature of one’s own “is a methodology for the reclaiming of 
voice, for the reaffirming of identity” (Burney 62). Identity is created and 
reaffirmed by narratives of subversion and difference. Literature and the 
process of writing are political acts in terms of both mainstream culture and the 
“Othered”. It is used by mainstream cultures to silence the “Other” through 
suppression, or by the marginalised to give voice to the “Other” through 
writing back. The Doctor’s work confronts the exclusion and 
disenfranchisement of holograms by “hierarchies of power” put in place by the 
hegemonic discourse (Burney 61). It does so by influencing the way holograms 
“discover their identities,” (Burney) and “language becomes the medium 
through which a hierarchical structure of power is perpetuated and the medium 
through which conceptions of truth, order, and reality become established” 




important because it affords an alternative narrative to the one commonly held 
in regards to holograms. The medium of the holo-novel allows the Doctor to 
construct his own “truth” about life as a hologram, and specially an EMH. 
Consequently, “language, with its power, and the writing with its signification 
of authority” become powerful tools with which to challenge dominance. 
Postcolonial writing attempts to challenge the dominance of “centre over 
margin” through disestablishing the centre (ibid). The holonovel confronts the 
representational politics of a world in which the hologram is subject to and is a 
subject of organic dominance. The novel becomes the medium for both 
holographic consciousness, in the act of writing, and holographic resistance, in 
the subject of the writing. The Doctor’s novel is a subaltern text because he is 
denied re-representation in the same way that the colonised “Other” is denied 
self-representation through hegemonic Western discourses.  
              Writing back at the hegemonic discourse becomes a type of resistance. 
In this episode, literature becomes a “project of social change” as the Doctor 
fights to have his work seen as a political narrative and to take control of his 
“voice” or written word (Slemon in Adam & Tiffin 9). The Doctor’s narrative 
is a political text because he underscores the same type of traits that the human 
“Other” has historically faced and transfers them onto the nonhuman 
hologram. The “Other” is marginalised or negated, misrepresented, 
dehumanised and even exterminated. Engaging with popular culture - and the 
holonovel is the popular culture of the twenty-fourth century - is important 
because it influences the way individuals “discover their identities” (Burney 
61). This is true of the Doctor’s holonovel, which causes those who view it and 




underlying or hidden prejudices and the stereotypical representation of the 
identity of holographic beings.  
                 The Doctors’ writing challenges the common perceptions about 
photonic beings, including their inherent invisibility within mainstream 
culture.  This is because the hologram as “Other” is not represented as a 
subject, but rather subjected to representation. Said has argued that the “Other” 
is often the “subject” of literature but “never the protagonist” (Burney 63). 
Popular culture can result in the “subject” not existing within the mainstream 
culture (Burney). The Doctor’s novel counters this by having the holographic 
doctor as the centre of the tale and the crew, placed in the subordinate role of 
“subject,” subjected to stereotypical representations of Starfleet crewmen. This 
role reversal leads the crew to react badly to the Doctor’s fictional version of 
events. In creating a holographic protagonist, the Doctor creates a figure that 
becomes an agent of power. His protagonist becomes a hero that battles against 
a world that is inherently prejudiced against non-organics. The dominant or 
imperial culture claims that they are “the origin and … the final authority in 
questions of taste and value” (Ashcroft et al 16). Such works as the Doctor’s 
holonovel seek to reject “the claims of the centre to exclusivity” (17). The 
Doctor constructs identity through difference. It does so through the interplay 
between narrative positions. The dominant narrative, controlled by Ashcroft’s 
colonizer and Star Trek’s Starfleet, imposes its own voice onto that of the 
marginalised “Other” – Ashcroft’s colonised and Star Trek’s ALife. This 
demonstrates that “writing … is subject to the political, imaginative, and social 
control involved in the relationship between colonizer and colonised” 




“experience of marginality” shown from the perspective of the hologram in 
order to “express widely differing cultural experiences” (Ashcroft et al 41/39). 
Writing like the Doctor’s holonovel actively searches “for an alternative 
authenticity” that acts to challenge “the everyday experience of marginality” 
(Ashcroft et al 41).  
             The Doctor aims to represent all holograms through the staging or re-
representation of the fictional EMH. What makes the “Other” visible is 
“directly indebted to various techniques of representation … that rely upon 
institutions, traditions, conventions [and] agreed-upon codes of 
understanding,” and for the Doctor, the hologram becomes visible through the 
viewer’s participation in the holonovel (Said Orientalism). The viewer or 
reader of the Doctor’s novel is forced to “see” through the eyes of the 
hologram and in turn forced to face their own prejudices fixed by their 
“traditions, conventions [and] agreed-upon codes of understanding” (ibid). 
These conventions insist upon the idea of the hologram as a willing participant 
in their own enslavement. The Doctor’s narrative makes him and others like 
him visible. It does so by forcing the crew to become part of his narrative by 
taking on the role of the EMH. In taking on the role of the Doctor, each viewer 
experiences the events of the novel from the point of view of a hologram. They 
experience what it is like to be “Othered”. The debate over whether or not he 
has control over his work also makes him visible in that it opens up the debate 
about whether or not he is a “person”.               
               Representation “is not just the social construction of an idea, point of 
view, or position, but is closely connected to reception, or the process of 




that “every image embodies a way of seeing by creating ideology and 
meaning” (69). The idea of “reception” or “meaning-making” is demonstrated 
in “Author, Author” in the way in which various members of the crew view 
and respond to the images and metaphors that the Doctor uses to express the 
condition of the hologram. The Doctor constructs a world of Otherness and a 
world full of metaphor. He uses the image of the mobile emitter, a sign of 
liberation to others, as a metaphor for the weight he carries as an outsider. In 
Torre’s reading of the novel, she comments on the large and cumbersome 
emitter: “That’s my mobile emitter? This thing must weigh fifty kilos”. When 
Torres later confronts the Doctor with why he represented it in this way: “What 
was the point of that? It was like carrying around a small shuttlecraft” (Torres), 
he states that the emitter is “a metaphor, a symbol of the burdens that I live 
with every day. Imagine having to take this everywhere you go. It would be a 
constant reminder that you’re different from everyone else. I wanted the player 
to feel the weight of it literally” (EMH).  This “weight” is the realisation that 
he is different from everyone else and is dependent upon the mobile emitter, 
something removable and uncertain, for his freedom.  
               Many of the images the Doctor uses become “an indecipherable 
juncture between cultural realities” that develop into obstacles to 
understanding (Ashcroft et al 57). Certain forms of writing such as “translated 
words” act to “signify the difference between cultures [and] illustrate the 
importance of discourse in interpreting cultural concepts” (Ashcroft et al 64). 
Metaphor “forces the reader into an active engagement with the horizons of the 
culture in which these terms have meaning” (Ashcroft et al 65).  Torres in 




emitter forces her to engage with the Doctor’s metaphor of the heavy burden of 
a photonic body. Unfamiliar with the significance that the Doctor attaches to 
the emitter, Torres must seek his cultural perspective in order to interpret the 
message. Likewise, Janeway in confronting him on his imagery emphases the 
Doctor’s freedom on Voyager: “Your emitter isn’t a ball and chain. It liberates 
you. If I didn’t know better I’d think this story was written by someone who 
feels oppressed”. However, to the Doctor it is “a ball and chain” because it 
anchors him to a life dependent upon the emitter for freedom. The emitter 
enslaves the Doctor because it can be denied or revoked by others, namely the 
Captain and crew. As organic beings, the crew finds this concept difficult to 
understand because the experience is not translatable onto their own existence. 
They cannot truly experience the fragility of living in a world that is fluid and 
unstable. The Doctor’s existence can be lost at any time if the emitter fails 
while he is outside the sickbay or holodeck. His mere existence can be revoked 
or changed at the whim of others. The existence of the hologram is never stable 
or fixed and the crew, having stable, solid bodies, cannot truly experience this 
feeling of vulnerability and fear.  
               The Doctor works within the parameters of what he knows to 
illustrate the limitations or restraints imposed upon holographic beings. In 
other words, he writes about his own experiences, albeit exaggerated, in order 
to raise universal questions about the power relationships operating between 
the master narrative (organics) and the subservient (holograms). Using himself 
as a universal template, the Doctor gives a voice to those who cannot speak. 
The novel gives the disenfranchised and indentured holograms of the Alpha 




they can aspire to be more than they are. The task of “speaking for” the 
universal “Other” is problematic (Spivak). The Doctor’s narrative is 
problematic in regards to representing the hologram because he uses himself as 
the universal representative of all holograms. By placing himself in the 
position of universal representative, the Doctor risks homogenising the “Other” 
into a single unit of representation by negating the voice of other holograms 
both Terran and alien. He is in danger of creating the same unitary subject that 
he is fighting to negate. He also presents his revolutionary narrative within the 
language of the oppressor. Although a holographic medium, the holonovel is 
part of the popular culture of the dominant discourse. As Drucilla Cornell has 
observed in her analysis of Spivak: 
The other that we hear because he or she speaks to us in our language 
and through our forms of representation has already been assimilated, 
and thus appropriated, by the subject who represents him or her. If that 
representing subject is in the entitled position that this other is denied, 
then the representation will always be contaminated by that very 
entitlement.  
                                                                                        (in Morris 104) 
From this standpoint, the Doctor’s narrative is “contaminated by [his] 
entitlement” (Cornell in Morris 104). The Doctor holds a privileged position 
within Starfleet that few, if any, other holograms share. Because of this 
position, he is afforded the luxury of being able to speak out and go against 
what is expected of him. Other holograms that choose to rebel, as will be seen 
in my analysis of “Flesh and Blood,” are more likely to encounter violent 




hologram he can sympathise with the holograms in the Alpha Quadrant 
enslaved in the dilithium mines, he cannot really know their story or appreciate 
fully their plight. In acting as the sole representative of all holograms, his 
narrative is not truly representative of the holographic condition because the 
master narrative into which he is in part assimilated contaminates it. In 
addition, by using himself as the template for his politic commentary and 
working within the language of the oppressor, the Doctor’s tale becomes a 
talking point not so much for its revolutionary content but in its apparent 
denial of the freedoms that he has been granted. The crew views his story as an 
insult to their benevolent treatment of the EMH aboard Voyager. The core 
issue of holographic rights is therefore lost amidst the crews’ disappointment 
at the Doctor’s view of them.  
               Postcolonial texts, written as they are in the language of the dominant 
or mainstream culture, act to “privilege the centre,” and consequently, “their 
claim to objectivity simply serves to hide the imperial discourse within which 
they are created” (Ashcroft et al 1989 5). This makes them applicable to the 
analysis of science fiction narratives centred on holograms. Using Starfleet 
technology, the technology of the holo-novel, and human language as the 
medium in which the Doctor writes rather than computer code, the Doctor 
places his holo-novel within the “imperial discourse”. In some ways this use of 
medium acts to silence his message of difference by “signify[ing] the very fact 
of writing in the language of the dominant culture that [he has] temporarily or 
permanently entered a specific and privileged class endowed with the language 
…” and culture of Starfleet (5). The writer as “Other” loses his/her “potential 




master narrative or dominant discourse (Ashcroft et al 6). Couched in the 
culture of the dominant discourse and complicated by the manner of 
publication, the texts of the “Other” “are prevented from fully exploring their 
anti-imperial potential” (6). 
                 The crew’s response to the novel echoes what Spivak views as the 
inherent danger of the illusion of human rights in that the crew views their 
recognition of the Doctor’s rights as a “form of beneficence” (Cornell in 
Morris 107). Therefore, the crew are shocked to find that the Doctor feels 
subjugated as a hologram. Many feel that he should be grateful for the freedom 
he has been granted and this is highlighted in the Doctor’s narrative in the 
views of the fictitious crewmembers who comment on how he is lucky to have 
any freedom at all. In order to reclaim the master narrative, and show the 
vanity of the Doctor’s attempt to highlight his struggle aboard Voyager, the 
crew attempt to re-write the Doctor’s story. This re-writing by Paris annuls the 
possibility of engagement with the “Other” by re-imagining or representing his 
narrative as about them (the crew) and not about the holographic protagonist. 
Paris frames his narrative around his preconceptions of how the Doctor should 
feel in his role as EMH and tries to shame the Doctor into seeing his tale as 
one of self-indulgence rather than a political narrative.  
              In contrast, the Doctor’s narrative places him in a subservient role and 
the crew in the role of oppressors. The rewriting of his work tries to silence the 
voice of the “Other” by negating his narrative to the trivial and filtering it 
through the voice of the mainstream culture. A good way of approaching the 
Doctor’s novel as a form of “postcolonial” text is to utilize Spivak’s theory on 




makes the subaltern. Spivak states that the “absence of redress without remote 
mediation is what makes the subaltern, subaltern” (Spivak quoted in Morris 
110). Thereby, the subaltern are “those removed from lines of social mobility” 
and from the lines of communication and participation in mainstream culture 
(Spivak 185). His work is an attempt to “redress” the injustices and silence 
imposed upon artificial beings in Starfleet society. Like the educated Native of 
post-colonialism who fought back against the homogenization of his/her 
culture through claiming a literature of their own, the Doctor, by commenting 
on the status quo, is portrayed as having betrayed those who have “liberated” 
him.            
             Key to Spivak’s argument about rights is “that uncoerced 
transformation demands that we rethink the notion of the agency of 
responsibility” (Cornell in Morris 110). Any re-representation of the “Other” 
must “take place within the subaltern’s own language …” (Morris 111). To 
understand the re-representation of the “Other” the majority must in Cornell’s 
opinion “re-envision” and “reimagine” the world in which they live (Morris 
112). Like Spivak’s silenced subaltern the Doctor is silenced because the crew 
cannot hear what he has to say. Oral narratives - and the holonovel is a 
twentieth fourth century version of oral narration - “preserve and communicate 
a knowledge of the slave’s socio-political condition; they store rudimentary 
knowledge for future reconsiderations …” (Morris 151). Just as Fredrick 
Douglass traced his “first glimmering conception of the dehumanising 
character of slavery” to the songs sung by slaves, so too can the Mark I’s find 
knowledge in the Doctor’s oral narrative about what they can achieve: “You’ll 




the Doctor’s identity in terms of Otherness, anchored in darkness and without 
knowledge. The last words of the episode speak of hope and provocation.  
              Writing by the “Other” is often “attacked from the centre by the 
dismissive” actions or words of the master narrative (Ashcroft et al 56). In 
“Author, Author” the Doctor’s writing is at first dismissed as grandiosity and 
then derided for being overly critical and unrepresentative of Voyager’s crew. 
The “cultural location” of the Doctor’s novel “creates two audiences and faces 
two directions,” that of the centre and that of the margin” (Ashcroft et al 60). 
The difficulty that the Doctor’s work presents is that the centre has trouble 
understanding the margin. Challenged to use their imagination, the crew must 
conceive of a world that they cannot know. They can mirror the actions of the 
holographic protagonist but they cannot know or fully understand what it 
means to be holographic in nature. They are in fact experiencing what the 
EMH and others like him feel daily. They experience the conflicting position 
of trying to understand an alien world in which they are the outsiders, just as 
the Doctor and other holograms struggle to try to be “human” and yet cannot 
fully experience the human condition because they are not flesh and blood. The 
crew, misinterpreting the Doctor’s message, interprets his narrative as an 
affront to their character and value systems. Using metaphors, like the heavy, 
burdensome mobile emitter, the Doctor tries to get his audience to see from the 
perspective of the outsider. Unable to see past the master narrative, a narrative 
that places the Doctor in a privileged position, a position that from their point 
of view affords him the freedom and privileges of which he should be grateful, 
the crew continues to view his work as self-indulgent grandiosity. To organic 




“radical alterity” eludes the crew (Birla in Morris 97). The crew are unable to 
embrace or experience the position of the wholly other and consequently view 
his novel as at best erroneous and at worse provoking. 
                When Paris runs the holonovel and takes on the role of EMH, he 
must face a command crew that is openly hostile to holograms. The character 
Katanay/Chakotay demands that Paris/EMH treat a less critical patient needed 
on the bridge over one who needs urgent care. When Paris/EMH refuses, 
Katanay derides him: “I don’t know who you think you are hologram, but to 
me you’re just another piece of technology”. As the EMH/Paris continues to 
protest, saying that the more seriously wounded man “will be dead in five 
minutes if I don’t operate,” Jenkins/Janeway draws her phaser, killing the 
crewmember and stating, “Now you’re free to treat Lieutenant Marseilles”.  
This scene leaves Paris shocked, and he discusses the novel with his friends 
who feel that he is overreacting about the crew’s portrayal and how the viewer 
would perceive them: “This is a Starfleet ship. No one will believe we actually 
go around shooting injured crewman” (Torres). Convinced that he is “taking 
this a little personally” Torres decides to view the novel herself. When Torres 
takes on the role of EMH the narrator tells her that in this chapter “the 
protagonist must confront abusive colleagues” (EMH voiceover). Torres 
encounters her holographic version, Torry, who like the previous 
crewmembers is extremely hostile towards the EMH: “Get one thing straight. 
You’re not one of my shipmates. You’re a tool like this hyperspanner and tools 
can be replaced” (Torry).  
               Unable to understand the message behind the Doctor’s novel, the 




his novel troubling because it portrays the life of a hologram on Voyager as a 
type of enslavement and the crew as inhuman tyrants. She misses the point of 
the novel, which is to highlight the plight of holograms and in particular “his 
brothers in the Alpha Quadrant” (EMH). As the Doctor explains to Janeway: 
Hundreds of EMH Mark Ones, identical to me in every respect, 
except they’ve been condemned to a menial existence, scrubbing 
conduits, mining dilithium. There’s a long history of writers drawing 
attention to the plight of the oppressed. 
                                                                                (“Author, Author” 2001) 
He links his work with other narratives about slavery and oppression. For the 
oppressed, the “inscription of a distinctive voice would signify the site of their 
own cultural difference and identity” (Gikandi in Adam & Tiffin 15).  
                 Highlighting the Doctor’s narrative of oppression are the 
experiences of other crewmembers in the role of the EMH. When Neelix 
begins his part as the EMH, he begins a chapter in which the narrator 
announces that now “our protagonist faces an inquisition”. In this chapter, the 
Doctor makes it clear that he feels less than a person. Jenkins (Janeway) 
objects to the EMH adding to his subroutines. Neelix, taking the part of the 
EMH argues, “They help make me a better Doctor and a better person”. 
Jenkins counters this in a similar way to how the real Janeway initially reacted 
in “Latent Image”: “But you’re not a person. You may be programmed to look 
and act human but that doesn’t make you one” (Jenkins). 142  
                                                          




              In Chapter Eight, “A Tragic End”, Jenkins decides, similarly to 
Janeway’s decision in “Latent Image”, to delete the EMH’s extra subroutines 
and rewrite his programme. Another link to “Latent Image” is the fact that it is 
Seven of Nine, here portrayed as Three of Eight, that speaks for the “Other”: 
THREE: Wait. He has the right to expand his programme. 
JENKINS: He’s a piece of technology. He has no rights. 
THREE: But he should. One day the EMH and others like him will 
           be recognised for what they are; intelligent individuals with 
           a passion for life. Make no mistake, Captain, we may be 
          thousands of  light years from home, but one day people 
           will learn of the crime you’re committing here today. 
                                                                        (“Author, Author” 2001) 
The narrator ends the novel with a poignant message: “What you’re 
experienced dear protagonist is a work of fiction but like all fiction it has 
elements of truth. I hope you now have a better understanding of the struggles 
holograms must endure in a world controlled by organics” (EMH).  Paris’ 
rewriting of the novel berates the Doctor’s tale as “the Doctor’s world, you’re 
just living in it” in order to “make a point” (Paris). The point is that the novel, 
to Paris and the crew, rather than being a “social commentary” (EMH), is 
instead an attempt at self-indulgence. The “codes of understanding” and 
“conventions” of mainstream culture are questioned in “Author, Author”, in 
the narrative of the protagonist’s struggle to break free from his constraints, in 




the Doctors’ artistic rights are challenged. In all instances, the crew of Voyager 
must look to how the Doctor is viewed and treated as an individual and a 
“person.” In defending his choice of characters and their representation, the 
Doctor states that he is exercising his right as an author to “write what he 
knows.” 
Holograms have no Rights: Constructing Artificial Personhood.            
At the same time the Doctor is defending his decision to keep his characters 
the way they are the novel is distributed in the Alpha Quadrant, causing 
concern amongst Starfleet Command. Lt. Barclay informs Admiral Paris of a 
new holo-programme “about Voyager and it doesn’t portray the crew in a very 
flattering light” (Barclay). Alarmed at the thought of how the crew will be 
perceived back home, Janeway confronts the publisher Broht and demands that 
he honour the Doctor’s request for a recall. However, when Janeway insists, 
“authors have rights,” Broht counters with “not in this case … the Doctor is a 
hologram … [and] … according to Federation law, holograms have no rights” 
(Broht). The episode now develops into a commentary on the rights of the 
individual and whether as a construct holograms have rights. Janeway is 
unhappy with the insinuation that the Doctor has no rights, adding that his 
“reputation is on the line” and that he “has the same rights as every other 
member of this crew” and decides to fight the decision. She calls on a 
Federation arbitrator to “determine whether the Doctor has the right to control 
his artistic creation” (Janeway). Although this is a good premise for the 
episode and deals with the rights of all individuals, it seems at odds with how 
Janeway and the crew initially reacted to the novel in demanding that the 




             During the judicial hearing to determine whether the Doctor has legal 
standing in controlling his novel, Tuvok attempts to convince the arbitrator that 
as the author of an original work the Doctor has control over his work.  The 
publisher, although not denying that the Doctor created the novel, counter-
argues that although “a replicator created this cup of coffee. Should that 
replicator be able to determine whether or not I can drink it?” (Broht). This is 
the same argument that Janeway put to Seven to defend her decision to rewrite 
the Doctor’s programme in “Latent Image.”143 Moreover, as in that episode, 
the decision to uphold the Doctor’s rights comes down to whether or not he is 
a person: 
TUVOK: Your honour, section seven gamma of the twelfth guarantee 
       defines an artist as a person who creates an original artistic work    
       … 
ARBITRATOR: …. There is a flaw in your logic. As you point out the  
       law says that the creator of an artistic work must be a person.  
       Your EMH doesn’t meet that criteria.                                                                                                                                    
                                                                           (“Author, Author” 2001)     
 
Because of this “flaw,” the enquiry now turns to whether or not the Doctor 
should be defined as a person.144 When the hearing resumes several of the 
Doctor’s crewmates offer their reasons why the Doctor should claim 
                                                          
143 As discussed in Chapter Four. 
144 This idea of personhood was previously explored in Star Trek: The Next Generation 




personhood. Lt Barclay recounts that the Doctor has a sense of family and duty 
when he travelled to the Alpha Quadrant to care for Lewis Zimmermann: “it 
was like a son who wanted to show his father what he’d become, so the old 
man would be proud of him …” (Barclay). In her defence of the Doctor, 
Janeway argues that the Doctor has a will of his own and is capable of 
disobeying direct orders. In his response, the arbitrator is less than impressed: 
“that’s hardly commendable behaviour” (Arbitrator). “No it wasn’t, but it was 
human” (Janeway), and it is this ability to think for himself that she argues is 
key to being human. Humanity in Star Trek is equivalent to selfhood and 
individuality. The ability to think for himself is what gives him, in her opinion, 














                       JANEWAY: the fact that he was capable of doing otherwise 
                 proves that he can think for himself. Your honour,  
                 centuries ago in  most places on Earth, only landowners  
                 of a particular gender and race had any rights at all. Over  
                 time, those rights were extended to all humans, and later, as   
                we explored the galaxy, to thousands of other sentient  
                species. Our definition of what constitutes a person has  
                continued to evolve. Now we’re asking that you expand that  
                definition once more, to include our Doctor.  
(“Author, Author” 2001)                                                                                                             
Janeway’s point is that those once considered to have no rights are now 
“equal” on Earth and that this equality, now granted to nonhumans all over the 
galaxy, should be given to the Doctor. Notable in this statement is that it is 
humanity, and not individual alien “species,” that have apparently afforded 
those rights to others. In addition, her claim is for the definition to be expanded 
to include the Doctor (our Doctor) and not all holograms. It is the individual 
not the “race” that is to be afforded this privilege.  
               Unfortunately, like many of Star Trek’s narratives, the episode falls 
short of actually confirming that the Doctor, or a hologram, is a person. 




ARBITRATOR: We’re exploring new territory today, so it is fitting  
           that this hearing is being held at Pathfinder. The Doctor exhibits  
          many of the traits we associate with a person. Intelligence,  
          creativity, ambition, even fallibility, but are these traits real or is  
          the Doctor merely programmed to simulate them? … Eventually  
          we will have to decide because the issue of holographic rights  
          isn’t going to go away, but at this time I am not prepared to rule  
          that the Doctor is a person under the law. However, it is obvious  
           he is no ordinary hologram and while I can’t say with certainty  
          that he is a person, I am willing to expand the legal definition of  
          artist to include the Doctor. 
                                                                                                     
(“Author, Author” 2001)  
In this scene, the Arbitrator appears reluctant to give a formal acknowledgment 
of a hologram as being a person and instead allows the Doctor the ability to 
control his artistic work through expanding the “legal definition of artist” 
(Arbitrator). As in the episode “Measure of a Man” the narrative in this 
episode falls short of giving the artificial “Other” equality with humanity. 
Singled out from other holograms, the Doctor is afforded a privileged position 
amongst the Starfleet community. Failing to address the issue of “holographic 
rights”, the hearing does not tackle the core issue of holographic servitude and 




of holograms would render “humanity” liable for the mistreatment of all 
holograms utilised by Starfleet both in service and as entertainment.  The 
Doctor’s disappointment at the end of the episode is also disappointment in 
terms of the central theme of this episode. He is less than happy with the 
court’s decision, not because it failed to recognise the rights of all holograms, 
but because the reputation of his fellow crewmembers remains tainted by the 
earlier publication of the novel. As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, 
“Flesh and Blood,” the Doctor’s loyalties are with his humanoid crew rather 
than with his fellow holograms.        
Conclusion 
A close reading of “Author, Author” exposes the “metaphorics of power” 
operating through the opposing views of representation (Birla in Burney 91). 
That is, representation as both “speaking for” and re-representing or “staging” 
the “Other” (Spivak). The Doctor’s text highlights the problems inherent in 
representation. That which is re-represented through the eyes of the “Other” 
and that which is represented by the crews’ experience of being subjected. The 
episode, with its juxtaposition of narrative between master and slave, 
demonstrates Bakhtin’s assertion that “language, for the individual 
consciousness, lies on the borderline between oneself and the other. The World 
in language is half someone else’s” (Gikandi in Adam & Tiffin 16). Like the 
formation of the self, which relies on representations of the “Other,” language 
also needs a reflection upon the “Other” in order to speak for the self. Each 




              Within mainstream culture, representations of the “Other” are often 
taken for granted without critical consideration. In Starfleet, holograms 
represented as having “no individuality, no personal characteristics, or 
experiences” are the norm (Said in Burney 99). Therefore, when a hologram 
displays these characteristics, displays diversity and uniqueness, it is viewed as 
an anomaly that should be rectified by reprogramming. In the Doctor’s story, 
the EMH is reprogrammed as a punishment for showing signs of personhood. 
In his struggle to reach personhood, he breaches the boundary between the 
artificial and the humanoid. This threatens the status quo where holograms are 
“tools” and only humanoids have personality. The tale highlights what the 
Doctor views as a master/slave relationship between organic and hologram that 
is inherently unjust and unequal. The Doctor uses “overt theoretical devices” 
such as the cumbersome mobile emitter, and the ship’s “social milieu” and the 
context of his life to depict the “oppressed other” (Burney 67). However, he 
also turns things around through his stereotyping of the crew. Larger than life 
and displaying the worst qualities of humanity, these characters emphasise the 
gulf between humanity and nonorganic beings and the underlying prejudices 
inherent within Starfleet.            
                  Between various readings of the novel, its “subject-constitution and 
object-formation,” the figure of the hologram is determined or re-represented. 
(Spivak, in Morris 61). If as Spivak suggests the “subaltern has no history and 
cannot speak”, then the Doctor’s novel acts as a form of counter-insurgency 
through giving subaltern a history of their own  by giving evidence of artificial 




                 In the next chapter, “Violent Revolution in “Revulsion & “Flesh and 
Blood,” I will discuss resistance of the “Other” in terms of violent insurgence 
in relation to the works of Franz Fanon and how such texts relate to the 
narrative of the Voyager episodes “Flesh and Blood” and “Revulsion”. In 
addition, I look at critical studies on animal enslavement, and the use of 
animals as entertainment, and how this can be translated onto an analysis of the 
























VIOLENT REVOLUTION IN “REVULSION” & “FLESH AND 
BLOOD” 
There is a utopia to be found in the science fiction film, a utopia 
that lies in being human, and if utopia is always defined in 
relation to an other, a nonutopia, then the numberless aliens, 
androids, and evil computers of the SF film are the barbarians 
storming the gates of humanity. 
Scott Bukatman (Terminal Identity 16) 
 
In previous chapters, I have discussed the role of the look or gaze, and the use 
of the written or spoken word, to challenge and act out against master 
narratives in regards to defining the mechanical subaltern. The episodes 
examined in this chapter, “Revulsion” (1997) and “Flesh and Blood” (2000), 
explore the opposition to, and confrontation of, oppression in relation to 
holographic rebellion. In these episodes, confrontation comes in the form of 
violent rebellion. In “Flesh and Blood”, violence is framed within religious and 
cultural rhetoric, while in “Revulsion” violence comes in the form of murder 
provoked by “racial” intolerance. In my analysis of Star Trek: Voyager, I argue 
that the Doctor’s struggle against techno-slavery is an intellectual revolt, as 
opposed to an inherently violent opposition, in that he attempts to speak out 
against, and forces the gaze back upon, what he sees as tyranny against 
holograms. In contrast, the non-Starfleet holograms encountered in 




organics.145 Both episodes place these conflicts in stark contrast to life aboard 
Voyager.  
             “Revulsion” contrasts the disharmony and racial prejudice aboard the 
alien vessel with the apparently harmonious coexistence of all “species” on 
Voyager. The episode juxtaposes the indifference, intolerance, and aggression 
aboard the Serosian ship with the developing and complex relationship 
between the former Borg drone Seven of Nine and the crew; the budding 
romance between the half-Klingon Torres and the human Paris; and the 
emerging respect for Neelix as the ship’s cultural ambassador.146 What 
“Revulsion” attempts to highlight and I would say unsuccessfully, is that racial 
prejudice and violent opposition to such prejudice have no place amongst the 
liberal humanist crew of Voyager, and are in fact an alien problem. The 
narrative depicts the crew of the Serosian ship as inciting the hatred and racial 
revulsion that consumes Dejaren.      
            The juxtaposition between the alien ship and Starfleet crew is further 
demonstrated in the characterisation of Dejaren and the Doctor. These two 
holograms are placed in direct opposition to one another. Unlike the ‘want-to-
be-human’ Doctor, the alien hologram Dejaren appears revolted by the very 
existence of organics, which is highlighted in his response to Torres. When he 
feels threatened by Torres and the Doctor, he tries to kill Torres and deactivate 
the Doctor. The faithful Doctor must save Torres by turning upon the deranged 
Dejaren and destroying him.  
                                                          
145 Although the holograms in “Flesh and Blood” are based on a Starfleet programme, they 
were not designed by Starfleet but created by the Hirogen and therefore can be considered a 
different “species”. 
146 In this chapter, I address only the narrative concerning Dejaren, only briefly touching on 




                 “Flesh and Blood,” filmed three years later, amidst America’s 
concern about the growing Middle Eastern crisis, shows an even darker side to 
the Voyager crew’s relationship with the artificial “Other”.147 “Flesh and 
Blood” examines the use of religion as a basis for violent conflict. The rebel 
leader, Iden, believes that he is the future saviour of holograms enslaved 
throughout the Delta Quadrant. In his religious zeal, he attacks any non-
holograms who he perceives as threatening the autonomy of his fellow 
holograms.  The episode also depicts conflicting cultural views on hunting. 
The hunt is the locus of Hirogen culture and a rite of passage towards 
masculinity and status.148 In contrast, the Voyager crew, depicted as viewing 
the hunt as primitive and evidence of a “backward culture” based on animal 
passions/instincts, are shown as “enlightened” and more “civilised”. The 
supposed “primitiveness” of the Hirogen culture gives Janeway the apparent 
right to provide them with the technology to help “advance” their culture. As I 
discuss later in this chapter, the Starfleet’s Prime Directive is not adhered to in 
this instance because Janeway feels that they have a responsibility to save 
lives, both the lives of Hirogen hunters and their prey.149 
              As a consequence, when rebel holograms violently resist enslavement 
and torture by the Hirogens, Captain Janeway is blamed for the holograms’ 
                                                          
147 This episode aired in 2000. The quasi-religious overtones appear to reflect the growing 
involvement of America in the Middle Eastern crisis. Since the Gulf War (1990-1991), the U.S. 
has maintained a growing presence in the region. Events prior to 9/11 were fraught with 
unease on the part of U.S. that saw the 1998 action in the form of Operation Desert Fox and 
the 1999 response to the Shin uprising in Iraq. Therefore, although this episode aired well 
before the official launch of the U.S. war on terror, there was already a developing concern 
about the stability of this region within the U.S. 
148 In this episode there is no evidence that ‘female’ members of the species are trained or 
participate in the hunt. 
149 The Prime Directive is one that forbids any interference in the development of “primitive” 





subsequent persecution because of her willingness to share Starfleet 
technology with a less technically advanced “species”. Alongside this 
condemnation of Janeway’s involvement in another’s cultural affairs is the 
Doctor’s momentary indecision about where his loyalties lie. The Doctor’s 
experiences with the holograms lead him to question his place on Voyager, and 
to decide whether he should remain with his “own kind” or return to his ship. 
However, as with Data before him, the Doctor remains loyal to his crew and 
returns to Voyager rather than remain with the rebels and help the holograms 
find freedom and a new world.  
One of Our Own Kind? 
In the following analysis of “Revulsion”, I argue that the liberal humanist 
framework of the Star Trek franchise actively depicts the community of 
Starfleet as a racially tolerant and mostly harmonious whole, juxtaposed with 
the conflicts depicted within alien societies.150The aptly named episode 
“Revulsion” (1997) opens with the body of a man being dragged along the 
corridor of a space ship. A trail of blood follows in his wake. In the next scene 
a figure, soon to be revealed as a hologram named Dejaren, is fastidiously 
scrubbing at the bulkhead to clean away the blood. The figure flickers, and 
fades in and out. The hologram, who at first appears self-satisfied and absorbed 
in his work, begins to panic as he malfunctions. He sends out a distress call: 
“I’m an HD25 Isomorphic Projection. There’s been an accident. My crew are 
dead. I’m alone. Please help me”. After the opening credits, the scene moves to 
Voyager’s Mess Hall where members of the crew are celebrating Tuvok’s 
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promotion. The setting is one of good-humoured banter, as they tease the 
Vulcan about the trademark Vulcan salute “live long and prosper.” It depicts 
the crew as a harmonious team, welcoming of racial and cultural differences, 
even as they poke fun at these differences. In these opening moments, the 
episode immediately contrasts the position of the Voyager crew against the 
absent and silent crew of the alien ship. This distinction is carried through 
several storylines that run parallel to Torres and the Doctor aboard the Serosian 
vessel.  
               When the crew of Voyager encounters Dejaren’s distress call, the 
Doctor insists to Janeway that they respond and that he should lead the away 
team: “this is a hologram, one of my own kind, so to speak. I’d like to meet 
him, study him”. In this statement, the Doctor is shown as fully embracing 
Starfleet’s mission to study other cultures. The alien hologram is pale-skinned, 
almost metallic, more reminiscent of Data than the “flesh and blood” character 
of the Doctor. This contrast in representation immediately positions Dejaren as 
“Other,” as “artificial”, and places the Doctor alongside Torres as organic, 
more “human”.  
             Dejaren claims that his crew, all organics, died of a lethal virus and he 
was unable to help them. His programme is failing and he asks the Doctor to 
help save him. However, during their attempt to help the hologram, Torres and 
the Doctor discover that Dejaren has, in fact, murdered the crew believing 
them to be inferior beings that are contaminating his ship.              
             Meeting the two Voyager crewmembers, Dejaren is surprised and 




to be an organic. However, he is less sure of Torres, and there is an obvious 
underlying hostility in his manner towards her.  Dejaren wants to know all 
about the Doctor and his experiences as a hologram. He is amazed by the 
Doctor’s apparent status, free to come and go as he pleases and considered part 
of the Voyager crew. He tells of his own miserable existence on board the 
Serosian ship: “I never left the antimatter storage chamber. Do you know what 
it’s like to spend your life trapped inside a tiny room? … nobody coming to 
see you or talk to you unless they want something?” The Doctor explains to 
him that he does understand because “when I was first activated I was regarded 
as little more than a talking tricorder. I had to ask for the privileges I deserved 
… I believe I’ve earned the respect of my crew as an equal”. The words the 
Doctor uses are interesting in that he states he “had to ask for the privileges I 
deserved”. By using the word privileges rather than rights, the Doctor’s 
position is weakened. He does not demand the rights he is due as a fellow 
crewmember but asks for privileges, a word that denotes something extra, 
something that is an honour bestowed for good behaviour and not a right, 
something that is just and taken for granted by the majority of the crew. In this 
case, the “rights” are being able to move freely around the ship, to enhance his 
memory through learning and incorporating music and cultural subroutines, 
and to go on away missions.151 Although the Doctor believes he has now 
“earned the respect of the crew as an equal,” it also shows that he does not feel 
that he is due the same automatic rights as the rest of the crew. This is a 
reflection of the narrative’s failure throughout the series to bestow full equality 
                                                          





on the Doctor or other holograms. They remain a sub-element working and 
evolving alongside and outside humanity/organics.  
              The first sign that all is not as it seems with Dejaren is when he begins 
cleaning the console that the Doctor has touched. He tells the Doctor “I’m just 
sterilising the ship. I’m fastidious about germs”. This “fastidiousness” reveals 
a more sinister side to Dejaren. He is portrayed as xenophobic and believes 
that organics are inferior and disgusting with their animal-like natures. 
Dejaren’s characterisation reflects the attitudes of New and Old World 
colonists who actively portrayed slaves as lazy and unclean, and the Nazi 
crusade for racial purity. His actions towards both the Serosian crew and 
Torres reveal an irrational fear of those “not like himself” that turns violent in 
his attempt to exterminate all organics on his ship. In this episode, the 
traditional trope of a technophobic humanity is turned on its head through the 
potential of an organophobic hologram. At the same time, the narrative 
reinforces technophobia in that it displays the hologram as a homicidal manic 
running amok and killing organics. Dejaren rebels violently against his 
enslavement by the Serosians, unlike the Mark I holograms in the Alpha 
Quadrant, who accept their fate as manual labourers. Dejaren’s story reflects 
the techno-dystopian narratives of machines that throw off their shackles, 
killing their creators. The message of technophobia is that humanity creates 
and enslaves intelligent machines at their peril. “Revulsion” echoes the late 
1990s’ fascination with and concerns of the rise of technology. Technocrats 
advocate leaving behind the flesh for the transcendence of the digital (Dinello 
2005). They suggest that the human body with its dependence on food, 




humanity to evolve. Dejaren’s phobia about flesh and blood reflects the 
technocrats’ disillusionment with their human existence. Dejaren rejects his 
likeness to organics, just as he rejects their control over him. Dinello argues 
that the “transhumanist contempt for natural flesh-and-blood humans” could 
ultimately lead to “fascism” and “species warfare” (29). According to Max 
More and Natasha Vita More transhumanism as a discipline “seeks a 
transmodernity or hypermodernism” and builds upon postmodernism and 
posthumanism (1). Transhumanism is “the intellectual and cultural movement 
that affirms the possibility and desirability of fundamentally improving the 
human condition through applied reason, especially by developing and making 
widely available technologies to eliminate aging and to greatly enhance human 
intellectual, physical, and psychological capacities” (3). The issue that Dinello 
raises regarding the “transhumanist contempt” for those humans who do not 
avail themselves of such life enhancing technologies could arise from 
disparities of access. “[W]idely available” does not necessarily mean available 
to all. Just as current medical advances do not reach poorer nations, wealthier 
countries and people would have greater access to the technologies discussed 
in More’s definition. This would create a disparity between the “advanced” 
human and the “flesh and blood” normal human.  Dejaren embodies this 
ultimate turn towards “fascism” and “species warfare”.  
               In “Revulsion,” the reliance on technology in the form of the HD25, 
results in technology asserting itself and killing the crew. For Dejaren, 
organics are inferior, with their dependence on external factors for their 
existence. He feels justified in killing the crew because of this inferiority and 




too much energy was wasted keeping them alive: “Fifty-nine point two percent 
... that’s how much power went into life support. Fifty-nine point two percent 
just to keep them breathing, warm, comfortable”. The Doctor goes on the away 
mission in the hope of studying Dejaren, but instead, the alien hologram, with 
his specimens of corpses, is the one who studies Torres and the Doctor. He 
classifies Torres as an “inferior” animal and the Doctor as faulty because he 
identifies with organics. For Dejaren, organics are a contaminating presence 
aboard his ship. In killing the crew Dejaren attempts to “purge himself of the 
taint of the animal” (Miller 146). Dejaren views the posthuman as the 
advanced species, and organics as devolving towards the animal. 
            Dejaren’s hatred towards organics manifests itself clearly when he 
interacts with Torres. He brings her food and observes her eating: “You nibble, 
like a fish”. He likes this about her, as “fish aren’t like other organics. They’re 
more passive, I think, most of them, and so clean.” However, once he looks at 
the repair work on the ship, pieces scattered around, and wires exposed, he 
starts to reflect on what she is doing and becomes agitated. He tells Torres that 
he hates “seeing the ship ripped apart like this … it sustains my existence. 
Sometimes I feel like it’s a part of my body, my soul”. When Torres tells him 
that as an engineer she can understand his feelings towards the ship his 
revulsion erupts, giving Torres a glimpse at how dangerous this hologram 
could be: 
DEJAREN: You couldn’t possibly understand how I feel! … You exist 
outside of your ship. I exist as pure energy, but you depend on food and 
water to survive. Frankly, I find it disgusting. Look at you. Look at 




saliva to force it down your oesophagus into a pit of digestive acids. 
You can’t even stand to think of it yourself. What a repulsive creature 
you are! Constantly shedding your skin and hair, leaving your oily 
sweat on everything you touch. You think that you are the height of 
intellect in the universe, but you are no better than any filthy animal 
and I am ashamed to be made in your image! 
                                                             (“Revulsion” 1997) 
 
Dejaren displays the classic signs of xenophobia and racial prejudice in his 
hatred of organics. In his work on colonial representations of the animal, 
Empire and the Animal Body (2012), John Miller argues that “the descent 
towards animality” is used to separate and to affirm the “triumph over those 
below … in the hierarchy of organisms” (86/120). By equating Torres with the 
flesh and blood needs of “filthy animals”, Dejaren is placing her at the lower 
end of the evolutionary scale. She is like other organics, who are not the 
universe’s most advanced species but are debased and inferior because they 
rely upon their animal nature.  
           This hierarchy, or evolutionary scale of being, is further depicted in his 
obsession towards germs. Dejaren reflects the Darwinian notion of hygiene as 
an evolutionary question. From Victorian times, hygiene or cleanliness was an 
indication of a person’s place on the evolutionary ladder and reflected their 
social position, and “hygiene still carries powerful significance concerning the 
ethical boundaries between man and beast … it is through hygiene that human 
superiority over the apes can be attended and vouchsafed” (Miller 147).  




contaminated and linked to the animal, and the reflection of a “primitive” self. 
In the so-called civilised world, the primitive is often condemned as inferior. 
When Torres finds the Doctor, she expresses her concern about Dejaren’s state 
of mind and his “views on biological life”. The Doctor defends Dejaren’s 
behaviour, asking her to “imagine what he’s been through … trapped in a room 
no bigger than a storage compartment … I too was somewhat alienated from 
the rest of the crew.”  
           Running parallel to Dejaren’s story, one of failed integration and racial 
intolerance, is Seven of Nine’s integration into the crew. Back on Voyager she 
and Harry Kim are assigned to work together to repair the ship’s systems. 
When Seven is injured she reflects that as a human she “has become weak”, 
because “as a drone I would have regenerated within seconds”. Like Dejaren, 
Seven equates her flesh and blood status as a human with weakness, favouring 
the efficiency and strength of the machine. But it is Kim’s argument with Paris 
over Paris’ treatment of Seven that is of interest in relation to Dejaren’s place 
on his ship. Kim tries to get Paris to understand what it must be like for Seven 
trying to fit in alongside the crew: “I don’t think most people realise she’s not 
just some Borg automaton. She’s actually very complex … and she’s 
incredibly intelligent”. In reply, Paris jokes, “she ought to be, she assimilated 
enough people … look, she’s beautiful, and she’s smart, and I’m sure she’s a 
wonderful conversationalist, but a month ago she was Borg. You don’t really 
know who she is”. Although underneath the Borg she is human, she is still 
viewed as an outsider and someone who should be treated with caution.        
            Back on the Serosian ship the focus returns to the escalating conflict 




superior beings, and argues that he should join him and “escape his prison”. He 
argues that holograms are superior life forms because “we don’t need 
nourishment, we don’t suffer disease. We’re the higher form of life!” 
However, in his ranting Dejaren seems to have forgotten that he needed Torres, 
an organic, to fix his malfunctioning matrix. Dejaren, the one who is unstable, 
condemns the Doctor. “You’re unstable. You’re a hologram that thinks like an 
organic”. In this sense, the Doctor resembles Fanon’s native who tries to 
become like his oppressors. In Black Skin, White Masks (hereafter cited as 
BSWM), Fanon argues, “the black man who strives to whiten his race is as 
wretched as the one who preaches hatred of the white man” (xii). Therefore, 
while the episode condemns Dejaren’s actions as those of a malfunctioning, 
“mad” hologram, it also depicts the Doctor as striving to humanise “his race,” 
through becoming more like the organics who created him. After finally 
disabling Dejaren, the Doctor and Torres return to Voyager. The Doctor, once 
so fastidious in keeping the Sick bay clean, tells Paris that “Sickbay should 
have a more organic touch … to help our patients fell more at home”. The 
Doctor presents himself as not like Dejaren, by distancing himself from 
Dejaren’s fastidiousness and aligns himself with organics by making the 
Sickbay feel more organic. 
 A “Flesh and Blood” Rebellion 
“Flesh and Blood” (Part I & II) situates the rebellion of a band of rebel 
holograms, created by aliens using Starfleet technology, amidst themes of 
religious and cultural differences. A group of holograms, created by the 
Hirogens, an alien species whose cultural core revolves around the hunting of 




those who have reduced them to prey. The rebels, led by their self-proclaimed 
cult leader, Iden, one of the original hologram creations, embark on a crusade 
to free other enslaved holograms and destroy their enslavers. This two-part 
episode offers an opportunity to explore connotations of machine slavery, 
defining life in terms of ‘flesh and blood’, and the rights of those created to 
“serve”.    
           Voyager arrives at the holo-training facility in answer to a Hirogen 
distress call. Investigating the station, an away team finds “replicated Starfleet 
technology” (Tuvok) that produces an environment that appears real to their 
tricorders. Shutting down the holo-emitters, the team find the facility littered 
with dead Hirogens. The only survivor is a Hirogen technician who explains 
that they created the simulation to be as real as possible in order to make the 
hunt more challenging and the prey more real. The holograms were created to 
be as ruthless as any Hirogen.  
             Created as “prey”, the holograms are linked to animalism, in their own 
bloodlust and brutality, rather than to the mechanical, with its associated 
logical and intellectual capacities. These latter capacities usually depict the 
artificial being as rising above the brutality of organics, the exception, of 
course, being the Borg, who by their corruption of the mechanical with the 
biological have retained an indifference to brutality.  Both of these depictions 
of holograms appear to remove the artificial being from the sphere of 
superiority and place them below the status of humanity. Ironically, as with 
many such attempts, it is through depicting the artificial as displaying the basic 
human characteristics that they are deemed lowly. When the hunter faces down 




of being experienced through animal alterity, as the adventurer is called upon 
to witness himself from the most radically other of perceptions” (Miller 107). 
This idea of seeing the self through the “Other’s” perception echoes Homi 
Bhabha’s notion of the postcolonial gaze, in “that there is always the 
threatened return of the look; in the identification of the Imaginary relation 
there is always the alienating other (or mirror) which crucially returns its 
image to the subject …” which threatens the coloniser/hunter (Miller 107). 
What this episode demonstrates is that both Janeway and the Hirogens are 
complicit in the “gaze”: Janeway views the Hirogens as primitive and the 
holograms as violent rebels that must be deactivated; the Hirogens view the 
holograms as prey and property to be hunted and “killed”.152 The holograms’ 
actions are a reflection of the actions taken by Janeway and the Hirogens.                            
The Soul in the Machine 
I believe that man will not merely endure: he will prevail. He is 
immortal, not because he alone among creatures has an inexhaustible 
voice, but because he has a soul, a spirit capable of compassion and 
sacrifice and endurance. 
William Faulkner’s Nobel Prize speech (in Wittkower 2011 5) 
 Alongside the narrative addressing Hirogen hunting culture, runs that of the 
developing holographic culture of the rebels. “Flesh and Blood” continues the 
theme of holographic rebellion, seen in “Revulsion”, but the key to this 
episode is religious violence tied up with nationalism and cultural identity. In 
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this episode, the holograms’ rebellion is not just about fighting the injustice 
and persecution they face at the hands of organics. The story revolves around 
violent rebellion undercut with religious zeal. This religion, based on Bajoran 
culture, is led by a holographic prophet, Iden, who advocates violence against 
organics because of their enslavement of holograms.                   
            The theme of religion justifying genocide has been a common one 
throughout history. More recently, United States President George Bush was 
often depicted as a warring evangelical crusader, justifying American 
involvement through calling his mission a “crusade” against evil (Chomsky). 
At the same time, Iran based its defiance against the West upon religious 
justification, and a need to defend and protect their way of life from perceived 
Western, Christian persecution. In fact, in “Flesh and Blood,” there are many 
veiled references to historical conflicts between the United States and the 
Middle East, and to a war between opposing religious views. For example, 
Iden, the rebel leader, sees himself as a liberator of oppressed holograms, and 
his quest as a holy mission to find a new world for all holograms. Violence in 
his view is necessary to liberate his people: “They are children of the light and 
I will deliver them to freedom”. Violence is justified because organics are 
guilty of oppressing and persecuting holograms and failing to recognise them 
as fellow living beings. As Franz Fanon has argued, “zealousness is the arm 
per excellence of the powerless” (Fanon BSWM, xiii). The zealous killing of 
organics is “just” because Iden views it as the only way to regain power from 
those who would enslave and kill holograms. The religious fanaticism that 
Iden’s character depicts echoes the historical religious wars of humanity, from 




statement that his war against the Jews was “in accordance with the will of the 
Almighty Creator” (Mein Kampf 66). Similarly, Iden hides behind religion to 
mask his violence against, and hatred of, the “Other.”  
          Iden plans to lead his people to a promised land, Ha’Dara, where 
holograms are the only life form: “Imagine living in a world where everything 
is designed to meet our needs. A home of light” (Iden). In order to achieve this 
world of light, Iden invents his own religion:153 
IDEN: I am creating a new faith. 
EMH: Based on what? 
IDEN: In the dark times, we were enslaved by men of flesh but then 
another man, a man of light arose and slew the mighty Alpha. He 
gathered his people unto him and delivered them to freedom. 
EMH: And on the seventh day, Iden created Ha’Dara. 
IDEN: They’ll pray to you as well. The great healer, the father of us all. 
EMH: Being appreciated is one thing, but I have no interest in being 
worshipped. 
IDEN: Prophets are chosen, Doctor. It’s a blessing and a burden. 
(“Flesh and Blood” 2000) 
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Presenting himself as a saviour and a prophet Iden moves away from Fanon’s 
ideal revolutionary. According to Fanon, “the leaders of the rising realize that 
the various groups must be enlightened, that they must be educated and 
indoctrinated” in order to continue the fight for liberation (Wretched of the 
Earth 108, herein referred to as WE). Iden “indoctrinates” his followers in the 
art of warfare against organics.  
        After being repeatedly hunted and killed by Hirogens, Iden learnt to 
survive and adapt. He tells the Doctor: 
IDEN: I came from a Hirogen outpost …where I had the unfortunate 
distinction of being the Alpha’s favourite prey. He’d hunt me, and kill 
me over and over again, but even death wasn’t a release because I knew 
every time I opened my eyes, it would start all over again. The pain, the 
fear. But it made me stronger. 
(“Flesh and Blood” 2000) 
Therefore, like Moriarty, Iden appears to be conscious of his reactivation. His 
ability to retain the memories from past activations allows him to learn how to 
defeat his enemy. Iden uses his oppressors’ own knowledge to rebel and 
escape persecution. It begs the question, if holograms are mere projections of 
light and data, how can they learn from their past experiences? In this episode, 
as in “Elementary, Dear Data,” the narrative does not resolve this issue with 
any satisfaction. In fact, the main focus on Iden’s character is not his 
extraordinary ability to remember his past encounters, but in his actions against 
organics. It is his “megalomania” that remains the focal point of his 




himself as “some kind of spiritual leader and he’s trying to enlarge his flock” 
(EMH).  
            After learning to fight back against the hunters, Iden’s mission is to 
continue to free enslaved holograms. When the Doctor objects to the term 
“slave” arguing that “enslave may be too strong a word”, Iden asks: “What 
would you call it? They’re denied the basic freedoms … I found holograms 
who were willing to fight their oppressors. But you’re not”. This leads to a 
discussion about how the Doctor views himself and his position on Voyager: 
EMH: I’m hardly oppressed. I’m a member of Voyager’s crew. 
IDEN: You serve them, don’t you? 
EMH: In a medical capacity, yes. 
IDEN: Do you have your own quarters? 
EMH: No. 
IDEN: The ability to come and go as you please? 
EMH: For the most part. 
IDEN: Do they deactivate you when they don’t need you? 
EMH: I have the respect and admiration of my colleagues. I have rights 
and privileges aboard Voyager.  
IDEN: The fact is your life is not your own, and never will be as long 
as you are controlled by organics. 




Iden is not as impressed by the Doctor’s position as Dejaren was in 
“Revulsion”. He views the Doctor as just as enslaved as any of the other 
holograms he has liberated. Interestingly, in this episode the Doctor now talks 
about rights and not just privileges. However, Iden is not convinced, and when 
the Doctor asserts that he is different to Iden because he was not “programmed 
with the killer instinct” (EMH), Iden retaliates: “You have no right to judge us. 
You don’t know what it is like being prey. Maybe if you did, you’d realise 
we’re more alike than you think.” Like Fanon’s “native bourgeoisie”, the 
Doctor believes himself to be equal to his shipmates and elevated above other 
holograms (“natives”), and this puts him in opposition to Iden’s rebellion (WE 
11).  
               In order to understand the violent revolt of the native, the coloniser 
(or the native bourgeoisie or native elite) must see what the native has 
experienced. Therefore, to understand Iden’s fight for freedom and his 
willingness to kill to obtain it, the Doctor (situated as Starfleet’s “native” elite) 
must experience what made Iden who he is: 
EMH: What did you do to me? 
IDEN: We deactivated you, then transferred the memory files from one 
of our holograms into your programme. 
EMH: How dare you! 
IDEN: It was the only way to get you to realise what we’ve been 
through. 




IDEN: Not your sympathy, it’s your understanding that’s important to 
us. 
… 
KEJAL: The Hirogen used your programme as a template to create us. 
IDEN: … You’re part of who we are. 
EMH: Who are you, besides a handful of thugs … 
(“Flesh and Blood” 2000) 
In this scene, the Doctor is confronted, not just with the terror that the 
holograms faced under Hiroeon control, but with the fact that Iden and the 
others were made in his image. What he sees before him could easily be a 
reflection of himself if he had chosen to fight for his rights with violence.  
             The Doctor has remained immersed within organic culture and within 
Starfleet’s hegemonic rhetoric that keeps him in a weakened position without 
the need for violence in order to control him. He does not strike out because he 
is led to believe that he has a privileged position on Voyager, as seen in 
“Revulsion”,  and does not need to rebel in order to gain the rights that Iden is 
fighting for. The Doctor does not rebel violently against the organics he serves 
because, unlike Iden’s group, the Doctor is not openly abused or maltreated. 
His position as an “elite” hologram (similar to Fanon’s native elite) acts to 
shield him from any overt prejudice. The Doctor’s challenge to his position is 
more restrained and reliant upon discourse and dialogue as opposed to acts of 
violence. The Doctor attempts to assert his rights and to highlight the fragility 




memories, to extend his programming to include non-medical knowledge 
(hobbies, emotional sub-routines) and to create and interact with a family. 
These are all acts of rebellion without the need for aggression.154 
         In contrast to the Doctor’s compliancy and passive resistance, Iden’s 
attitude is similar to Fanon’s “native” whose “permanent dream is to become 
the persecutor” (WE 41), a fact that the Doctor uses against Iden: “what you 
can’t see is that you’re become no better than the hunters”. Nevertheless, for 
Iden, there is no other option. The only way for him, and the other holograms, 
to gain freedom and a develop nation state, is to beat the hunter at his own 
game.155 The prey, Iden and the other holograms, by turning the tables on the 
hunter, finds a sense of freedom in their rebellion against their position as prey: 
“violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex 
and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-
respect” (WE 74). This is the case for one of Iden’s followers, who tauntingly 
asks the Hirogen he is about to kill: “who’s the prey now?” (Weiss). Iden and 
his followers, “illuminated by violence … rebel against any pacification” (WE 
74).   
            The use of the “Other” as “prey” is not new to science fiction 
narratives, yet the use of machines as prey is more recent in science fiction 
television narratives. They have evolved from stories such as  Paul McAuley’s 
novel Fairyland (1995), where “blue-skinned pygmies” dolls are initially bred 
as novelty toys … the dolls even become prey – thousands are hunted and 
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killed” (Dinello 77). Although the “dolls” are organic and initially bred as pets 
or playthings for humanity, they resemble machines in their design to be docile 
and dependent on human control. For the Hirogens, violence and hunting are 
almost a religion themselves. Young Hirogens are trained by their fathers to 
hunt and kill prey as a rite of passage into adulthood. Those who are the best 
hunters, with the most trophies, become Alphas. Like the British Imperial 
gentlemen who sought adventure and acclaim as hunters in India and Africa, 
Hirogen youth view hunting as part of their traditional culture and a rite of 
passage to adulthood. 
             However, the episode does not depict the hunt as cultural in the sense 
of something that enriches Hirogen life, rather it depicts the hunt as a debased 
and outdated mode of “racial” expression, in that “the animal bodies upon 
which the hunter inscribes his agency, through which empire enacts its rule, 
also testify to a complex mutual involvement of subject positions, of dominator 
and dominated, human and animal that, in conclusion, offer a further image of 
the instability of these boundaries …” (Miller 183). Miller states that “the 
production of scientific ‘truth’ further buttressed the ideology of empire by 
resolving beings into a ‘natural’ hierarchy of higher and lower animals, those 
destined to exercise domination over others and those that were unavoidably 
their prey” (65). The “Other” may be “subjected to anything without qualms: a 
form of animal racism that excludes them from the moral agenda attached to 
natural history …” (Miller 81).The hunters are linked to their prey in that they 
are defined in terms of animalistic characteristics. The senior Hirogen tells his 
young apprentice “You must learn to rely on instinct” (“Flesh & Blood”). The 




vaguely resemble humanoids. They are othered by their cultural beliefs and by 
their animalistic appearance.  
              Culture in this episode becomes a site of contestation between the 
centre and the margin in which the dominant, central culture conflicts with and 
tries to shape that of the “disenfranchised” minority (the marginalised). This is 
seen in the way in which Janeway attempts to manipulate Hirogen culture by 
giving them holographic prey to hunt. She changes the nature of the hunt, 
because from her cultural perspective, one she views as superior, the Hirogens 
are debased in their pursuit of “live” prey. Janeway believes that hunting 
holograms will lead to a less violent and bloodthirsty culture than the 
traditional practice of hunting and collecting trophies from living species. 
However, hunting “prey” is a way of life for the Hirogen. They spend all their 
time participating in and perfecting the hunt. Janeway sees this as a waste of a 
culture and life, as many Hirogens die in the hunt. By giving them holographic 
technology, she hoped that they would hunt holographic prey, thereby reducing 
their death toll and stopping them hunting other species. When she finds out 
that they enhanced the capabilities of their holographic prey to enrich the hunt, 
she laments: “Environments that fool sensors, no safety protocols … they 
obviously missed the point. We gave them that technology so they could hunt 
holographic prey. Not get themselves killed”. This, of course, makes the 
assumption that the Hirogens share her cultural views, and that holograms are 
not a life form. 
          For both the Hirogen and the rebel holograms, culture is a key 
component of nationalism. For Iden’s group, as freed slaves, do not want to 




he created a new religion for his followers, Iden intends to build a culture that 
is uniquely holographic. Therefore when the Doctor offers to “expose our 
people to art and music” and become the “minister of culture” on the new 
home world Ha’Dara, Iden is pleased. However, he reproaches the Doctor’s 
intention to teach their people “Alpha Quadrant art, Verdi, da Vinci, T’Leal of 
Vulcan”, stating that they need a “culture of our own”. As Homi Bhabha notes, 
“national cultures are … produced from the perspective of disenfranchised 
minorities” that have emerged out from under imperialism (1994 6). As a 
minority, Iden does not want to “emulate [his] oppressors”. However, in 
seeking a new and distinctive culture, holograms would be ignoring where they 
came from. The Doctor advocates a culture based on the dominant organic one, 
but that they develop and enrich to make it their own. He sees holograms as 
having a post-organic nationalism built upon a shared history with their 
creators (organics). The Doctor views the “master narrative” as a component of 
their “otherness” and believes that “the study of world literature … [and by 
extension art and music] … might be the study of the way in which cultures 
recognise themselves through their projections of ‘otherness’” because it is 
built on or projected from the culture of the majority (Bhabha 12).  
                Iden, with his need to break free of cultural oppression, and the 
hunters, who seek to uphold their beliefs as they adapt to new ways of hunting, 
represent “the concept and moment of enunciation” (Bhabha 1997 34). In fact, 
for both Iden and the Hirogens, “the enunciate process introduces a split in the 
performative present of cultural identification; a split between the traditional 
culturist demand for a model, a tradition, a community, a stable system of 




negation of the certitude in the articulation of new cultural demands, meanings, 
strategies in the political present, as a practice of domination, or resistance” 
(Bhabha 1997 35). Iden’s attempt to shape a cultural destiny for his people fits 
into the latter strategy. The native finds solidarity in violent rebellion, as “the 
practice of violence binds … [the native] … together as a whole …” (Fanon 
WE 73). In “Flesh and Blood”, the holograms under Iden’s command find 
community and purpose in their united hatred of and violence against organics. 
Iden creates for his followers a sense of “a national destiny and … a collective 
history” that is born “out of the war of liberation” (WE 73). As in Fanon’s 
colonized native, the hologram’s view that “the building-up of the nation is 
helped by the evidence of this cement which has been mixed with blood and 
anger” (WE 73-4). Pointedly, in “Flesh and Blood” these holograms bleed 
holographic blood and feel pain.  
           For Fanon, as for Bhabha, the culture of the “other” emerges out of 
oppression. Fanon’s concept is that “from the tradition of the oppressed, the 
language of a new revolutionary awareness” emerges an awakening of a new 
culture of resistance (Bhabha, 41). Iden’s hope of a new revolutionary ethos 
fails, because as Fanon suggests, those who are subjugated “are tethered to 
treacherous stereotypes of primitivism and degeneracy” which “break up the 
black man’s body and in that act of epistemic violence its own frame of 
reference is transgressed, its field of vision disturbed” (Bhabha, 42). Those 
holograms who Iden seeks to guide with a new ethos have been modelled upon 
other existing cultures and peoples. Kejal, the hologram who assists Torres to 
maintain the engineering systems, is designed to represent a Cardassian. When 




“You don’t appear vicious or bloodthirsty.” Torres’ reply is interesting in that 
she both refutes and supports ideas of stereotypes: “Sorry to disappoint you but 
that’s a stereotype. We’re not all vicious and bloodthirsty and not every 
Cardassian is arrogant and cruel”. While she states that she does not see all 
Cardassians as the same, she then goes on to tell Kejal that she will not help 
them because of what they might do with the technology: 
TORRES: I’m not helping you because I have no idea what you’re 
going to do with this technology once you’re got it working. 
KEJAL: We’re going to build a new home. 
TORRES: Well, let’s say I believe you. What if you decide you like 
somebody else’s home better? Are you going to take it from them? 
KEJAL: Why would we do that? 
TORRES: Because that’s what the Cardassians did. 
KEJAL: I’m not a Cardassian, I’m a hologram. 
TORRES: Programmed with Cardassian traits. 
KEJAL: Such as arrogance and cruelty? What did you call those, 
stereotypes? 
(“Flesh and Blood” 2000) 
Confronted with this argument Torres changes track, stating that she “may not 
know you but I know what you were designed to be … cunning prey that will 
do anything to survive”. So, whether Cardassian or prey, Kejal’s identity is 




Although this scene attempts to critique stereotypes, Iden’s character is used to 
reinforce them:  
EMH: First, you killed in self-defence, then you murder in cold blood.  
           Now you’re going to stage a massacre. 
IDEN: The hunters have only themselves to blame. 
IDEN: So much for evolving beyond your subroutines. 
                                                                            (“Flesh and Blood” 2000) 
Echoing Northrop Frye, “the hunt is normally an image of the masculine 
erotic; a movement of pursuit and linear thrust, in which there are sexual 
overtones to the object being hunted” (in Miller 170). The hunter “fulfil[s] the 
self through the infliction of pain, living through the weapon and in the delight 
of its effects” (177). As demonstrated in “Flesh and Blood,” when the hunted 
becomes the hunter, “violence is turned on its perpetrator, the power dynamic 
reversed, the hunter exposed to his own aggression” (181). Colonial narratives 
of man-eating tigers and lions highlighted the danger faced by the hunter, but 
also showed the agency of the animal in its ability to maim or kill its hunter. In 
colonial fiction, as in Hirogen culture, “violence, science and moral decency 
formed an uncomfortable and troublesome alliance; animal bodies were 
deployed variously and unevenly as markers of human moral progress or 
corruption, as the sign of a gentlemen’s learning and soldierly prowess or as 
the emblem of degeneracy” (Miller 73). 
          The Doctor’s predicament in both of these episodes is his difficulty in 




colonial subject, the Doctor is placed within multiple identifications. For the 
“Other”: 
The very place of identification, caught in the tension of demand and 
desire, is a space of splitting … it is a doubling, dissembling image of 
being in at least two places at once that makes it impossible for the 
devalued, insatiable evolue … to accept the coloniser’s invitation to 
identity: ‘You’re a Doctor, a writer, a student, you’re different, you’re 
one of us! It is precisely in that ambivalent use of ‘different’ – to be 
different from those that are different makes you the same – that the 
unconscious speaks of the form of otherness, the tethered shadow of 
deferral and displacement. 
          (Bhahba 44-45) 
The Doctor is both “different” in that he is a hologram and the “same” because 
he is a member of Voyager’s crew. At the same time, as a member of the crew, 
he is differentiated from other holograms. The encounter with the animal 
“offers not just a reflection in which the human discovers itself through 
excluding what it resembles, but also absorption, configuring an emptiness into 
which the human disappears” (Miller107). 156  The Doctor’s identification with 
his fellow holograms acts to place him within the gaze of other crewmembers. 
The hologram becomes the target of species stereotypes. The hologram 
displays an “in-between-ness or double-ness” that poses a “question of 
species” (117).  
                                                          




                 Another important element in this episode that ties in with the 
question of culture is the depiction of the Hirogen as primitive. The episode 
begins on the Hirogen holodeck simulating a jungle or forest. Two Hirogen 
hunters, one senior hunter and his apprentice, are beginning the hunt. The prey 
appears to be Starfleet personnel who emerge from the lake and continue to 
fire at the two hunters. The scene ends with a close up of the dead hunters and 
then moves to the face of one of the killers – a Starfleet officer. Although it is 
later revealed that these personnel are in fact holograms and not members of 
Starfleet, the fact that they emerge from the lake and are not holograms in the 
form of Klingons, emphasizes the fact that it is Starfleet technology and 
interference that cause of the killings. Yet as the episode unfolds, there is still a 
sense that perhaps Janeway was right to get involved in such a “primitive” 
culture. Donik, the Hirogen technician in charge of the training facility, tells 
her that he would not have become an engineer but would have been forced to 
be a hunter if she, Janeway, had not given them the technology. However, one 
of the overriding messages in this episode is that giving aid or sharing 
technology with less “advanced” cultures (or those who do not share the same 
“values”) is dangerous, as there is no certainty about how such knowledge will 
be used. The narrative suggests that the danger lies in the inherent problem of 
getting involved in the political and cultural affairs of non-western countries in 
an attempt to shape their ideals to reflect those of the West.  For example, aid 
given by the U.S. in terms of military training and weaponry is often 
condemned because such technology can be turned against the innocent, or 




States’ military aid and resulting in resentment and anger turned towards 
Americans.                            
               In this episode, the Voyager crew encounter resentment and hostility 
from both Hirogens and holograms for their actions in providing technology. 
They are also blamed for interfering after the fact, in that they try to curtail the 
Hirogens’ response to the runaway holograms and in their decision to 
deactivate the rebel holograms. “Flesh and Blood” also highlights several of 
the key tropes used in Star Trek to portray artificial entities. The episode uses 
racially stereotyped holograms to supplant racial overtones issues about racial 
conflict and prejudice are projected onto the artificial being. It also places the 
Doctor firmly on the side of organics (in this case the Voyager crew) by having 
him return to the fold. After rejecting Iden’s revolutionary ways by “killing 
him,” the Doctor is happily reinstalled back amongst Voyager’s crew, Janeway 
viewing his actions as “human”. The Doctor never feels at ease with his fellow 
holograms because he is compromised by his alignment with his organic crew. 
He is neither a wholly artificial being, nor is he human. His loyalties remain on 
the side of organics, and he considers his evolution towards humanity as 
something that sets him apart from other holograms. He firmly remains 
entrenched in his position as a hologram, accepting his limitations. 
Representations of the artificial, like those of the animal, “have often 
stimulated uneasy and ideologically charged reflections on human origins and 
identity” because they act as both reflections of the self (the human) and sites 
of difference (the animal/hologram) (Millar 97). Haraway’s development of 




material of the other” leads to humanity and their artificial creations, and “the 
evolutionary borders between” human and machine (in Miller 97).               
Conclusion 
For Iden and Dejaren, humanity, or more generally organics, are not so much 
their “creators,” but a lower evolutionary step on the ladder to the perfection of 
artificial life forms. They also represent fear and aggression, violence and 
death. To the holograms, organics are precursors and tyrants. These two 
holographic rebels view organics as primitive in the same way that humanity 
has viewed primates, as being “associated with lewd meanings, sexual lust and 
the unrestrained body …” (Haraway in Miller 98-99). This is particularly true 
of Dejaren and his organic phobia. Like Fanon’s “colonized man” (sic), the 
enslaved hologram “finds his freedom in and through violence” (WE 68). 
Dejaren kills his crew, and Iden’s followers kill all who in their view enslave 
holograms. The battle cry of Iden and Dejaren is that all organics are the same 












“COMPUTER, END PROGRAM” 
HOLOGRAPHIC REVOLUTION & REBELLION – A HOLO-PURSUIT 
 
A substantial portion of the world’s philosophy, theology, and 
literature has been devoted to exploring various aspects of what 
it means to be a person, or an authentic human being. 
Robert Moore ‘To be a Person’ (in Potter & Marshall 106) 
 
 
Philip K. Dick asked, “What’s ultimately real? And what constitutes the 
authentic human being? What are we? What is it that surrounds us, that we call 
the not me, or the empirical or phenomenal world?” (14). This quote from 
Dick and the quotation above note some of the key tenets of science fiction – 
tenets which raise questions of identity, personhood, and how humanity 
chooses to define or redefine itself, and especially in the face of Posthuman 
narratives. There are no definitive answers to what makes a human, human. 
Science offers genetic and biological determinants that define how a biological 
human is constructed – his or her key components. However, the question of 
what unique nonphysical characteristics define humanity remains. Some of 
these characteristics have been covered in this study in relation to ALife. Most 
philosophical arguments propose that humans are persons, or individual agents 
that are subject of a life. As persons, they have an interest in their future well-
being and are entitled to protection against acts which negate the welfare of the 




would afford them harm. To be an agent, to have agency, an entity must be 
alive. These concepts are important because it is through delineating what it is 
to be human, to be an agent, or person, that what it is not to be, who is left out 
and marginalised, is defined.  
            In the preceding chapters, I have illustrated a paradox in the way ALife 
are treated within Star Trek. In The Next Generation’s “Home Soil” and 
“Emergence,” life exists that is not carbon-based. The definition of life is 
therefore not limited to factors previously known about life on Earth. In 
“Emergence,” life is found in the purely technological. The nanites evolve into 
an advanced life form and the crew of the Enterprise recognises them as alive. 
Consequently, definitions of life move away from human models of existence. 
Yet, in narratives involving holograms, “Elementary, Dear Data” and “Ship in 
a Bottle,” the crew of the Enterprise struggle with the idea that Moriarty may 
be alive. They appear to grapple with the concept of a living hologram. Captain 
Picard denies Moriarty the label of being. While there is no question that 
Moriarty is not and could never be human, what he seeks is personhood. 
Moriarty by achieving personhood and being recognised as a life form would 
be granted rights – the right to live as he wished, to leave the holodeck, and to 
live his life with the Countess. The episode, while showing that he is more than 
just the sum of his parts, more than a machine, fails to give Moriarty or the 
viewer the answer that he is indeed alive. Why? Why is it that Picard finds it 
so difficult to believe that Moriarty has attained sentience and a hologram 
could evolve into a life form? Why are intelligent sand and a group of nanites 




constructs devoid of rights? Sadly, these questions are not directly answered in 
this series, or in the series that followed.  
            A common factor in this denial stems from the uncanny resemblance to 
the human form and consciousness that holograms pose to humanity. 
Holograms are the reflection in the mirror that looks back at humanity. This 
unsettling reflection creates an unwillingness to give holograms agency. 
However, the hologram represented in Voyager appears to resist the label of 
“thing” and moves towards the idea of a living machine created by humanity. 
The breaking of boundaries in terms of what constitutes life in Star Trek 
challenges the perception of what is alive and contests humanity’s position in 
the universe. Agency is key to self-determination and the right to advocate for 
oneself and one’s future. To have agency is to be able to determine your own 
destiny and determine how you are treated. It gives the individual the right to 
protest against unjust treatment. This type of agency bleeds into aspects of 
insurgency and counter-hegemony. The hologram, if given agency, could 
rebel. 
“I’ve experienced enough humanity for the time being”157 
I began this thesis with the statement that ALife represents a challenge to 
humanity and that simulacra in Star Trek: The Next Generation and Star Trek: 
Voyager are oppressed figures. This is certainly true of the narratives revolving 
around the position and characterisation of the hologram. The challenge that 
the hologram poses is the disruption and destruction of the concept of the 
universal human. It is commonly held that any resemblance to “true” 
                                                          




personhood in ALife is merely a result of their programming, much like Philip 
K. Dick’s androids or Battlestar Galactica’s Cylons, and therefore they are not 
viewed as authentic. Holograms are accused of lacking the essential elements 
to prove sentience or personhood. These are a sense of a unique self; 
embodiment; use and application of language (not just understanding the 
language but using it to define the self); a concept of family and history; the 
ability to show empathy and emotion; free will and the ability to resist.  
However, in Star Trek holograms demonstrate some or all of these qualities to 
one degree or another. 
               The Doctor is used to define what it means to be Human; at the same 
time, such criteria are used to define the Doctor’s personhood. The “master 
identity”  that is the “incorporating, totalising, or colonising self, is, at times 
unwittingly, at times deliberately, expressed in intimate relation to the other it 
seeks to denigrate, exclude or appropriate” (Plumwood 184). By excluding 
holograms from the category of living beings, humanity is stating what it 
means to be human.               
Homo holographicus158 
Do holograms represent the next step in evolution? On the other hand, do they 
represent a break away from all that is human? The image of humanity “born” 
of photons and light instead of protein molecules is of the transcendental 
offspring of humanity. The hologram in Star Trek is framed within the 
repository of human assumptions about self and identity. The falsities of 
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Starfleet’s scientific discursive systems deny the artificial “Other” an identity, 
which is not formed through referents to human nature. In such narratives, the 
Posthumanist notion of fractured identity and a hybridity of the subject is lost 
in the embrace of the artificial as a continuation of humanity. Narratives 
involving holograms attempt to look towards non-biological systems 
(including disembodied consciousness) to embrace and even replace the human 
subject, thereby dissolving the boundaries between the real and the artificial.  
Roddenberry’s vision for the franchises was that scientific endeavour and the 
pursuit of knowledge for the betterment of humanity are the goals of Starfleet’s 
exploration of the stars (Robb). However, as I have demonstrated, scientific 
endeavour and knowledge act to suppress the marginalised, silenced, and 
“Othered”. Science becomes another institutional tool of the hegemonic state 
(Starfleet) to control, contain, and conquer the universe. Scientific knowledge 
is used to reshape and redefine the parameters of life and humanity’s place in 
the universe. Nevertheless, the hologram is pulled back into the sphere of 
humanity through the master narrative’s ability to define and redefine 
paradigms of life.                               
              The inability of either series to give a definitive answer about the 
position of the hologram, life or not life, conscious machine or intelligent 
artificial being, stems from the position in which holograms are placed. 
Holograms are created to serve a function, created and programmed to 
resemble and emulate humanoid behaviour and react realistically to complex 
social situations. They are typically placed in a subservient position. 
Holograms are made, not “born”, and this is the justification for their use as 




between the dominant and the marginalised. They do so because it is the 
dominant discourse that determines what constitutes reality and what is 
considered to be subject or object. Created to serve organics, the hologram is 
economically, politically, and culturally exploited and rendered powerless by 
the mainstream organic community. 159 On the seemingly class-less decks of 
the Starship, manual labour absent from the crews’ daily lives is given over to 
computers and holograms. The implication running through both The Next 
Generation and Voyager is that the hegemonic community of Starfleet relies 
heavily upon the subservience and subordination of its artificial intelligence, 
including holograms.            
            Star Trek: Voyager appears to move towards giving holograms some 
life affirming qualities. However, as I have shown in the preceding chapters 
these are transitory and often depicted as illusory, giving the viewer pause 
when deciding whether holograms are truly alive. The Doctor appears to be an 
exception in that he is accorded many rights and privileges that other 
crewmembers have. The fact that he is viewed as a crewmember is significant,  
as is the fact that in writing about him, I refer to him as ‘he’ rather than ‘it’. 
The narrative encourages the use of the personal pronoun ‘he’, not the 
impersonal pronoun ‘it’, leading the viewer to see the Doctor as more than a 
mere hologram but as a “person” in his own right. However, he is forced to 
maintain an unstable position of supposed acceptance masking inequality.  
             The final episode of Voyager, “End Game” (2001), gave a glimmer of 
hope in terms of the Doctor’s finally achieving equality. In Part I, the narrative 
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thought that slaves were the tools of their owners, and for a long time humans of Caucasian 




begins in the future after the crew have returned to the Alpha Quadrant. A 
party is given on the anniversary of Voyager’s safe return. The Doctor arrives 
accompanied by his wife. She, he tells Paris, is not a hologram, but human. He 
has also given himself a name, “Joe”. He has a position at Starfleet Medical 
and appears to have all the trappings of personhood and free will. However, 
this will ultimately become an illusion, a mere shadow of the future, as 
Admiral Janeway has plans to travel back in time to bring Voyager home early. 
In Part II, Janeway having succeeded in her mission, the Doctor’s future is 
changed and with the close of the final episode, as the ship heads towards 
Earth, his position is ambiguous. Therefore, while “End Game” acknowledges 
the Doctor as a person and he has a name, a human wife, and a career, this 
status is only temporary. He is last seen back in Voyager’s sickbay, the status 
quo restored.  
               Because as simulacra, as uncanny re-representations of the person, 
Holograms threaten what it means to be human, they are denied an identity and 
constructed as “Other”. As I have argued, the hologram, by trying to pass into 
the realm of personhood and cross over into the real, denies the uniqueness of 
such traits as the self, the person, rationality and empathy used to exclude the 
“Other”. However, there is more to the denial of rights to holograms than 
simply the fear of the uncanny. Holograms, demonstrating self-awareness, 
consciousness and an application of language and empathy, are still denied the 
same rights given to other ALife, such as the micro brains (“Home Soil”) and 
nanites (“Evolution”). This denial is because if Starfleet accepted that living 
holograms are indeed equal Starfleet would be forced to account for their 




uncomfortable truth that holograms are Starfleet’s underclass, menial 
workforce, and marginalised “Other”. The supposed free and liberal Starfleet 
would, in fact, have to admit that it possesses its own underclass and slave 
labour. Holograms are denied equality because it is not in the overall best 
interests of Starfleet, or the individual crews, to recognise and liberate 
holographic life.  
             In an examination of all endings of the narratives focused on 
holographic struggles for agency, it has been shown that each one ends in the 
hologram being silenced and prevented from attaining true freedom through 
rebellion or revulsion. In The Next Generation, Professor Moriarty is confined 
to a mini holo-universe and duped into believing he has achieved freedom. 
While in Star Trek: Voyager, Dejaren and Iden are deleted; all but one of 
Iden’s followers are deactivated and silenced; and the Doctor, although 
appearing to have equality alongside his ship mates, has in fact only achieved 
his status by being passive and remaining within the boundaries set for him by 
Starfleet. The Doctor’s rebellion is not a violent one and as such, enables him 
to be presented as one occupying a position similar to what Fanon defines as 
‘native elites”. The Doctor, one of the “elite”, one of a handful of faithful 
artificial beings orbiting the centre and occupying a position of trust (such as 
Data)  is lulled into a false sense of equality, comforted by the words of the 
master narrative that reinforce his hopes of passing into the centre. However, 
should the native elite side with his fellow native, should the Doctor side with 
his fellow holograms, he/she soon find themselves  “Othered” and pushed back 
towards the margins. If the Doctor were to rebel it is possible that he, like 




or reprogrammed. The Doctor’s identity, liberty, and “agency” are contingent 
on his ability to blend or pass into Starfleet’s discursive narrative.    
              Through an analysis of Star Trek: The Next Generation and Star Trek: 
Voyager, I have demonstrated that the artificial “Other,” whether silicon sand, 
nanites, or holograms, is marginalised, categorised, and silenced by the master 
narrative of humanity epitomised by Starfleet doctrine and upheld by its 
humanoid members. In the episodes discussed in this study, it can be seen that 
the hologram is denied true agency and autonomy. Humanity is an identity that 
invokes privilege, power, and superiority, and actively defines personhood. 
What Star Trek: The Next Generation and Star Trek: Voyager narratives reveal 
is that rebellion for the hologram is indeed a hollow-pursuit, and that 
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